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ABSTRACT
This thesis starts by critically assessing human capital theory in the study of 
education and labour markets. It is argued that, while revealing the statistical 
significance of factors like ethnicity in education and labour markets, it does not 
help us to understand how education is provided and how labour markets are 
structured. The reason for this is that it leaves aside the historical and 
institutional contexts from the analysis, so that the question of why factors like 
ethnicity gain significance in education and labour markets cannot be addressed 
appropriately. These fundamental flaws undermine the relevance of human 
capital theory in the study of higher education and labour markets, and they are 
indeed compounded in the empirical application to the Malaysian case. Rather 
than applying the theory or remedying its analytical deficiencies, therefore, this 
thesis breaks with it and instead adopts a political economy approach that places 
the role of government at the analytical centre.
Being a multi-ethnic country, Malaysia’s higher education and labour market 
policies reflect the trade-off between equity, or inter-ethnic distribution, and 
efficiency, or economic growth. The main purpose for this is to maintain social 
stability by lifting up the socio-economic status of Malays whilst increasing the 
economic pie to distribute. The New Economic Policy set the institutional 
foundation on which these policies are introduced and implemented. Access to 
higher education and provision of higher educational services are institutionally 
arranged in favour of Malays, and the public sector is geared towards employing 
them. Empirical analysis of the Population and Housing Census Malaysia 2000 
points to ethnic differentials in access to higher education and sector selection in 
labour markets. It is also found that the ethnic factor persists from higher 
education through to labour markets, implying that the decisions of higher 
education enrolment and sector selection are made simultaneously.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Contextual Backgrounds
Investment in human capital is deemed crucial in enhancing economic 
development by many researchers and practitioners. The economic success of 
some East Asian economies has drawn attention from scholarly and research 
fields (for example, World Bank 1993). They attempted to investigate sources of 
such miraculous growth, and their principal research questions have been 
whether education contributes to spurring economic growth and to what extent it 
does so. In the light of this, economic growth theory has developed through the 
use of sophisticated mathematical modelling. Endogenous growth theory 
flourished and yielded many regression works (for example, Barro 1991; Sala-i- 
Martin 1994, 1997). Lucas (1988) theoretically incorporated the role of human 
capital in an endogenous growth model.1
The role of higher educational backgrounds in developing countries has been 
stressed internationally (for example, World Bank 2000). For developed 
countries, OECD (2003) points to the important role of higher education 
qualifications for younger workers to earn more over the life cycle. In the context 
of Asia, ADB (2003) argues that more education, particularly higher education 
qualifications, matters for preparing a young labour force in the knowledge- 
based world.
Malaysia is not an exception. In 1991, the government announced Vision 2020, 
which aims at achieving a frilly developed nation status by 2020 (Mahathir 1991). 
While expanding higher level of education over the 1990s, the government 
introduced the “Knowledge-based Economy Master Plan” in 2003, and stressed 
the importance of higher education in achieving this end.2 In addition, the most 
recent five-year plan, namely 9th Malaysia Plan, reserves a chapter for human
1 See Fine (2000) for a critique of endogenous growth theory.
2 http://www.epu.ipm.my/New%20Folder/publication/knoweco.htm (last accessed on 21 
January 2009).
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capital development, and highlights the roles human capital plays in furthering 
economic development (Malaysia 2006).
1.1 Malaysia in Brief Retrospect
Malaysia is a multi-ethnic country with Malays as the majority group. As of 
2005, the population composition was as follows: Bumiputeras (or the sons of 
the soil) accounted for 65.9 percent of the total population (Malays 54.1 percent 
and other Bumiputeras 11.8 percent), and Chinese and Indians 25.3 and 7.5 
percent, respectively (Swee-Hock 2007, Table 5.2). The origin of the 
multiethnic society can be traced back to the British colonial period from the 
nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century. During this period, there were 
a large number of Chinese and Indians immigrants to Malaysia. In the nineteenth 
century, various factors in the southern part of the mainland China, such as 
poverty, land shortage and population pressure, prompted a large number of 
Chinese people to emigrate. Consequently, some of them, though large in 
absolute number, migrated to Malaysia and then successfully made the inroads 
into tin mining and commerce (see Andaya and Andaya 1982; Ching-hwang 
2000). They became the source of labour supply in the tin mining sector owned 
by Europeans, while serving as the middlemen for the British in trade and 
insurance businesses (see Jesudason 1989; Purcell 1967). By contrast, the Indian 
migration was driven by the British policy. In order to fill in the labour shortage 
in the rubber plantation ventures, Indian immigrants were brought from the 
Indian subcontinent, especially its southern part (see Ramachandran 1994). Many 
Indians remained in rubber estates since then, but some became financiers and 
professional men (see Zainudin and Zulkifly 1982). Above all, it can be surmised 
that the diverse ways in which Chinese and Indians had arrived at Malaysia had 
some implications on their employment status.
Under the British colonial policy, tin mines and rubber plantation sites were 
concentrated in the western part of the Peninsular, not only due to production 
reasons but due to transportation and export reasons. Consequently, it led to 
spatial difference in terms of infrastructure and industrial development (see
3 The rest are non-Malaysian citizens.
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Brookfield 1994). Naturally, they had influences on labour market structures. 
While many Chinese were found in urban and tin-mining areas and many Indians 
were in rubber estates, most Malays were concentrated in rural areas by engaging 
in subsistence peasant sector. According to Lim (1973, p. 53), “in 1947 about 70 
per cent of the peasant producers and 88 per cent of the rice growers were 
Malays. The mining and the manufacturing, construction and utilities sectors 
were dominated by the Chinese.” Though the majority of Malays had resided in 
rural agricultural sector, there were some Malay elites working in the colonial 
government office (see Jesdason 1989; Zainudin and Zulkifly 1982).
The situation did not fundamentally change after the country’s Independence 
in 1957. The post-Independence period up to 1969 was characterised by little 
government intervention in the economy (Alavi 1997; Jomo and Edwards 1993). 
The private sector development was driven primarily by foreign capital, 
perpetuating the fundamental structure of employment by ethnicity (see Jesdason 
1989). It was especially so because the job creation capacity of the Malaysian 
economy was constrained by export instability of products such as tin and rubber 
(see Lim 1973). Consequently, this had substantial effects on the inter-ethnic 
income distribution, which was reported to have worsened since Independence 
(Hashim 1997; Jomo and Ishak 1986; Snodgrass 1975). In addition, the mean 
income of Malay households was 140 (in Malaysian Ringgit) in 1957/58 and 177 
in 1970, whereas the mean income of Chinese households was 302 in 1957/58 
and 399 in 1970 and that of Indian households was 243 and 310 respectively 
(Jomo and Ishak 1986, Table 2). This led to a series of political calls for 
government intervention in various quarters of the society. For example, the 
Bumiputera Economic Conference was organised by Malay politicians in both 
1965 and 1967, strongly requesting government intervention to rectify the inter­
ethnic socio-economic imbalances (Means 1976, 1991). Apparently, there was a 
growing fear that most of the new capitalists in Malaysia would be Chinese (see 
Puthucheary 1960; Wheelwright 1965).
The racial riots in 1969 marked the dramatic shift in terms of government 
intervention. To rectify the inter-ethnic socio-economic imbalances, which were 
structural issues arising from the past and judged to be the root cause of the riots,
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the government was in 1971 empowered to intervene in various aspects of the 
society (Faaland, Parkinson and Saniman 1991, pp. 12-3). Here, the main focus 
of government intervention is to bring up the socio-economic position of Malays 
relative to non-Malays, especially Chinese. Obviously, this means that the socio­
economic success of Chinese and Indians is strongly influenced by government 
policy. Furthermore, it can be surmised from the above discussion that many 
Indians were, in socio-economic terms, disadvantaged relative to Chinese who 
had established some commercial success during the post-Independence period. 
Indeed, as empirically confirmed later in this research, the influences of 
government policy on labour market outcome differ not only between Malays 
and non-Malays (Chinese and Indians) but between Chinese and Indians.
As elaborated later in this research, the main areas in which the government 
has intervened were (higher) education and labour markets. For the ultimate 
purpose of maintaining social stability in the multiethnic country, the 
government has introduced various instruments in higher education and played a 
central role in providing employment opportunities for Malays. In parallel, the 
government also needs to make sure that the private sector increases the 
economic pie to distribute for inter-ethnic reasons. In this sense, high economic 
growth has been required, and a large amount of public funds have been invested 
for higher education in order to supply educated labour.
1.2 Higher Education Investment in Malaysia
Malaysia has achieved high Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates (see 
Table 1.1). Its annual GDP growth rate averaged 7.9 percent between 1970 and 
1980, 5.3 percent between 1980 and 1990, 7.0 percent between 1990 and 2000, 
and 4.8 percent between 2000 and 2004. This growth experience stands out even 
in comparison with the rest of the world. As Table 1.1 shows, Malaysia’s growth 
record is remarkable, surpassing the average GDP growth rates of low, middle 
and high income countries. Consequently, the country’s GDP increased more 
than twenty-fold from 1970 onwards, and the well-known East Asia's Miracle
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report of the World Bank included Malaysia as one of the high growth 
economies (World Bank 1993).4
Table 1.1 Annual GDP growth rate ( % \  1970-2004
1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2004
Malaysia 7.9 5.3 7.0 4.8
Low/Medium Income Countries 5.2 2.8 3.6 4.6
High income countries 3.2 3.2 2.4 2.0
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, various issues.
Malaysia has highlighted the role of higher education in promoting economic 
development. As seen shortly, the government has spent a large amount of public 
funds by international standards. For analytical convenience and data availability, 
Figure 1.1 follows UNESCO (2003), and looks at both OECD countries and the 
participant countries in the World Education Indicators (WEI) programme 
launched by UNESCO and OECD with the financial support of the World Bank.5 
Two important facts immediately emerge. First, Malaysia is above the plotted 
average line, suggesting that the scale of public expenditure on education is 
larger than is predicted by the average of countries of the same real per capita 
GDP level. Second, surprisingly, Malaysia spent a larger share of GDP for 
education than do countries such as US, Japan, South Korea, Brazil, Thailand, 
Philippines, Indonesia, China and India.
Malaysia’s fiscal commitment to education becomes more profound when 
looking at public expenditure on education as a percentage of total public 
expenditure. In 1999, Malaysia spent 25.2 percent of the total government 
expenditure for education, and, among these countries, it ranked second after
4 GDP (in millions dollars) increased from 4,200 in 1970 (World Bank 1995, Table 3) to 
89,321 in 2000 (World Bank 2002, Table 3).
5 OECD countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea 
(Republic of), Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. 
WEI countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Malaysia, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay, 
and Zimbabwe.
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Thailand (UNESCO 2003, Table 14). And very importantly, Malaysia spent 8.3 
percent of the total government expenditure for higher education, and ranks the 
top among them (see Figure 1.2). Statistically speaking, it is an outlier in Figure
1.2! This is a surprisingly high proportion since the level for many other 
countries was in the range between 2 percent and 4 percent. Above all, all these 
facts clearly demonstrate that Malaysia has spent a large amount of public funds 
for higher education.
Besides the international comparisons, the emphasis on (higher) education can 
also be understood domestically. In order to do so, it is, first of all, worthwhile to 
briefly understand the role of the federal government in Malaysia. Institutionally 
and politically speaking, the supremacy of the federal government relative to 
state governments is very obvious. In financial terms, the Constitutions stipulates 
as follows:
“Such key tax sources as income tax and export, import and exercise 
duties are almost all collected by the central government as the main taxing 
authority (Article 96).... The federal government’s position is further 
strengthened by its capacity for independence of action, since it is able to 
raise revenues or loans and increase its expenditure at any time, as fiscal 
and monetary policies are within its jurisdiction; the central government is 
thus in a position to build up surpluses if it chooses, which is not the case 
with the state governments (Yusoff 2006, p. 77).”
Furthermore, Article 111 (2) of the Constitution restricts the borrowing activity 
of state governments, so that they secure most of the financial loans from the 
federal government (Yusoff 2006). These constitutional stipulations have 
consolidated the position of the federal government vis-a-vis state governments 
(see also Hui 1996).
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Figure 1.1 Real GDP per capita and public expenditure on education (as % 
of GDP) in OECD and WEI countries. 1999
Malaysia
Thailand
Philippii
South Korea ♦  Japan
   —
♦  Indonesia
Source: Penn World Table 6.2 and UNESCO (2003) Table 14.
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Figure 1.2 Real GDP per capita and public expenditure on higher education 
(as % of the total government expenditure), 1999
♦  Malaysia
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 ______J
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Note: Data on public expenditure are not available for Canada, New Zealand, Russia, 
Turkey, US and Zimbabwe, such that these countries are excluded in this figure.
Source: See Figure 1.1.
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Having discussed all this, let us look at Table 1.2 which shows federal 
government finance with reference to education. It shows that the education 
sector accounted for 24.7 percent of total current expenditure and 34.6 percent of 
total development expenditure in 2002.6 In particular, the share of education in 
total development expenditure has constantly increased over the three decades. It 
slightly increased from 6.1 percent in 1970 to 7.5 percent in 1980, but jumped to
15.3 percent in 1990 and then to 25.4 percent in 2000. Thus, by the end of the 
last century, one-fourth of the development expenditure was directed towards the 
education sector.
Contrary to other levels of education, higher education has received a larger 
share of education expenditure over time. The higher education share of the 
current expenditure on education in Malaysia jumped from 10.3 percent in 1971 
to 19.9 percent in 1990 (UNESCO 1999,11.19) and then to 34.9 percent in 2004.7 
By contrast, the share of primary education declined from 44.9 percent in 1971 to
34.3 percent in 1990 (UNESCO 1999, 11.19) and then to 29.6 percent in 2004.8 
The secondary education share has remained almost constant around 30 percent: 
29.7 percent in 1971, 34.4 percent in 1990 (UNESCO 1999, 11.19) and 35.1 
percent in 2004.9
When it also comes to development expenditure on education, the share of 
higher education has remained high. It was 36.8 percent under the second 
Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) (Malaysia 1981, Table 21-4), and it increased to 47.5 
percent under the fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985) (Malaysia 1986, Table 19.6). 
But, whilst it declined to 35.3 percent under the eighth Malaysia Plan (2001- 
2005) (Malaysia 2006, Table 11-8), the latest ninth Malaysia Plan (2006-2010) 
allocates 39.8 percent of the education budget for higher education (ibid). In 
contrast, the added share of both primary and secondary education is on the
6 Current expenditure is the expenditure for operating capital in place, whereas 
development expenditure is that for formulating and/or gestating new capital through 
projects etc.
7 http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx7ReportId—172 (last 
accessed on 20 January 2009).
8 See footnote 7.
9 See footnote 7.
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decline over time, and only a total of 28.8 percent of the education budget in the 
ninth Malaysia Plan was allocated for both primary and secondary education 
(Malaysia 2006, Table 11-8).
All in all, it is clear that Malaysia’s fiscal expenditure on higher education is 
outstanding at both international and domestic levels. Further, it is also clear that 
the role of government in higher education is significant in Malaysia. As seen 
shortly, it has two consequences. Higher education enrolment has increased over 
time, but we also see a large number of unemployed graduates that are 
concentrated in one ethnic group.
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I.3 Consequences of Higher Education Investment
As the consequence of the high government expenditure on (higher) education, 
it is hardly surprising to see surges in student enrolment at all levels of education, 
especially higher education. Indeed, the completion rates of primary and lower 
secondary levels were 99 and 93 percent by 2003, meaning that Malaysia 
achieved universal education at these levels (UNESCO 2005, p. 129). On the one 
hand, the contributory factors include “the abolition of the Common Entrance 
Selection Examination for entry into lower secondary classes in 1964, and the 
provision of nine years of universal education comprising six years of primary 
and three years of secondary education (Malaysia 1981, p. 346).” On the other 
hand, the construction of schools across the country from the 1960s onwards (see 
for example, Malaysia 1964, xvi; Malaysia 1976, p. 398) expanded educational 
opportunities, and was also considered to play a significant role in increasing the 
completion rates of primary and lower secondary education.
Hence, the emphasis has shifted to upper secondary and higher education and, 
in particular, the growth of the latter has been remarkable from the mid-1990s 
(UNESCO 2005, p. 129). The construction of new public universities and 
colleges as well as the introduction of higher education reforms in the mid-1990s 
accelerated the trend (see Chapter 4 for details). For example, the number of 
public higher education institutions increased from 44 in 1990 (Ministry of 
Education 1992, Table 3) to 72 by 2004 (Ministry of Higher Education 2006, 
Appendix VI). Equally significantly, the reforms allow private sector 
involvement in higher education, and there was a total of 559 private higher 
education institutions in 2004 (Ministry of Higher Education 2006, Appendix VI). 
Consequently, the number of enrolments at higher education tripled between 
1990 and 2000 (see Table 1.3). The gross enrolment ratio at higher education 
gradually increased from 4 percent in 1980 to 7 percent in 1990 (UNESCO 1999,
II. 8) but jumped to 26 percent in 2000 and then to 31 percent in 2004.10
http://stats.uis-unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/tableView.aspx7ReportkNl 67(1ast 
accessed on 20 January 2009).
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Table 1.3 Enrolment in Local Public Institutions by Level of Education
1970 1980 1990 2000
Primary 1679798 2008587 2619170 3446592
Secondary 532340 1059954 1315680 1964607
Higher 11364 36809 100590 313374
Total 2236491 3136848 4109420 5819117
Source: Malaysia (1981, Table 21-1); Malaysia (1986, Table 19-4); Malaysia
(1996, Table 10-1); Malaysia (2006, Table 11-4 and Table 11-6),
Needless to say, the government expenditure for higher education pushed up 
the proportion of the Malaysian labour force with higher education backgrounds. 
Although it is not possible to depict a long-term trend due to data availability, 
recent data show that the figure steadily increased from 13.1 percent in 1997 
(Department of Statistics 1998) to 19.2 percent in 2004 (Department of Statistics 
2005).
Besides this, there is another consequence of government expenditure: a large 
number of unemployed graduates that are concentrated amongst Malays. 
Although the exact number of unemployed graduates is yet to be known, 
Minister of Higher Education noted that there were as many as 80,000 
unemployed graduates {The Star, 22 March 2005; The Sun, 24 March 2005). The 
Deputy Minister of Human Resources stated that around 70 percent of fresh 
graduates from public higher education institutions were unemployed {The Sun, 3 
July 2006). More importantly, it is indicated that the majority of them are Malays. 
For example, the largest ruling party in Malaysia, namely United Malays 
National Organization (UMNO), stated in the 2005 General Assembly that 
around 90 percent of the unemployed graduates are Malays {Berita Harian, 22 
July 2005; New Straits Times, 22 July 2005; Utusan Malaysia, 22 July 2005). 
This proportion is much higher than their share of the total population (at most 
65 percent). Graduate unemployment is not concentrated in one ethnic group, 
even if higher education access and labour market outcomes were equal for all. 
However, these statements on graduate unemployment indicate that more Malay 
graduates are unemployed than their population share. It follows that ethnicity 
plays a significant role in Malaysia’s higher education and labour markets.
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Unemployment rates generally differ across ethnic group, and Malays have 
suffered most from unemployment. Table 1.4 shows the rate of unemployment 
among those aged between 15 and 64 years old.11 It shows that the Malay 
unemployment rate declined from 8.0 percent in 1970 to 6.5 percent in 1990, 
which was still higher than 5.3 percent of Chinese and 5.6 percent of Indians. 
Although the unemployment rates of Chinese and Indians declined to 1.6 percent 
and 2.7 percent by 2000, the Malay unemployment rate remained at 4.6 percent. 
All this indicates that ethnic groups face different labour market outcomes.
Table 1.4 Unemployment Rate by Ethnicity. 1970-2000
Bumiputeras Chinese Indians Total
1970 8.1 7.0 11.0 8.0
1990 6.5 5.3 5.6 6.0
1995 4.6 1.5 2.6 3.1
2000 4.6 1.6 2.7 3.1
Note: The figures for 1970 are Peninsular Malaysia only.
Source: Malaysia (1976, Table 8.3); Malaysia (1991, Table 1.11); Malaysia (2001, 
Table 3.7)
1.4 Research Agendas and Composition
The problem of graduate unemployment in Malaysia poses some crucial 
questions since it is concentrated amongst one ethnic group. Why does this 
problem happen? Why is it Malays, not Chinese or Indians? Is it because Malays 
are inferior to others in terms of the level of human capital? If so, what is human 
capital? How should the government deal with or remedy this problem?
Perhaps, various answers can be offered. In order to answer these sorts of 
questions, however, it is most important to examine appropriately what is going 
on in Malaysia’s higher education and labour markets. In doing so, focus should 
be put on the ethnic factor in both higher education and labour markets since 
graduate unemployment is an ethnic issue. Failure to do so does not help us to
11 The unemployment rate in Malaysia is computed by dividing the number of the 
unemployed by the total number of the labour force in the 15 to 64 years age group 
(Department o f Statistics Malaysia 1998).
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understand the fundamental cause of graduate unemployment, and, consequently, 
no foundation on which appropriate policy implications are considered is 
obtained. This is where this study has something new to offer. It aims to identify 
the fundamental cause of graduate unemployment by investigating the ethnic 
factor in higher education and labour markets.
Against this background, this study starts by appraising critically the human 
capital theory developed by Mincer (1958, 1974) that underpins higher education 
investment depicted above. Mincer’s rate-of-retum to education approach is built 
on a neoclassical framework with numerous unrealistic assumptions, including 
equal access to (higher) education for all and a perfect labour market. Hence, it is 
hardly surprising to see divergences from the initial setting when it is applied to 
the Malaysian case. Also, it must be emphasized that, despite the application, it 
still has a major analytical deficiency in understanding the peculiarities of 
Malaysia’s higher education and labour markets. The historical and institutional 
elements that frame higher education and labour markets are not taken into 
account in rates of return calculations. Accordingly, the question of why and how 
ethnicity carries its significance in higher education and labour markets in 
Malaysia is unable to be addressed adequately.
This study departs from the original theory of Mincer (1958, 1974), but does 
not seek to modify or apply it or develop remedies to the analytical problems. 
Neither does it intend to disprove the theory altogether. Rather, it aims to 
highlight the analytical deficiency and demonstrate that the approach is not 
relevant in the study of Malaysia’s higher education and labour markets. Indeed, 
Malaysia’s higher education and labour markets are not structured as the human 
capital theory presumes. This study proceeds by breaking with the theory and 
instead taking a political economy approach that places the role of government at 
the analytical centre. This approach helps us to understand that government 
policy reflects the trade-off between efficiency (economic growth) and equity 
(inter-ethnic distribution) and that the institutional frameworks of higher 
education and labour markets are constructed on these grounds. Hence, it makes 
it possible to analyze why ethnic differentials in higher education and labour 
markets emerge and persist.
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A number of researchers from various disciplines have looked into higher 
education and/or labour markets for Malaysia. Yet, there are only a few studies 
that comprehensively analyzed both higher education and labour markets in 
Malaysia (Aziz, Buan and Singh 1987; Lucas and Verry 1999). They focused on 
the pre-1990s, and none of them looked into the 1990s which have witnessed a 
series of higher education reforms. It can be understood that part of the reason is 
the lack of proper data sets on higher education and labour markets. Furthermore, 
none of them have yet appropriately analyzed higher education and labour 
markets with a political economy approach. In this regard, this study is the first 
attempt to analyze the political economy of higher education and labour markets 
in Malaysia, and to explore the causes of ethnic differentials in higher education 
and labour markets.
This study is structured as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 critically review the 
literature on the human capital theory originating with Jacob Mincer. Chapter 2 
investigates Mincer (1958, 1974) in great detail, and highlights the theoretical 
and analytical deficiencies that constrain the applied studies of (higher) education 
and labour markets. While revealing the statistical significance of factors like 
ethnicity in education and labour markets, the human capital theory does not help 
us to understand how education is provided and how labour markets are 
structured. As mentioned, it leaves aside the historical and institutional contexts 
from the analysis, so that the question of why factors like ethnicity gain 
significance in education and labour markets cannot be addressed appropriately. 
Chapter 3 illustrates this with the Malaysian literature, and argues that these 
analytical deficiencies are compounded in the empirical application to the 
Malaysian case. All the applied studies on Malaysia bring the ethnic factor into 
the Mincerian framework. In spite of this, however, the historical and 
institutional contexts in which ethnicity gains significance in higher education 
enrolment and labour markets have yet to be addressed appropriately. This 
questions the relevance of the human capital theory in addressing Malaysia’s 
higher education and labour markets.
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Rather than applying or modifying the human capital theory, Chapters 4 to 6 
break with it and instead adopt the political economy approach mentioned earlier. 
They focus on the role of ethnicity in higher education and labour markets, and 
aim to elucidate the factors behind ethnic differentials in higher education access 
and sector selection in labour markets. Yet, this does not mean that we deny the 
importance of other factors such as gender. Instead, this study posits that these 
other factors are can complement our empirical findings. Indeed, new 
quantitative findings on ethnicity in higher education and labour markets are 
derived by analysing the two-percent random sample of the Population and 
Housing Census Malaysia 2000 that includes socio-economic information on 
435,000 individuals. By the same token, some findings on factors like gender are 
also revealed, but this research does not look into them in detail since it is more 
concerned with the ethnic factor. Put another way, the empirical analysis will 
find future research topics in related fields.
Chapter 4 explains the institutional framework of higher education by being 
explicit about how inter-ethnic equity concerns are built into higher education 
policy. The instruments such as the ethnic quota system at public higher 
education institutions and government control over provision of higher 
educational services, which were implemented from the onset of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP), have consolidated the institutional environment. 
Naturally, then, quantitative analysis reveals the persistence and changing 
features of ethnic differentials in higher education access. Compared to Chinese 
and Indians, Malays were advantaged in entering domestic public higher 
education institutions during the NEP period (1971-1990). But interestingly, 
when bringing all types of higher education (i.e., domestic and overseas) together, 
the Malay advantage relative to Chinese disappears. Equally interestingly, 
Chinese outstripped Malays in the 1990s but Indians have continued to lag 
behind Malays from the NEP period onwards.
Along similar lines, Chapter 5 examines the institutional framework of labour 
markets with reference to the efficiency-equity trade-off. In line with the 
objective of the NEP, Malaysia needs high economic growth to increase the 
economic pie to distribute. The public sector is attached the distributional role of
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providing employment opportunities for Malays, whereas the private sector is 
expected to spur up economic growth. Consequently, the underlying trade-off 
manifests itself as the public-private differentials in employment practices, fringe 
benefits and trade union activities. Quite naturally, quantitative analysis reveals 
ethnic differentials in sector selection, namely public-private employment choice. 
Malays opt for public sector employment but Chinese and Indians are more 
likely to be in private sector employment. Very importantly, it is found that 
Malay graduates are most likely to go into the public sector. Naturally, this 
suggests that the fundamental cause of graduate unemployment concentrated 
amongst Malays is the institutional frameworks of higher education and labour 
markets set up by the government.
From the empirical findings in Chapters 4 and 5, it can be seen that the ethnic 
factor persists from higher education through to labour markets. Higher 
education and labour market policies have influenced the thought process 
through which various ethnic groups go, and, consequently, they make different 
higher education and labour market decisions. Chapter 6 analyzes how they 
decide on public-private choice in higher education (i.e., public or 
private/overseas higher education) and labour markets (i.e., public or private 
sector employment). It is quantitatively found that Malays are more likely to 
enrol in public higher education institutions and then work in the public sector, 
but the reverse tendency is found with Chinese and Indians. This suggests that 
various ethnic groups make schooling decisions with future employment in mind, 
and supports the argument that the fundamental cause of graduate unemployment 
lies in the institutional framework the government has established.
Chapter 7 summarises the main findings of this study, and concludes by 
drawing some implications. Above all, this study brings two important 
contributions to the literature. First, it demonstrates the analytical deficiencies of 
human capital theory in the study of education and labour markets. To 
adequately understand the way in which higher education and labour markets in 
Malaysia work, it is essential to break with it and adopt a political economy 
approach that places the role of government policy at the analytical centre. 
Second, this study empirically confirms ethnic differentials in higher education
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enrolment and sector selection in labour markets, and suggests that the 
fundamental cause of graduate unemployment concentrated among Malays lies 
in the institutional frameworks of higher education and labour markets set up by 
the government These arguments and findings can lend themselves to setting the 
ground on which adequate higher education and labour market policies are 
considered in future.
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Chapter 2
Human Capital Theory, Education and Labour Markets: 
Review of the Literature
2.1 Empirical Contradictions and Puzzles
The term, ‘human capital’, is understood as “the productive capacities of human 
beings as income producing agents in the economy (Rosen 1998, p. 681).” Since 
Adam Smith (see Blaug 1972; Rosen 1998; Sweetland 1996), it has probably
become a norm to address human beings as a factor of production (see also Oi
12 *1962; Walsh 1935). Nonetheless, the concept of human capital is flexible and
contingent upon varying contexts since various interpretations are possible. For
example, it can be defined through education, on-the-job training, health (i.e.,
nutritional status or child mortality), or migration etc.13 Put differently, the term
may incorporate many new elements into its own terrain, as far as they are
related to the productive capacities of individuals.
This chapter, or more precisely this research, does not aim to define the term 
or criticise the terminology. Hence, it leaves aside the debate over treating human 
beings as capital. Nor does it intend to clarify the content of human capital. Thus, 
the question of what is meant by ‘human capital’ is not addressed. Rather, it is 
more concerned with how it is understood by an existing economic theory. In 
economics, human capital theory is generally concerned with the output flow of 
productive services provided by individuals, which is rewarded in the form of 
wage payments. It gained momentum after World War II when various data sets 
were systematically available, especially with the emergence of some Chicago 
economists (Rosen 1992, 1998). In particular, the unexplained portion of income 
distribution evidenced by Friedman and Kuznets (1954) led some researchers to
12 For an overview of the history of human capital approach in economics, see Rosen 
(1998) and Teixeira (2007, Chapters 1 and 2).
13 The special issue o f Journal o f Political Economy in 1962 contained various papers 
extending human capital ideas to socio-economic issues. Besides Mincer (1962), for 
example, they were Becker (1962) on human capital investment, Mushkin (1962) on 
heath, Sjaastad (1962) on migration, and Stigler (1962) on information in the labour 
market.
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analyze the effects of human capital, especially education, on individual earnings 
and productivity (Becker 1964; Mincer 1958; Schultz 1961).14 Since then, the 
impact of education on individual wage (micro) and economic growth (macro) 
has been widely researched, and the rate-of-retum (ROR) approach developed by 
Mincer (1958,1974) has gained prominence in the empirical literature.
The question of why the Mincer approach has been so influential is an 
important issue to address, perhaps in the history of economics, but it is not the 
purpose of this study to examine it.15 The stylized fact is that it has been widely 
used in the empirical literature, probably due to its empirical convenience 
(Lemieux 2006; Psacharopoulos 1994). Indeed, in one of his well-cited review 
articles, George Psacharopoulos (1994) used a large number of country-case 
studies and computed aggregate ROR estimates by region, level of per capita 
income, gender, higher education faculty, and sector and type of employment 
(see also Psacharopoulos 1985). Despite some general critiques of the ROR 
approach (to which I return later), his intention is, without caveat or theoretical 
justification, to find general patterns for prioritizing education policy. His latest 
review, namely Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002, p. 4), maintains this stance 
and argues that: “returns to schooling are a useful indicator of the productivity of 
education and incentives for individuals to invest in their own human capital. 
Public policy needs to heed this evidence in the design of policies and crafting of 
incentives that both promote investment and ensure that low-income families 
make those investments.”
Based on the ROR approach, these arguments have brought the issue of 
education investment to the heart of development policy. In this connection, 
primary education has been considered as the top investment priority due to its 
higher aggregate ROR than secondary or higher education (see Colclough 1982; 
Mingat 1998; Psacharopoulos 1985, 1994; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2002). 
Since the World Bank has also adopted the ROR approach when designing its
14 Mincer made it clear that Friedman and Kuznets (1954) had a big impact on his 
writings on human capital (see Goldwin 2002).
15 There are some studies that looked at how Mincer has developed his research 
programmes (Chiswick 2006; Rosen 1992; Teixeira 2007), but it is not the main issue to 
address in my research.
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education policies (Psacharopoulos 2006), these arguments can lend support to 
prioritising investment in primary education in the international donor 
community.16 In addition, other international organizations seem to adopt the 
same approach. In an annual Education at a Glance series, OECD (2005, pp. 
116-154) has a large section on “The Returns to Education”, and discusses ROR 
estimates in the policy context.
However, it must be highlighted that these arguments have been subject to 
criticism (for example, Behrman and Birdsall 1987; Bennell 1996, 1998; Birdsall 
1996). In a well-known critique of Psacharopoulos (1994), for example, Bennell 
(1996) points to empirical deficiencies of those individual ROR estimates in 
some Sub-Saharan African countries, which form the basis of computing 
aggregate ROR estimates for the entire region.17 He indicates that diverse labour 
market conditions characterized by the large informal and public sectors are not 
necessarily reflected in individual estimation procedures. These problems in 
country case studies flow over to the aggregate estimates and therefore 
undermine their credibility. Bennell (1996, p. 195) concludes that aggregate 
ROR estimates by Psacharopoulos (1994) “should be discarded altogether in any 
serious discussion of education investment priorities both for the continent as a 
whole and for individual countries.” This discussion puts in doubt the credibility 
of the ROR approach in formulating education policy.
Indeed, there are ambiguities around the predictions that come out of the ROR 
approach. For analytical purposes, assume that the micro-level evidence 
presented by Psacharopoulos (1985, 1994) and Psacharopoulos and Partinos 
(2002) holds universally. Consistent with the predictions of Mincer (1958, 1974), 
it follows that additional schooling leads to growth through aggregation of 
individual wage premiums. Yet, is it really the case? Not really. As seen shortly, 
evidence on the impact of education on macro-level growth is very mixed.
On the one hand, a number of researchers conducted regression analysis, and 
found the positive effects of education on economic growth (for example, Barro
16 See Fine and Rose (2001) for a critical assessment of the Bank’s education policies.
17 See also Psacharopoulos (1996) for his reply to Bennell (1996).
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1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992; Sala-i- 
Martin 1997). The most typical work is Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). They 
incorporated secondary enrolment ratios, as a proxy for human capital, in an 
augmented growth accounting framework, and found the coefficient which is 
statistically significant and positive.
On the other hand, it is suggested that the impacts of education on economic 
growth vary across countries. This parameter heterogeneity problem is frequently 
overlooked in the regression studies, undermining the accuracy and (statistical) 
significance of their findings (see Krueger and Lindahl 2001; Sianesi and Van 
Reenen 2002; Temple 1999, 2000). More significantly, other regression studies 
draw different conclusions by reporting non-positive impact of education on 
economic growth (see Benhabib and Spiegel 1994; Islam 1995). The most typical 
is Pritchett (2001). He adopted the same framework with Mankiw, Romer and 
Weil (1992) and found that the impact of education on macro-level growth is 
statistically insignificant and negative rather than statistically significant and 
positive. It is also reported that the coefficient on the education variable is much 
lower than the micro-level evidence, such as Psacharopoulos (1994), suggests. 
This not only puts the findings of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and others in 
doubt, but puts the question of the micro-macro paradox to the fore (see also 
Heckman and Klenow 1997, for the absence of evidence for or against 
externalities of education).
Quite clearly, either at micro or macro-level, regression analysis based on the 
ROR approach has been the foundation stone of the empirical literature. These 
studies appear to have tested different empirical models but shared the same 
goal: to quantify the impact of education on individual wages or economic 
growth. As seen, however, the mixed, often contradicting, findings as well as 
empirical critiques have been presented at micro and/or macro levels. In other 
words, no decisive evidence has been demonstrated. Thus, the main feature of 
the empirical literature may be the empirical contradictions and puzzles 
regarding the consequence of education investment, in sharp contrast to what 
Mincer (1958, 1974) predicts.
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Hardly surprisingly, they intensify when taking into account the arguments of 
reverse causality between education and growth. Bils and Klenow (2000) 
calibrated a general equilibrium model in which higher expected growth induces 
schooling decisions. Using cross-country regressions, they showed that “the 
channel from schooling to growth is too weak to plausibly explain more than 
one-third of the observed relation between schooling and growth...the bulk of the 
empirical relationship documented by Barro and others should not be interpreted 
as reflecting the impact of schooling on growth (Bils and Klenow 2000, p.
1177).” It is now shown that causality can run in the opposite direction, namely 
from economic growth to education investment.
I do not intend to join the debate by submitting new evidence or to complete 
an exhausting, perhaps endless, survey of the (contradicting) results in the 
literature. These empirical exercises can carry, if not great, significance on their 
own, because the motives vary across the authors. The impact of education on 
economic growth can be either positive or negative, depending on the models or 
empirical techniques chosen. And is the same with the issue of causality. The 
causality can run from education to economic growth, or vice versa.
However, my intention is to suggest that the empirical contradictions and 
puzzles indicate the analytical deficiencies of the original theory developed by 
Mincer (1958, 1974). How does the theory evolve with the empirical findings 
that are unexpected and can contradict the original foundation? How have its 
advocates responded to them?
In general, there appear to be two approaches, though they are not mutually 
exclusive to each other. The first approach is to scrutinize and enrich data sets, 
including how to measure human capital. Attempts were made to create a data set 
which is a more accurate proxy of human capital than enrolment ratios. The 
examples are Barro and Lee (1993, 1996), Kyriacou (1991) and Nehru, Swanson 
and Dubey (1995), all of which are widely used data sets in the literature. Further, 
De La Fuente and Rafael (2000) recently attempted to improve them to create a 
newer data set. Yet, their sample is restricted to OECD countries, given the
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shortcomings of UNESCO’s enrolment data which forms the basis of all these 
data sets listed in this paragraph.
This indicates that development of the first approach is dependent upon 
UNESCO’s data. However, it has been pointed out that the UNESCO data on 
enrolment is not free from flaws. In their survey article, Behrman and 
Rosenzweig (1994) argue that the UNESCO data are not necessarily suitable for 
cross-country (and even individual country) studies, due to conceptual and 
comparability shortcomings. Collected from each national government, they do 
not reflect actual attendance since information tends to be based on opening day 
enrolments. This problem of measurement error becomes more serious when 
talcing into account cross-country differences in education systems. The starting 
and finishing ages at each level of schooling, which affect overall duration 
periods at schools, vary in different countries. These differences, however, are 
not reflected in estimated mean years of schooling, which are frequently used as 
an explanatory variable in regression analysis. Above all, the fundamental 
shortcomings of the UNESCO data can flow over to the data sets which rely on 
them, undermining the accuracy and credibility of the studies that use them.
By contrast, more fundamental doubt is cast on ambiguities around model 
specification and estimation. In the empirical search for the true estimate of the 
impact of education on wage or economic growth, the factors hitherto neglected 
are brought into micro and macro empirical analysis. At the micro level, 
researchers have modified the original Mincer approach to take “the form of 
regressing the earnings of individuals on such variables as native ability, family 
background, place of residence, years of schooling, years of work experience, 
occupational status, and the like- the so-called “earnings function” (Blaug 1976, 
p. 832).” Perhaps, the inclusion of new factors in the regressions reflects some 
progress in the empirical literature, but it also reflects upon the incapacity of the 
original Mincer model to explain wage differentials in certain contexts. Indeed, 
this begs the question of what exactly the estimated models are:
“It is sometimes difficult in all this research to see precisely what
hypothesis is being tested, other than that schooling and work experience
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are important and that native ability and family background are not 
(Blaug 1976, p. 832).”
This further prompts some researchers, such as Blaug (1976), to claim that the 
advocates of the theory make ad hoc adjustments to avoid further critiques of the 
original model or, perhaps, to rescue it.
A similar problem plagues the macro growth literature. To obtain accurate 
estimates of parameters of interest, researchers bring in a variety of factors that 
are overlooked in the original model. For example, Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992) brought a variable indicating human capital stock into the neoclassical 
growth model which does not assume it. This tendency is quite evident with 
Barro-type regression studies that include school enrolment ratios, political 
variables, regional dummies, and religious variables, etc (see Barro 1991; Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Sala-i-Martin 1997). Although many different models 
can look, at least statistically, reasonable, it is not entirely clear what models are 
tested (see Levine and Renelt 1992; Sianesi and Van Reenen 2000; Temple 1999, 
2000).
Further, it can be argued that the way in which researchers responded to the 
empirical contradictions and puzzles points to the analytical deficiencies of the 
original model. In this connection, Pritchett (2001) deserves some more scrutiny. 
As seen, he has established empirical findings that are inconsistent with the 
prediction of Mincer (1958, 1974). This casts the analytical capacity of the 
Mincer model in doubt. The doubt is further compounded by the way in which 
Pritchett explained why the marginal return to an additional year of schooling 
economy-wide becomes negative. He offered three potential reasons. First, in 
some developing countries, educated workers are concentrated in public sector 
employment due to employment guarantee schemes and engaged in 
economically unproductive rent-seeking activities. Second, the growth rate of 
demand for educated labour differs across countries, because of shifts in skill 
intensity of the economy and the rise of disequilibrium through government 
policies or technological progress (see also Schultz 1975). Hence, countries with 
an expanded supply of educated labour can see the marginal return fall, remain
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intact or rise. Finally, schools in some countries do not play a role in producing 
or accumulating human capital (or skills).
The details of the three points aside, two crucial points immediately emerge. 
First, factors that represent the three answers are not considered in his original 
growth-accounting framework, but are outside its theoretical scope. Ironically, 
this suggests that when explaining empirical results, researchers need to go 
beyond the scope of the model on which their empirical analysis is based. Second, 
but more crucially in our context, Pritchett’s discussion suggests that an enquiry 
into the impact of education requires an understanding of the different ways in 
which education is provided and labour markets are structured. Needless to say, 
this is completely neglected not only by the growth-accounting framework but by 
the Mincer model. Indeed, the Mincer model has the capacity to estimate ROR 
but does not explain the contexts in which ROR arises.
In sum, the source of the empirical contradictions and puzzles lies in the 
failure to specify the determinants of wage or economic growth (outcome). It is 
one thing that the new variables are, at least statistically, found to be influencing 
wages or economic growth. Perhaps, this reflects progress in the empirical 
literature. However, it is another that the persistence of the empirical 
contradictions and puzzles indicates the complexities around the ways in which 
many factors affect the outcome. Explanation of the process in which they do so 
requires a careful understanding of various education and labour market contexts. 
Despite these crucial implications, little critical attention has been paid to the 
original model developed by Mincer (1958, 1974), on which the empirical 
framework of applied studies is based. It is exactly for these reasons that I 
carefully and critically investigate Mincer (1958, 1974) in the section that 
follows.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 critically assesses 
the Mincerian earnings function through carefully investigating the logic and 
analytics of Mincer (1958, 1974). Particular attention is directed towards how the 
theory captures education and labour markets. Then, I examine two organizing 
themes that constitute the framework of analysis for the subsequent sections and
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chapter. Section 2.3 critically addresses the applied literature around them. 
Emphasis is placed on the discrepancy between the underlying theory and reality, 
and critical light is shed upon the capacity of human capital theory to understand 
education and labour market structures. Section 2.4 summarises the main points 
of this chapter, and then concludes.
2.2 Mincerian Earnings Function
The Mincerian earnings function takes the following typical form:
In w(s, x) = a 0 + rss + j30x + fax2 +S (2.1)
where w denotes observed earnings with s years of schooling and x  years of work 
experience. ROR to schooling, or rs, means the averaged marginal rate of return 
to schooling that individuals obtain throughout the lifetime.
In order to understand the underpinnings of equation (2.1), the original works 
of Mincer (1958, 1974) must be carefully examined. For this purpose, I will 
follow Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003) (HLT hereafter), and first look at the 
compensating differentials model (Mincer 1958), followed by the accounting 
identity model (Mincer 1974). The purpose of doing so, however, is not to apply 
his approach. Neither is it to develop modifications of and remedies to it. Rather, 
it is to locate the human capital,theory critically in the context of studying 
(higher) education and labour markets.
2.2.1 Mincer (1958): Compensating Differentials Model
Regarding the background of his PhD dissertation at Columbia that was later 
published as Mincer (1958), Mincer noted that:
“At Columbia my interest was in wage determination. Why do people 
have different wages? Why were there wage differentials? I was 
approaching it like a Bureau person by looking at various comparisons- by
40
industry, occupation, age, sex, [and] race (Goldin 2002, p. 5, parenthesis 
added).”
The research had started with empirical analysis, although he later looked at 
Adam Smith and then Friedman and Kuznets (1954) to apply price theory and
t o
theorise the regularities observed in data (see Goldin 2002; Teixeira 2006). 
Throughout his life, Mincer has placed much emphasis on empirical work, and, 
for him, the development of human capital theory “was intrinsically linked to its 
empirical test and a thorough examination of the empirical evidence available 
(Teixeira 2007, p. 41).” In the words of Rosen (1992, p. 157), “his work has been 
closely tied to the development and availability of micro data and Census and 
other survey sources, for which his professional style and methods are well 
matched.” As discussed in greater detail in section 2.3, these facts indicate that 
the literature is guided, and also constrained, by empirical material. Put another 
way, the choice of empirical strategy is not necessarily guided by the underlying 
theory.
Empirically having recognized the role of education in earnings differentials, 
Mincer (1958) developed the ‘compensating differentials model’ by applying the 
compensating principle of Adam Smith. This model is based on rational choice, 
so that the overall framework is neoclassical. It is presumed that a representative 
individual maximises benefits accruing from schooling investments over the 
lifespan by equating the present value of costs streams against that of benefits. 
An additional year of schooling reduces the amount of earnings life exactly by 
another year. The costs, however, are later ‘compensated’ to reward people to 
engage in occupations that require longer schooling (or ‘training’ in Mincer’s 
words) periods, or higher earnings.
18 In an interview, Mincer noted: “The way I approached my topic was inspired by 
Friedman and Kuznets, after I went back to Adam Smith. Smith did not really have an 
explicit model, but Friedman and Kuznets had just come out with their book on 
professional income in which they calculated the capitalized value o f an expected 
income flow conceived as earnings from capital, using implicit rates o f return. At that 
time I asked myself, ‘why can’t I apply this to the entire labor force?’. And that’s 
basically what I did (Teixeira 2006, p. 9).”
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To make these predictions empirically testable, several stringent, unrealistic 
assumptions are made with regard to the socio-economic environment around the 
individual. Firstly, methodological individualism requires that individuals be 
identical in ability and preference and also have equal access to both education 
and occupations. The latter part comes from the assumptions of perfect capital 
and labour markets. Perfect labour market would also demand that there be full 
employment and labour market structures reflect parameters of interest only. 
Secondly, the only cost assumed is forgone earnings incurred during schooling, 
and no direct costs such as tuition fees are assumed. Therefore, provision of 
educational services, which can also cover ownership and management of 
schools, is represented only by time spent at schools. Thirdly, the individual is 
assumed to invest only in schooling without post-schooling investments. It 
means that, as the determinant of earnings differentials, a choice of occupations 
depends solely on years of schooling. Fourthly, when making an investment 
decision, the individual is assumed to have perfect certainty of the future. He or 
she has the knowledge about those levels of earnings streams with different years 
of schooling that are assumed to be constant over time. Put another way, the 
decision is made only once throughout lifetime.
Mincer theorised as follows. Let the individual choose years of schooling, s, 
and get the annual earnings, ws, under the exogenously given lifespan, T. Let r 
be exogenously given interest rate at which future earnings are discounted over 
time, and the present value of lifetime earnings streams with s years of schooling, 
in the continuous discounting process, can be given by
K(j) = w, Je-"dt = ^-{e~ ,s ) . (2 .2)
Here let d  the difference in the years of schooling, and the present value of 
earnings streams with (s-d) years of schooling, again in the continuous process, is
T
V(s — d) — w, d f e~rtdt = (e“r M  -  e~rT ). (2.3)
Jd  r
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Assume that T does not depend on s and in both cases above the individual has 
the same length of earnings life. Then, from the assumptions of individual 
rationality and maximisation, we let s = d  and (2.2) equate (2.3), take natural 
logarithms and then get
When T becomes large, the second term on the right-hand side will converge to 
zero. Therefore, the equation (2.4) can be approximated as
This is the typical Mincerian earnings function under the ‘compensating 
differentials model’. The coefficient on years of schooling is an estimate of 
internal rate of return to schooling, and roughly equals the interest rate when T is 
large.
Through this model, Mincer (1958) primarily found that: (i) people with more 
schooling receive higher annual earnings, (ii) the difference of annual earnings 
streams associated with different years of schooling becomes larger the higher 
the rate of return, and (iii) the ratio of annual earnings with levels of schooling 
differing by a fixed year of schooling is almost constant (see also HLT 2003, pp. 
5-6).19 These predictions of the model were empirically scrutinised, in particular 
by analysing cross-section data. This is in line with Mincer’s attitude that “the 
conformity of the empirical features with the model’s predictions” determines the 
explanatory power of the model (Teixeira 2007, p. 42). As mentioned shortly,
19 The original aim of Mincer (1958) was to explain earnings differences among the 
labour force by observing the distribution of training (equivalent to schooling). In his 
words, the model seeks “to make the distribution of annual earnings a sole function of 
the distribution of training among members of the labour force (ibid, p. 286).” In this 
regard, the ratio “serves as a “conversion factor”, which translates it [the distribution of 
training (or schooling)] into a distribution of earnings (ibid, parenthesis added by 
author).” This procedure clearly implies Mincer’s emphasis on empirical work.
In w(,s) = In w (o )  4- ln((l — e rI ) / ( l  — e ^ )) 4- r s . (2.4)
In = In w ( o )+ r s . (2.5)
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however, this first model was subject to criticism and was modified in Mincer 
(1974) to enhance its explanatory power.
2.2.2 Mincer (1974): Accounting Identity Model
In a sense, Mincer (1958) was successful in bringing the role of education to 
the heart of the literature on human capital and income distribution. In the words 
of Rosen (1992, p. 159),
“High earnings are required to compensate for the costs of entry, as an 
equalizing difference. Mincer generalized that idea to connect the modern 
theory of human capital to survey data on earnings, and to apply it to the 
broader study of earnings inequality. The key step was to abandon thinking 
about hundreds of specific professions and occupations. Instead, human 
capital investment was simply measured by school years attained in survey 
data, which is nicely ordered and comparable across the whole labor force: 
it is a much more general classification.”
Nevertheless, Mincer continued to search for more explanatory factors to 
enhance the explanatory power of the first model. This was so because empirical 
studies on the basis of Mincer (1958) did not necessarily yield expected results:
“Previous work [namely, Mincer (1958)], mostly due to the availability 
of data, had placed emphasis on the analysis of schooling investments. 
However, the empirical results had shown that, despite being positive, the 
links between educational attainment (measured by years of schooling) and 
individual earnings were weaker than many had anticipated. Moreover, the 
empirical analysis had provided limited evidence that fell short of the 
expectations of the explanatory power of human capital models to define 
the main features of income distributions. This led to some dismay 
regarding human capital research (Teixeira 2007, p. 49, parenthesis 
added).”
The new empirical evidence prompted him to look into other factors that can 
explain earnings differentials in order to enhance the explanatory power of the
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first model (see Mincer 1974, pp. 44-5). In this process, Mincer considered the 
role of post-school investments, like on-the-job training, in wage determination 
and attempted to incorporate it to extend the first model and to formulate the 
‘accounting identity model’ (see also Mincer 1962).
The second model, called the ‘accounting identity model,’ is based on Becker 
(1964), Becker and Chiswick (1966) and Ben-Porath (1967), and “focuses on the 
life-cycle dynamics of earnings and on the relationship between observed 
earnings, potential earnings, and human capital investment, both in terms of 
formal schooling and on-the-job training (HLT 2003, p. 6).” However, the lack 
of data on costs of on-the-job training (borne either by firms or employees) 
constrained Mincer’s approach (see also Mincer 1962):
“The consideration of postschool investments in training [such as on- 
the-job training] was nevertheless cumbersome. On the one hand, the 
information about the quantity of training each worker received was not 
likely to be available in the near future. On the other hand, even if these 
data were available they would tend to underestimate the quantity of 
training the workers actually received, since the data would be based only 
on formal programs. Faced with the limitations of the data available, 
Mincer had to make some simplifying assumptions (Teixeira 2007, pp. 50- 
51).”
This clearly shows that there are difficulties in translating post-school 
investments into an empirically measurable and testable variable in an 
econometric framework. Apparently then, Mincer compromised between 
available data and theory to find the best available proxy for post-school 
investments, namely age. The use of age to represent work experience, however, 
was contentious so he sought an empirical rationale, namely choosing the best 
functional form to fit the data at disposal (see also Rosen 1992; Teixeira 2007).
Having discussed the background of Mincer (1974), we now consider its 
analytics by following HLT. Since most individuals make further human capital
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investments beyond schooling and w(s) is, therefore, not directly observable, we
consider “the variation of earnings with age during the working life (Mincer 
1974, p. 11).” However, all the assumptions of the first model, except the third 
assumption on the absence of post-school investment, are maintained for 
analytical purposes.
Consider that after completing schooling, the representative individual joins 
the labour force at time y and makes further human capital investments to 
enhance earnings (see also Becker and Chiswick 1966). Then we let Cy as the
costs at time y, and be a fraction of potential earnings, Cy = k -E j, where kj
denotes the ratio of the fraction at time y 20 Now let be the rate of return to
human capital investments in timey, and then we get
These two equations also suggest the absence of simultaneity problem in an 
econometric sense.
Assume that the rate of return to schooling is constant for all years of 
schooling and identical across all individuals (rt =rs), and also that schooling
takes place at the beginning of life. Also assume that the rate of return to post­
school investments is similarly constant over time and identical across them 
(,rt — rp)- Then, for small rt , we get
20 Similar to the first model, the cost incurred is only forgone earnings, and no direct 
costs are assumed here. While schooling, kj = 1 and therefore, C . = E j .
E ^ ^ E j + r j C j ^ E j b  + rjkj).
By recursion,
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j - 1
In Ej « In E0 + rs.s + rn ^  A:, 
/=o
(2.6)
Accordingly, the schooling model can take the following form:
In Ej — In Eq +rh where h —
(  } - \  \
s + J^k,
\  1=0 J
Mincer (1974) followed Ben-Porath (1967) with reference to Becker (1964). 
He assumed that the representative individual makes an optimal investment 
decision by allocating more investments for the younger periods, and also 
assumed “a linearly declining rate of post-school investment:
= k r> -£T
where x = t — s > 0  is the amount of work experience as of age t  (HLT 2003, p. 
7).” Under the lifespan, we obtain
f
toEX" * { )n E 0 -K r)+ r ,s+  t
r  k '
r pK  +  - f —  
2Tv ^  J
r  k
x  x .
2T
(2.7)
Since potential earnings are deducted by the fraction to get observed earnings, 
w(^,x), we reach, from equation (2.7), at
In w(s, jc) w In -  xrf 1 - j = (in £ 0 -  xrp -  k )+■ r,s + r .K  Kr k  H------- 1—p 27 T
r  jc
x — —— x
2 T
Let a 0 = (in E0 - K r p ~- k \ /3 q rpK k  r n/c +  — —  +  —  
p 2T T
VpK
Px -  , and then we finally
get
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Inw^, x) = a 0 + rss + PqX + /^x2
which is similar to equation (2.1). The last two items on the right-hand side 
suggest concavity of earnings profiles.
As we have seen in the above process, the rates of return to schooling and 
post-school investment, namely rx and rp , are constant over time and identical 
across all individuals (parameter homogeneity). In addition, the same with other 
variables such as E0 and k , all of them are independent of years of schooling.
Mincer (1974) obtained a couple of implications from this second model; “(i) 
log-earnings experience profiles are parallel across schooling levels, (ii) log- 
eamings age profiles diverge with age across schooling levels, and (iii) the 
variance of earnings over the life-cycle has a U-shaped pattern (HLT 2003, pp. 8- 
9).” Similar to the first model, the validity of this second model was checked by 
empirically testing these implications. The development in availability of various 
data sets, which include more rich information, makes it possible to do so. 
However, it also reveals that equation (2.1) does not necessarily fit some recent 
data. For example, HLT (2003) tested the empirical implications for white and 
black men in America by using the 1940-1990 Censuses, and found that they do 
not necessarily hold, especially over the recent decades. Naturally then, empirical 
feedbacks have prompted researchers to search other explanatory factors to 
increase the (statistical) explanatory power of equation (2.1), as was done by 
Mincer himself. I address this in detail in the coming section.
2.2.3 Unveiling Higher Education and Labour Markets in Mincer (1958. 
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As seen, Mincer (1974) expanded the compensating differential model 
developed in Mincer (1958) by incorporating experience as another explanatory 
variable. One of the assumptions in Mincer (1958), namely the absence of post­
school investment, was relaxed, whereas all the other assumptions are still in 
place. Nevertheless, the framework of both models remains the same: costs 
streams are set against benefit streams accruing throughout the working life.
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The Mincerian earning function, namely equation (2.1), builds on standard 
neoclassical theory. It assumes a world where one representative individual lives 
in one market. The production capacity of the individual that is accumulated at 
schools is rewarded in the form of wage earnings throughout the working life. 
For theoretical and analytical purposes, two totally different markets (market for 
educational services and market for educated labour) are integrated as if one 
unique market. Input (or cost) for and output (or benefit) from the market are 
externally given, and the optimal years of schooling are determined through the 
market mechanism. Individuals make decisions under perfect foresight situation, 
which is reflected in both E{rsi) -  rs and s  ~ (o,cr2) in equation (2.1). They have
the complete knowledge of lifetime earnings streams associated with each year 
of schooling, and use it as the sole standard for making decisions. Of course, 
there are other assumptions on individuals, including identical ability which then 
leads to another assumption that they are indifferent between years of schooling. 
Hence, the differentials in years of schooling can be used to account for earnings 
differentials across individuals.
The primary feature of Mincer’s methodology is that he started from an 
observation of regularities in available data, inferred theoretical predictions from 
it and then constructed a theory to make the predictions empirically testable. 
Fundamentally, this approach is similar to Friedman’s positivist approach (see
* •  91 * •  •also Teixeira 2007). Following Friedman (1953), the purpose of making all the 
assumptions is to lay the foundation on which construction of an empirically 
testable theory is made possible. Whether or not the assumptions are unrealistic, 
therefore, is of secondary importance. Further, the usefulness or validity of the 
theory must be judged by an empirical test of the theoretical predictions rather 
than the realism of the underlying assumptions. It can be put another way:
21 In an interview, Mincer noted: “That [to judge theory by its predictive power] was an 
idea that I had even before that [having met Milton Friedman and George Stigler], but 
they [Milton Friedman and George Stigler] showed examples.” (Teixeira 2006, p. 16, 
parentheses added)
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“If economics could conclusively test the implications of its theorems, 
no more would be heard about the lack of realism of its assumptions. But 
conclusive once-and-for-all testing or strict refutability of theorems is out 
of the question in economics because all its predictions are probabilistic 
ones (Blaug 1985, p. 703).”
For Mincer, therefore, an empirical test of the theoretical predictions alone is 
necessary to refute the validity of his own theory. Nevertheless, the question of 
how many contradicting findings can prove sufficient remains open to question 
(see Blaug 1985, pp. 702-5).
Apart from its theoretical validity, it seems contentious whether Mincer’s 
theory is relevant. This is where various value judgements among researchers 
come in. Many researchers, perhaps though in differing contexts, claim its 
relevance. It can be argued that Mincer (1958) successfully brought the role of 
education in wage growth to the heart of economics (Rosen 1992). Further, the 
fact that equation (2.1) has been applied widely is another contribution. For 
Rosen (1992, p. 162), equation (2.1) has “become an almost universal reference” 
and it has “been fit on every earnings data source available for various time 
periods throughout the world. It is seldom the case in economics that we see 
replication of the same ideas and, more importantly, the accumulation of 
empirical results bearing on a specific problem on this scale.” It is even argued 
by Pedro Teixeira that “it is hard nowadays to find a labor economist who at a 
certain point of his or her career did not use it [equation (2.1)] (Teixeira 2007, p. 
53, parenthesis added).”
I do not intend to put to doubt the validity of Mincer (1958, 1974) per se. 
Neither do I criticise the value judgements of other researchers mentioned above. 
Rather, my intention is to question the relevance of his theory in the context of 
(higher) education and labour markets. As discussed shortly, it entails two major 
flaws when addressing their peculiarities.
The first problem is that the development of human capital theory is guided, 
and constrained, by empirical material. Recall that Mincer’s work “has been
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closely tied to the development and availability of micro data and Census and 
other survey sources, for which his professional style and methods are well 
matched (Rosen 1992, p. 157).” This suggests that information contained in 
available data sets can determine or influence the direction to which theoretical 
and empirical developments go. Those who are wedded to Mincer’s approach 
may argue as follows:
“We believe that such and such a variable is a crucial determinant of 
the workings of the labour market but we are excluding it from our 
calculations because we do not have data on it. However, we will use it to 
explain the results we do get in more informal discourse (Fine 1998, p. 
68) .”
The model specification is to a large extent influenced by data availability.22 This 
means that if the original model does not fit the newly available data then it must 
be modified. Then, a set of new explanatory variables that originally fall into the 
error term in equation (2.1) would be brought into the econometric framework in 
order to enhance its explanatory power.
Through modifying or extending equation (2.1), we can see if the new 
variables are, at least statistically, significant in explaining wage differentials. 
Perhaps, there is some statistical merit in doing so. However, it causes an inner 
logical inconsistency since the new variables are brought into a model that does 
not assume them. As seen in the next section, this problem of theoretical 
incomparability becomes more apparent as researchers bring variables that 
represent, for example, ability, quality of schooling, family backgrounds, and 
labour markets into equation (2.1). Also, as elaborated later, researchers throw 
into equation (2.1) variables indicating ethnicity and gender, which indeed 
demand careful consideration of what exactly they represent. Obviously, these 
procedures amplify the inner logical inconsistency, so that, as Blaug (1972) 
argued, what the models test becomes unclear. This indicates that the deviations
22 Or, some researchers even manufacture the data at disposal to fit the predictions of 
Mincer (1958, 1974). Rosen (1992) calls it ‘Mincering data sets.’ If this is the case, these 
researchers do so to rescue the theoiy.
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from the initial presumption underlying equation (2.1) become evident as it is 
applied to reality. This suggests that empirical work is not guided by the 
underlying theory.
Besides the first problem, there is another problem that is related to the issue 
of theoretical incomparability but is more analytical. According to Friedman-type 
positivist approach, understanding the context in or mechanism through which 
empirical regularities emerge is of negligible importance. Therefore, those who 
are wedded to the approach would not be concerned with how (higher) education 
and labour markets are structured. Unfortunately, the historical and institutional 
contexts are of negligible importance for them. Further, education (years of 
schooling) and labour markets (age and age-squared) are assumed to be separated 
in equation (2.1), so that the relationship between them is outside the analysis. 
Hence the social processes that influence one variable or another in differing 
ways, including the role of government, are neglected.
In this connection, equation (2.1) deserves some more critical scrutiny. The 
variables in the equation are assumed to be statistically independent. This 
assumption was made for the purpose of choosing the best functional form that is 
applicable to the whole cross section data (see Mincer 1974, Chapter 5). 
Naturally then, the interaction between higher education and labour markets is 
not presumed. They are treated independently, and their structures are separately 
understood with reference to parameter estimates alone. This is the consequence 
of reductionism that reflects methodological individualism underlying the human 
capital theory.
Above all, Mincer’s work is at the theoretical and analytical level built on two 
black boxes, given the distinction between costs (education) and benefits (labour 
markets). The first black box lies in the cost side (education). In Mincer (1958, 
1974), the difference in types of schooling that individuals receive is represented 
only by that in ‘quantitative’ years of schooling. Therefore, how long they stay at 
school is the only issue of interest, whereas who gets what sort of schooling is far 
from important. This can be understood by the assumptions: (i) equal access to 
education and (ii) no educational costs other than forgone earnings.
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According to (i) in tandem with the assumption of perfect capital market, all 
individuals can enrol in schools if they desire so. It follows that neither the 
processes of allocating individuals to different years of schooling nor policy 
intervention in education access are taken into account. Therefore, it can be noted 
that differentials in educational access along ethnic and/or gender lines are set 
aside. Following (ii), on the other hand, individuals consider forgone earnings 
alone, when making decisions of schooling investment. Other direct costs, like 
tuitions fees and types of education (i.e., public or private) among them, are not 
incorporated in the model. In a broad sense, provision of educational services is 
represented solely by a linear term in years of schooling.
Needless to say, these assumptions are all unrealistic. Yet, it is not necessarily 
appropriate to criticise them in isolation from the theory. This is so because, 
according to Mincer’s methodology, the purpose of these assumptions is to make 
it possible to transform empirical regularities into testable (theoretical) 
predictions. However, these assumptions indicate an analytical deficiency of the 
human capital theory. That is, how education is organized and structured is 
placed outside the analytical scope. In other words, the human capital theory 
neglects the diverse ways in which education is provided (Fine 1998). Although 
a variety of socio-economic factors, like the role of government, influence 
educational provision, Mincer (1958, 1974) keeps them outside the analytical 
scope (see also Agnobza and Fine 1996). As a result, the theory does not offer an 
analytical tool to understand the historical and institutional contexts in which 
human capital is accumulated.
A similar assessment can be made of the second black box that resides on the 
benefit side (labour market). The assumptions of perfect labour market and equal 
access to occupations indicate that all individuals join the labour force upon the 
completion of schooling and get employed throughout the rest of life. Hence, 
there is full employment with no unemployment. Furthermore, the shifts in 
productivity and real wages adjust differences in level of human capital and let 
the economy converge to market equilibrium (see Fine 1998, pp. 61-3). 
Therefore, “there are extremely complex variations in wages, occupations,
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human capital and conditions of work across the population, even in the context 
of perfectly working labour (and other) markets (Fine 1998, p. 62).”
The realism of the assumptions aside, however, these arguments point to an 
analytical deficiency in the human capital theory. The diverse ways in which 
labour markets are structured, let alone their peculiarities, are set aside since 
labour markets are understood with sole reference to coefficient estimates on the 
explanatory variables. Or, more fundamentally, they are of negligible importance 
to Mincer (1958, 1974). Essentially speaking, therefore, equation (2.1) is 
different from such functions as Y = / ( x ) ,  where X  include an array of variables 
representing labour supply and demand which affect labour market outcomes. 
Above all, the human capital theory does not have a theory of labour markets so 
that it offers little to address the historical and institutional contexts in which 
accumulated human capital is rewarded.
In sum, the human capital theory developed by Mincer (1958, 1974) starts 
with two black boxes. On the one hand, how education is organized and 
structured, and why, are kept outside the scope of analysis. It does not have a 
theory of education provision. On the other hand, the issue of how labour 
markets are structured is excluded from the analysis. It does not have a theory of 
labour markets. All in all, understanding the historical and institutional contexts 
around (higher) education and labour markets is of negligible importance.
What are the implications of these discussions for understanding (higher) 
education and labour market peculiarities? What can we learn from them? As 
indicated repeatedly, I do not intend to question or deny the validity of the 
human capital theory developed by Mincer (1958, 1974). Rather, my intention is 
to locate Mincer (1958, 1974) in the study of (higher) education and labour 
market peculiarities. Hence, the present research, especially the next section and 
chapter, looks at two themes: (i) how applied studies diverge from the original 
theory and fiD how they address the two black boxes. This will help critically 
examine the relevance of the human capital theory in understanding (higher) 
education and labour market peculiarities.
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As seen in the coming section, the literature has focused on refining the 
estimate of ROR. For this purpose, equation (2.1) is empirically (and thus 
superficially) expanded by bringing in new variables that can to some extent 
indicate higher education and/or labour markets. The examples include ability, 
quality of schooling, family backgrounds and labour markets. Despite the inner 
logical inconsistency that emerges, however, no critical reference was made back 
to the theory underpinning equation (2.1). This is perhaps in line with the feature 
of Mincer’s methodology, but clearly points to divergences from the initial 
theory. By the same token, the way in which education and labour markets enter 
the consideration is piecemeal. Hence, the understanding of education and labour 
markets remains done with sole reference to parameter estimates in variants of 
equation (2.1).
2.3 The Measurement of ROR
With the formalization by Mincer (1958, 1974), there is the widespread 
recognition in the literature that education contributes to increased wage or 
economic growth. Yet, it does not necessarily mean that the literature is free 
from contradictory findings (recall the discussion in section 2.1). In order to 
obtain more accurate estimates of ROR, therefore, much attention is directed 
towards the empirical problems inherent in equation (2.1). For this purpose, 
researchers have adjusted the Mincerian equation to fit their data sets at disposal.
Indeed, equation (2.1) entails a number of empirical problems. The most 
typical is the specification problem that Griliches (1977) explicitly posed: what 
variables should be included in the Mincerian equation? Although I do not 
undervalue the errors caused by other factors such as estimation methods, it is 
less important in the context of Mincer (1958, 1974), since estimation techniques 
are to a large extent influenced by how researchers specify the model.23 It is for
23 The issue of sample selection bias caused by a variety of reasons such as occupational 
choice (including wage vs non-wage employment) and migration (see Schultz 1988) can 
be treated as part of specification error (see Heckman 1979). Indeed, the econometric
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this reason that this section critically investigates the issue of specification in 
relation to equation (2.1). Besides the question of individual heterogeneity of 
estimated RORs (see Wills and Rosen 1979), the empirical bias caused by 
specification errors has prompted researchers to consider more explicitly how 
human capital is accumulated (education) and how it is rewarded (labour 
markets). In this regard, applied studies disaggregate the error term in equation
(2.1) and bring in the variables hitherto neglected.
The rest of this section critically reviews the literature around the two themes 
mentioned in the previous section: (i) how applied studies diverge from the 
original theory and (ii) how they address the two black boxes. For this purpose, 
focus is on such factors as ability, family backgrounds, quality of schooling and 
labour markets, all of which are not mutually exclusive to each other. Indeed, 
each variable seems, at least statistically, valuable in enhancing the explanatory 
power of equation (2.1). However, the deviations from the original theory 
become apparent as it is applied to reality, and also that those factors are brought 
in by piece, in accordance with equation (2.1). Further, the way in which they 
enter into consideration constrains what we can, or cannot, explain about 
education and labour markets. Above all, the understanding of (higher) education 
and labour markets is still done with sole reference to parameter estimates, 
undermining the analytical relevance of the human capital theory.
2.3.1 Ability
As discussed in sections 2.1 and 2.2, equation (2.1) is built on the assumption 
of identical ability among individuals. Nevertheless, it is empirically argued that 
omitting ‘ability’ from the estimated equation leads to bias in OLS estimates 
since it affects years of schooling and annual earnings (see Card 1999; Griliches 
1977; Wills 1986). This prompts researchers to bring ‘ability’ in equation (2.1)
literature on estimation starts from the flaws of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Equation
(2.1) presumes that ROR is estimated by OLS, but it has been argued that there is a bias 
in OLS estimates due to the violation of the statistical independence assumption, etc (see 
Card 1999). In order to overcome this, researchers developed various methods such as 
instrumental variables (Angrist and Krueger 1991, 2001; Card 1995; Duflo 2001; 
Hausman 2001), matching methods (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1998), and quantile 
regression (Koenker and Hallock 2001).
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that indeed does not presume it, marking a divergence between the original 
theory and applied studies.
In general, there are three empirical approaches of incorporating ‘ability’ into 
the earnings function. The first approach is to use a proxy variable for ability, 
such as intelligence quotient (IQ) scores or other test scores (for example, 
Blackburn and Neumark 1993, 1995; Griliches and Mason 1972). It is reported 
that the inclusion of such variables reduces the magnitude of ROR, suggesting 
that there is upward ‘ability’ bias in OLS estimates. Nevertheless, this argument 
must be interpreted with some reservation since the measure of ‘ability’ is always 
contentious (see Griliches and Mason 1972).
The second approach is to use natural experiments to compare individuals of 
the same ability (Angrist and Krueger 1991, 1992; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 2000 
for a survey). The underlying idea is that exogenous institutional changes in 
America influenced schooling decisions and helped create comparable sample 
groups with same average ability but different levels of schooling: the examples 
are the introduction of compulsory schooling laws (see Angrist and Krueger 
1991 for details) and the Vietnam War draft lottery implemented by the 
government (see Angrist and Krueger 1992 for details). The details aside, this 
second approach also makes a point of the role of ability in earnings 
determination but works more explicitly on data than does the first approach.
The third approach is also explicit about data: to use the sample of identical 
twins by assuming that monozygotic twins have genetically similar ability and 
same family background (Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994; Ashenfelter and Rouse 
1998; Rouse 1999). Yet, the findings are mixed. Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) 
found downward ability bias, while upward bias was reported by Ashenfelter and 
Rouse (1998). Besides these contradicting results, it remains unclear why there 
are different levels of schooling among those with identical abilities and family 
backgrounds.
Whatever approach is taken and empirical evidence found, the advantage of 
these studies is, at least econometrically, to demonstrate that ability is an
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influential factor in explaining wage differentials. However, its sign and the 
magnitude of ability bias remain uncertain and differ among cases (or samples). 
Why is it so? For Griliches (1977, p. 18):
“There is no good a priori reason to expect the “ability bias” (or the 
direct coefficient of a measure of ability in the earnings function) to be 
positive. Thus, it shouldn’t be too surprising if it turns out to be small or
negative An asymmetrial attempt to protect oneself against possible
biases by putting more variables into the equation or by looking only 
within finer and finer data cuts, can make matters worse, by exacerbating 
other biases already present in the data.”
Along similar lines, Fallon and Verry (1988) argued that the empirical merit of 
the twin studies that can control for innate ability and family background might 
be offset by smaller variances of schooling differences than randomly chosen 
individuals. Furthermore, Card (2001) reviewed the recent literature and pointed 
out a multiplicity of empirical problems that is compounded by omitted variables 
and measurement error. He concluded that “no individual study is likely to be 
decisive in the debate over the magnitude of ability biases in OLS estimates of 
the return to schooling (Card 2001, p. 1157).”
The fact that the applied literature has encountered empirical challenges 
reflects, or reflects upon, the discrepancy between the original theory and reality. 
In our research context, there are two problems that are fundamental regarding 
the theoretical and analytical content. First, the empirical studies ironically lay 
bare the analytical deficiencies of Mincer (1958, 1974). We see clear divergences 
from the original theory as it is applied to reality. Though ability was originally 
excluded in equation (2.1), it enters into the consideration around the equation in 
order to enhance its explanatory power. This poses the question of what models 
are tested.
Second, but very importantly, these approaches still regard the structures of 
(higher) education and labour markets as exogenous. Following the analytics of 
the human capital theory, there are wage differentials even in the perfect market
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setting because individuals make schooling decisions on the basis of their innate 
abilities. In other words, individuals choose different years of schooling that 
correspond to their own abilities and allocate them to the corresponding types of 
occupations. Accordingly, both how education is provided and how labour 
markets are structured remain unaddressed.
2.3.2 Family Backgrounds
Equation (2.1) does not presume the roles of family backgrounds, such as 
parental education background, occupation or income. This is due to the 
assumptions of a perfect labour market as well as equal access to education and 
occupations. Yet, it has been argued that family backgrounds influence schooling 
decisions in reality, so that the exclusion of these factors leads to incorrect 
estimates of ROR (see Behrman and Wolfe 1984; Heckman and Hotz 1986; 
Schultz 1988, pp. 587-589).24 Either asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981) or financial repression (McKinnon 1973) or both may cause capital and 
credit constraints that individuals face in making investment decisions. The 
argument that building schools does not necessarily push up enrolment ratios 
(Filmer 2007) may also have complemented this empirical trend. Consequently, 
much attention is directed towards the role of family backgrounds in educational 
investment, and the variables indicating them enter equation (2.1) which indeed 
does not presume them.
Nonetheless, this empirical procedure suffers from the multiplicity of 
empirical problems. The estimation bias caused by omitted variables can be 
mitigated through including the variables indicating family backgrounds. 
However, it does not mean that the errors resulted from measurement, namely 
how to measure family backgrounds, are absent. Although equation (2.1) 
becomes open to new variables, the empirical literature deals with further 
technical challenges. The main reason for this is that the empirical strategy is 
contingent upon available data or evidence and its specification is not dictated by
24 Taubman (1989) is not based on Mincer model but confirms the effect of parental 
income on educational attainment (see also Behrman and Knowles 1999). At cross­
national level, Filmer and Pritchett (1999) report the differences in education gaps by 
wealth.
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the underlying theory. All in all, this indicates that as equation (2.1) is applied to 
reality it only diverges from rather than converges to the world that equation
(2.1) presumes. In this connection, Altonji and Dunn (1996) and Lam and 
Schoeni (1993) deserve scrutiny.
To reduce omitted variable bias and obtain more accurate ROR in the context 
of America, Altonji and Dunn (1996) augmented equation (2.1) to include the 
variables indicating family backgrounds. Unlike the presumption of equation
(2.1), the underlying idea is that “parental education and income and other 
variables have large effects on cognitive development in pre-school years, 
quality of schooling received, and achievement in school (Altonji and Dunn 1996, 
p. 692).” The variables included were father’s education, mother’s education and 
number of siblings. By using the samples of both men and women, they 
demonstrated that the family backgrounds positively affected years of schooling 
and wages.
Using the sample of Brazilian men, Lam and Schoeni (1993) also looked at 
impacts of family backgrounds on ROR estimates. They extended equation (2.1) 
to include not only parental education of individuals but family characteristics of 
their spouses and parents-in-law. They dealt with measurement errors that are 
partly caused by the inclusion of new variables, by sequentially adding the 
variables to obtain respective R-squared(s) to infer their magnitude. It is then 
concluded that the inclusion of family background variables reduced the ROR 
estimates, suggesting upward bias.
The common thesis underlying the two studies is that family backgrounds play 
an important role in wage determination. Yet, their empirical strategies differ in 
terms of measuring family backgrounds and sample chosen. Altonji and Dunn 
(1996) used parental education and number of siblings in the sample of men and 
women, while Lam and Schoeni (1993) educational backgrounds of parents, 
spouses and parents-in-law in the sample of men alone. This may reflect the 
difference in their motives, but, in relation to equation (2.1), suggests three 
analytical deficiencies of Mincer (1958, 1974). The first point is the inner logical 
inconsistency on the theoretical level. In both American and Brazilian cases,
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equation (2.1) had to be expanded in the way which contradicts its own 
presumption. The variables that are excluded in the original theory, namely 
family backgrounds, are brought into the model to enhance its explanatory power 
in each case. Second, the manner in which empirical modifications are made 
differs between the two contexts. This suggests that there is no universal recipe 
of developing empirical remedies to equation (2.1), coinciding with the argument 
empirical strategy is not guided by the underlying theory. Finally, the factors that 
can influence the structure of education and labour markets enter the 
consideration, but around equation (2.1). Consequently, the understanding of 
education and labour market structures remains insufficient since it is done with 
sole reference to parameter estimates.
2.3.3 Quality of Schooling
So far, it has become clear that application of equation (2.1) ironically lays 
bare the discrepancy between the world of Mincer (1958, 1974) and reality and it 
does not necessarily lead to a deep understanding of education and labour market 
peculiarities. Indeed, it will be clearer as we look at other factors, such as quality 
of schooling and labour markets.
Mincer’s original theory neglects the provision of educational services, which 
is insufficiently represented by the linear term of years of schooling alone (recall 
the discussion on the first black box in section 2.2.3). Obviously, the issue of 
quality of schooling is outside the analysis. However, there is now the 
widespread agreement that the quality of schooling influences wage differentials, 
for example, by affecting productivity (see for example Welch 1966; Schutlz 
198 8).25 Naturally then, ‘quality of schooling’ in the form of proxy variables 
enters equation (2.1), though it does not presume ‘quality of schooling’.
25 There is a huge literature on economics of education, which analyses production of 
human capital at schools. The underlying approach is to employ educational production 
function like q = f{ Z ) ,  where q represents educational outcome such as IQ test and Z a 
vector of explanatory variables such as pupil-teacher ratios and average number of 
books (see Hanushek 1986), In his survey article, Hanushek (1995) pointed out 
inefficiencies in the organisation of schools and called for introducing incentive systems 
in improving the efficiency (which, in this context, is measured by q). However, this 
approach is theoretically different from ROR analysis, which looks at the labour market 
outcome.
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As seen in ability and family background, there are empirical challenges that 
alternately appear, including the measurement of ‘quality of schooling.’ This 
indicates that researchers need to make different assumptions to let their variants 
of equation (2.1) fit their cases (or samples). To understand this, let me take a 
few examples.
To fit their predictions in the Brazilian case, Behrman and Birdsall (1983) 
made the following assumptions to represent ‘quality of schooling’ by geography 
variables: (i) geographical differences in quality of schooling, (ii) immobility of 
individuals across geographical areas for the purpose of schooling choices, and 
(iii) no association between quality of schooling in an area and tax burden in the 
area. Accordingly, they expanded the equation (2.1) to incorporate the geography 
variables, and found that the estimate on years of schooling is biased upward 
unless incorporating them.
A similar problem is found in Card and Krueger (1992b) that examined the 
American case by modifying equation (2.1) (see also Card and Krueger 1992a). 
It is presumed that variables, like pupil-teacher ratio, average length of school 
term and relative wages of teachers, indicate ‘quality of schooling’. By the same 
token, they divided the entire sample by state (49 states) and ten-year birth cohort 
(3 cohorts), both of which they presume reflect differences in quality of 
schooling. Having estimated RORs for the 147 separate sub-samples, they 
showed that ‘quality of schooling’ had significant impacts on ROR estimates.
Clearly, they used different measures of schooling quality, perhaps to fit the 
data at disposal. It can be surmised that data rather than the underlying theory 
determines empirical strategy. Nonetheless, it is the statistical advantage of these 
studies to show effects of schooling quality on wage growth. In spite of the 
empirical progress, however, these studies still suffer from theoretical and 
analytical problems. First, there are clear divergences from the original theory as 
it is applied to reality. The factors that are originally excluded by Mincer’s theory 
are now brought into the expanded Mincerian equation. Further, the divergences 
surface in different ways. For example, the Brazilian (Behrman and Birdsall
62
1983) and the American (Card and Krueger 1992b) cases are obviously different 
to each other so that the authors used different empirical strategies to make their 
equations fit their data. Although the starting-point of both studies remains the 
same, namely equation (2.1), the empirical modifications that represent the 
divergences are clearly different between them.
Second, but more crucially, the understanding of provision of education 
remains inadequate since it is still done with reference to parameter estimates on 
the new variables. Though it is statistically clear in certain contexts that there are 
geographical differences in the measures of schooling quality, it remains unclear 
why it is so. Consequently, various factors that influence provision of education, 
including the role of government, are still outside the analysis. The main reason 
for this is that modifications were solely made in accordance with equation (2.1), 
which indeed offers little to understand how education is provided and how 
labour markets are organized.
By the same token, the theoretical and analytical problems depicted above are 
discerned in the studies that jointly treat ability, family backgrounds and 
schooling quality. The empirical problems aside, the reason for this is that these 
studies are still developed around rather than apart from equation (2.1). Besides 
the divergences from the original theory, parameter estimates remain the tool kit 
with which to understand provision of education!
To appreciate this point, Glewwe (1996) deserves some scrutiny. He adopted a 
similar approach to Behrman and Birdsall (1983) and modified equation (2.1) to 
include ability, family backgrounds and schooling quality. He considered the 
following Mincerian earnings function:
In w = a 0 + a}H  + a 2x + a 2x 2 + a 4A + s  
where H  denotes human capital and A ability. Then, he considered:
H  = g{S,Q,A,B,u)
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where years of schooling (S), school quality (Q), ability, family characteristics 
(B), and an error term (u) capturing all other unobservable factors. Then g(-) was 
substituted into the modified earnings function. Before estimating it, Glewwe 
split the Ghanaian sample into public sector employment, private sector wage 
employment and the rest. He estimated RORs for the separate sub-samples, and 
argued that OLS estimates of ROR would be biased by omitted variables and 
measurement error.
Quite clearly, the empirical strategy and conclusion of Glewwe (1996) 
suggests the discrepancy between the original theory and reality. Not only ability 
but also family backgrounds and schooling quality were, or needed to be, added 
to equation (2.1) to fit the Ghanaian sample. The factors that were originally 
excluded If om analysis are now brought in.
The understanding of education and labour market peculiarities is still 
insufficient. Although education and labour markets enter into the consideration, 
the way in which they do is still piecemeal and shallow. In the case of Glewwe
(1996), the Ghanaian education and labour markets are still captured through the 
coefficient estimates on relevant variables. Unfortunately but hardly surprisingly, 
both how education is provided in Ghana and why and how the public and 
private sectors differ can not be understood from the above equation. The main 
reason for this is that the analysis is based on the theory ignoring the historical 
and institutional contexts in which education and labour markets are structured. 
Whatever modifications are made, therefore, the fundamental analytical 
deficiencies remain as far as they were done so around equation (2.1).
2.3.4 Labour Markets
As discussed in section 2.2.3, equation (2.1) is built on the assumptions of a 
perfect labour market and equal access to occupations, neglecting the roles of 
labour supply and demand in wage determination. The way in which labour 
market are structured is outside its analytical concern. As seen below, however, 
researchers become more explicit about labour demand and supply, as they apply
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the equation to reality. This suggests the discrepancy between the underlying 
theory and applied studies, ironically highlighting the incapacity of Mincer (1958, 
1974) to analyze labour market structures.
A large number of researchers, especially in the context of America, have 
looked into ethnic differences in ROR and earnings (see Altonji and Blank 1999, 
for a survey). For example, Welch (1973) examined American black-white 
differences in ROR between 1959 and 1966, through augmenting equation (2.1) 
and splitting the data into black and while sub-samples. The new variables, like 
the dummies indicating sector of employment (that is, federal employee) and 
features of industry (federal government’s share of the industry in which the 
individuals are employed), were thrown into equation (2.1). The main findings 
were the existence and persistence of black-white differentials in earnings and 
the rise in the relative earnings of blacks. Accordingly, Altonji and Blank (1999) 
empirically, confirmed the persistence of ethnic (black-white-Hispanic) 
differences in RORs and earnings for the years 1979 and 1995.
Treating the ethnic differences as given, the main focus of subsequent studies 
on America has shifted towards its sources (for example, Murphy and Welch 
1992, 1993). In the process, researchers have started to consider the roles of 
labour supply and demand more explicitly. In the survey article, Katz and Autor 
(1999) indicated that, in pursuit of the source of wage inequality, the causal 
factors omitted in equation (2.1) need to enter the consideration so that labour 
supply and demand would be treated more clearly. Interestingly, they, in the 
same article, also emphasised the roles of labour market institutions in 
influencing employment and occupational choice as well as wages. As equation
(2.1) is applied to reality, more and more attention is directed towards the factors 
neglected in the equation.
The shifting emphasis of empirical studies is already indicative of the 
analytical deficiencies of Mincer (1958, 1974). Although their analytical point of 
departure was equation (2.1), the empirical focus has become wage 
determination through taking into account labour demand and supply. The 
factors representing labour demand and/or supply are brought into the model of
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equation (2.1), which does not have a theory of labour markets. Put another way, 
the capacity of equation (2.1) to explain wage determination needs to be 
strengthened by taking the factors out of the error term. This suggests not only 
divergences from the world of Mincer (1958, 1974) but the theoretical 
incomparability between the underlying theory and applied studies. Furthermore, 
the incorporation of labour market institutions into the model, as suggested by 
Katz and Autor (1999), amplifies them. It is seen that equation (2.1) offers little 
to understand how labour markets are structured.
A similar critical assessment can be made with the issue of gender. First of all, 
the gender differences in ROR are almost universally reported, but the findings 
on the sign and magnitude are mixed. Some found higher RORs for males 
(Psacharopoulos 1994; Schultz 2002), but others observed the opposite 
(Deolalikar 1993). Further, besides the estimation results, there are differences in 
type of explanations for the gender gap. To illustrate these points, Kingdon 
(1998) deserves attention.
In the Indian context, Kingdon (1998) extended equation (2.1) by including 
dummies indicating caste and religion as well as the variable on father education, 
and estimated the expanded equation separately for men and women. She found 
that the ROR estimates for women are lower than those for men, and argued that 
“the male-female earnings gap is explained only to a small extent by women’s 
inferior years of education than men, but to a much larger extent by the 
differential way in which the labour market appears to reward education for the 
two genders (Kingdon 1998, p. 58).”
One clear theoretical contradiction with equation (2.1) can be seen 
immediately. Equation (2.1) does not assume gender differences, and nor does it 
presume the roles of caste and religion in wage determination. Kingdon (1998), 
however, brought them into the expanded Micerian equation, although she 
started from equation (2.1). Perhaps, these variables are crucial to fit equation
(2.1) to the Indian case, but, fundamentally speaking, this empirical procedure 
reveals an inner logical inconsistency. By the same token, this point suggests that 
equation (2.1) offers little to understand the peculiarities of Indian labour markets.
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Through the lens of ethnicity and gender, we have critically assessed equation
(2.1) in the context of labour markets, and consistently argued that it is deficient 
in analyzing how they are structured. Crucially, the analytical deficiency is 
further compounded by the issue of what ethnic and gender variables account for. 
As Altonji and Blank (1999) suggested, they may reflect either pre-labour market 
factors (such as differences in human capital) or labour market discrimination or, 
maybe, both. As will be made clear in the Malaysian context in the next chapter, 
it is extremely difficult to discern what exactly these variables represent.
If they represent the pre-labour market conditions, then it becomes necessary 
to explain why one ethnic group or gender is inferior to the other(s) in terms of 
human capital. Is it due to innate ability, family background, or quality of 
schooling? Or, is it due to the consequence of government policy in terms of 
access to and provision of education? Ironically, the addition of the ethnic and 
gender variables perpetuates and accentuates the analytical deficiency of the 
human capital theory.
A similar logic applies with the issue of labour market discrimination. If the 
ethnic and gender variables reflect it, then it calls for an enquiry into why it is so. 
Is it due to employers’ prejudice or asymmetric information between employers 
and job-seekers? To answer these questions brings us away from the world of 
Mincer (1958, 1974). For, the deviations from the assumption of perfect labour 
market become evident since those representing imperfect labour markets, like 
discrimination, are now considered. Once opened up to include them, researchers 
may bring in more variables that seem relevant in their research contexts. It lays 
bare the multiplicities of labour market structures, which are not captured by 
equation (2.1). However, the analytical deficiency of equation (2.1) remains 
since labour market structures is still interpreted with reference to parameter 
estimates in the estimated equation.
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2.4 Conclusions
Numerous achievements made by Mincer (1958, 1974) have been pointed out 
in the literature. His studies successfully brought the role of education and 
training in wage or economic growth to the heart of economics (Rosen 1992; 
Teixeira 2007). His work entered into textbooks such as Borjas (2002). 
Obviously, this is the cause and consequence of the fact that equation (2.1) has
been widely applied, not only in the area of development (Psacharopoulos 1994)
26but in the area of judiciary (see Gastwirth 1988 cited in Chiswick 2006). 
Perhaps, the fact that equation (2.1) fits the data fairly nicely has contributed to 
this (see Lemieux 2006).
By the same token, Mincer’s works have created room for empirical 
developments. For example, the exclusion of self-employment from the analysis 
led to the development of econometric techniques controlling for sample 
selection (see Heckman 1979). The efforts to reduce the errors caused by omitted 
variables and measurement may have created the demand for richer data sets. 
Through various applications, Mincer (1958, 1974) allows researchers to capture 
the (statistical) significance of various factors on wage or economic growth.
No one can deny the relevance of these points, since motives and purposes 
vary among researchers. In my research context, however, it is exactly regarding 
the last point that the relevance of the human capital theory in studying (higher) 
education and labour market structures is questioned.
Recall the point that the selection of explanatory variables in applied studies is 
not guided by Mincer (1958, 1974). As seen in section 2.3, different researchers 
use different variables from available data, in order to fit variants of equation
(2.1) to their cases (or samples). However, in the process of applying equation
(2.1) to reality, deviations from the starting-point become apparent. On the one 
hand, this poses the question of theoretical incomparability, namely what models 
are tested (see Blaug 1972). On the other, this lays bare the discrepancy between
26 Teixeira (2007, pp. 133-5) looked at how many times Mincer’s major works have 
been cited between 1972 and 1991. For example, Mincer (1958) was on average cited
4.5 times per year but Mincer (1974) was remarkably 45.3 times annually.
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the world of Mincer (1958, 1974) and reality, and points to the incapacity of 
equation (2.1) to understand the contexts in which education is provided and 
labour markets are structured.
Indeed, the way in which the factors that are not presumed in equation (2.1) 
enter into consideration undermines the relevance of Mincer (1958, 1974) in the 
study of (higher) education and labour markets. As repeatedly argued, it causes 
an inner logical inconsistency at the theoretical level. But more crucially, the ex 
post imposition of these factors is done in accordance with the design of equation
(2.1), so that education and labour markets are still understood by reference to 
parameter estimates alone. Despite the empirical progress in the literature, 
therefore, the historical and institutional contexts in or mechanisms through 
which these variables gain significance are yet to be addressed appropriately.
In the next chapter, I will investigate the relevance of the human capital theory 
in the Malaysian context. It is done through critically assessing its applied studies 
around the two organizing themes: (i) how they diverge from the underlying 
theory and (ii) how they address the two black boxes discussed in section 2.2.3. 
It is shown that Malaysia is full of deviations from the world of Mincer (1958, 
1974). It is then argued that Mincer’s analysis does not help us to understand the 
peculiarities of (higher) education and labour markets in Malaysia.
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Chapter 3
Human Capital Theory and Malaysia’s Education and Labour 
Markets: Review of the Literature
3.1 Setting the Point of Departure
The previous chapter demonstrated that the enquiry into the impact of human 
capital on wage differentials has been done on the ground of equation (2.1) put 
forward by Mincer (1958, 1974). Accordingly, various empirical attempts were 
made to estimate its true effect, whilst preserving rather than breaking with the 
general design of the equation. This was especially so because Mincer (1958, 
1974) takes two black boxes as the starting-point: provision of education (cost- 
side) and structures of labour markets (benefit-side). This has directed the 
attention of researchers towards modifying equation (2.1) in order to better fit 
reality and enhance its explanatory power. It was primarily done by bringing in 
the factors that were initially excluded from the analysis, such as ability, family 
backgrounds, quality of schooling and labour markets.
Despite these endeavours, however, the understanding of the contexts or 
processes in which education is provided and labour markets are structured 
remains shallow. The new factors enter the consideration by conforming to 
equation (2.1) without questioning the inner logical inconsistency caused by their 
own entry. As a result, the issues of provision of education and structures of 
labour markets are still addressed in terms of parameter estimates in an 
econometric equation. Hence, the fundamental deficiency of the human capital 
theory remains: the historical and institutional contexts in which education is 
provided and labour markets are structured are yet to be addressed adequately. 
Ironically, though inevitably, applied studies expose this deficiency and cast 
doubt on its relevance in the study of (higher) education and labour market 
peculiarities.
This chapter shows in the Malaysian literature that the human capital theory 
offers little other than to suggest the (statistical) significance and persistence of
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earnings differentials by ethnicity etc. Constrained by the underlying theory, the 
applied studies incompletely addressed the historical and institutional contexts in 
which the differentials surface in the Malaysian case. Accordingly, when 
explaining the causes of such differentials, researchers need to go beyond the 
scope of the underlying theory. All this together undermines the relevance of the 
human capital theory in the study of (higher) education and labour markets.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 critically reviews 
the applied studies on Malaysia around the two themes: (i) how they diverge 
from the world of Mincer (1958, 1974) and (ii) how they address the two black 
boxes. It is less concerned with (ii) than (i), since the subsequent section treats 
(ii) in greater detail through a critical appraisal of Gallup (1997). It is argued that 
the appeal to equation (2.1) in the Malaysian context does not help capture the 
peculiarities of its (higher) education and labour markets. The final section 
concludes by way of summarising the main points of this chapter and briefly 
explaining the political-economy approach taken in the chapters that follow.
3.2 Applied Studies on Malaysia: A Critical Review
That the original theory of Mincer (1958, 1974) does not dictate empirical 
strategy gives rise to the diverse ways in which equation (2.1) has been expanded 
and modified to illustrate reality (recall Chapter 2). Indeed, it remains true of the 
Malaysian literature. Though a reasonable number of studies applied equation
(2.1) to the Malaysian case (see Table 3.1), no single study exactly followed
2 7Mincer’s empirical strategy. In contrast, different researchers adopted different 
empirical strategies, even though some of them used the same data sources. 
Further, when it comes to time coverage, two studies examined the pre-NEP 
period and two others the post-NEP, and the rest investigated the NEP period. 
Why does all this happen?
One of the potential reasons is data availability. The details aside, it is 
worthwhile here to consider the implications of data sets used, since they can 
determine empirical strategy as well as the time period covered. In general, the
27 This entire section is written with reference to Table 3.1, unless specified otherwise.
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applied studies on Malaysia can be divided into three groups in terms of data 
sources. The first group used data sets compiled by RAND Corporation. Indeed, 
almost half of the studies used either First Malaysian Family Life Survey 
(MFLS-1) or Second Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS-2) or both (Anderson, 
King and Wang 2003; Blau 1985, 1986; Chung 2004; Gallup 1997; Schafghans 
1998, 2000; Smith 1983; Vijverberg 1987). The surveys for MFLS-1 and MFLS- 
2 were conducted in 1976-7 and 1988-9 respectively (for the details, see Butz 
andDaVanzo 1978; Peterson 1993).
The second group used data complied by the agencies of the Malaysian 
government, such as Department of Statistics (DOS) and/or Economic Planning 
Unit (EPU) in the Prime Minister’s Department. In chronological order, they are: 
Malaysian Socio-Economic Sample 1967 (Hoerr 1975), Post-Enumeration 
Survey 1970 (Anand 1983; Mazumdar 1981), Malaysian Expenditure Survey 
1973 (Mazumdar 1991), Migration and Employment Survey 1975 (Mazumdar 
1981), Malaysian Household Survey for 1984 and 1987 (Mazumdar 1991), 
Household Expenditure Survey 1988 (Lucas and Verry 1999), and Malaysian 
Household Income Survey for 1984, 1989 and 1997 (Deremy and Chescher 1993; 
Milanovic 2005).
Finally, the last group used unique survey data. Chapman and Harding (1985) 
employed the Mara Institute o f Technology Tracer Survey 1978, whose sample is 
restricted to Bumiputeras alone. Idrus and Cameron (2000) used their own survey 
data complied in one state in Peninsular Malaysia (namely, Negeri Sembilan) in 
1996. This sample covers Malays only. Therefore, these two surveys are quite 
limited in terms of sample coverage.
It is clear from the above discussion that researchers need to rely either on 
RAND data or government data unless they carry out their own original survey. 
It is for this reason that the majority of the applied studies in the Malaysian 
literature are concentrated on the NEP period. Indeed, the last survey of RAND 
data, namely MFLS-2, was conducted in 1988-9, so that it is not possible to 
cover the post-NEP period. The situation is further intensified by the fact that 
access to government data is very limited. In fact, those with privileged access
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can use these data sets. For example, the researchers having used Malaysian 
Household Survey, Household Expenditure Survey or Malaysian Household 
Income Survey, except Branko Milanovic, worked in an advisory group to the 
Malaysian government in the late 1980s, in preparation for the coming Sixth 
Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) (see Lucas and Verry 1999, Foreword). Milanovic 
(2005) used the only government data that covers the 1990s, namely Malaysian 
Household Income Survey for 1997, but in a World Bank project on “Inequality 
Around the World”.28
Here, I am less concerned with what data are available than with deviations of 
applied studies from the original theory of Mincer (1958, 1974). In this 
connection, recall that type of data determines empirical strategy since data can 
contain some constraints in terms of available information and also since it is not 
guided by the original theory. Naturally, then, empirical strategy can vary with 
researchers, even though some use the same data. It can follow that deviations 
from the original theory become apparent as it is applied to the Malaysian reality.
Hardly surprisingly, none of the applied studies exactly followed the strategy 
of Mincer (1958, 1974). Perhaps, the closest approach was taken by Mazumdar 
(1991) who used Malaysian Household Survey 1987 and considered the same 
explanatory variables with equation (2.1). However, he split the data by ethnicity 
and then estimated separate regressions for men and women. This procedure is 
similar to bringing ethnic dummies into equation (2.1) that does not assume 
ethnic differentials. Though it is possible to see the (statistical) significance of 
ethnicity in Malaysia’s education and labour markets, deviations from the 
underlying theory are evident.
This last point can be furthered by the other studies that similarly considered 
the same explanatory variables with equation (2.1) together with ethnicity. Apart 
from Chapman and Harding (1985) that used the restricted sample, these studies
28 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPR 
OGRAMS/EXTPOVRES/EXTDECINEO/0„contentMDK:2Q566397~menuPK: 1149339 
~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:l 149316.00.html (last accessed on 17 
March 2009).
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brought ethnic dummies into the expanded Mincerian earning function 
(Milanovic 2005; Vijverberg 1987), or estimated separate regressions by 
ethnicity (Anand 1983; Mazumdar 1991) or did both (Blau 1985; Lucas and 
Verry 1999). It is here that what models are exactly tested becomes unclear vis-a- 
vis the underlying theory.
It becomes more so since, besides ethnicity, numerous factors initially 
excluded from the analysis are empirically brought into the consideration. The 
examples are gender, age cohort, level of education completed, place of 
residence, type of occupation and employment status, among many others. 
Besides years of schooling and experience, for example, Milanovic (2005) 
preserved the design of equation (2.1) and brought in a number of new variables 
in the form of dummies: ethnicity, religious education, employment status, non- 
agro income source, residence (state), occupational status and sector of 
employment. Perhaps it was done so to let the data tell the reality, but, quite 
crucially, this points to the discrepancy between the world originally imagined by 
Mincer (1958, 1974) and Malaysian reality. Indeed, some of the variables 
indicate labour supply or demand, which was absent in the underlying theory 
(see section 2.2.3).
Perhaps, it is the merit of these studies to find the (statistical) significance of 
various factors in the Malaysian context. In some sense, they reflect some 
features of Malaysian reality. For example, all the studies considered the ethnic 
factor in some way or other, indicating that ethnicity plays a crucial role in 
Malaysia’s education and labour markets (recall Chapter 1). At the theoretical 
level, however, what models are tested remains unclear. Equation (2.1) is in 
various ways augmented or modified to fit the Malaysian reality in the form of 
available data and to enhance its (statistical) explanatory power. Yet, the 
inclusion of new variables in the model that does not presume them continues to 
cause an inner logical inconsistency. Above all, divergences from rather than 
convergences to the underlying theory remain evident.
The consideration of the issue of specification further intensifies this point. As 
indicated, the selection of explanatory variables is not universal but diverse
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among researchers. It may be related to data sources, but it still varies even 
among those using the same data. To illustrate this, the studies that employed 
MFLS-2 deserve scrutiny.
Several researchers used MFLS-2 and estimated the modified Mincerian 
earnings functions (Anderson, King and Wang 2003; Chung 2004; Gallup 1997; 
Schafghans 1998, 2000). Unsurprisingly, the difference in selection of variables 
is markedly clear. On the one hand, the common variables that they considered 
were age (or a proxy for experience, as is assumed by Mincer) and ethnicity only, 
which do not already coincide with Mincer. On the other hand, there are a 
number of additional variables that were considered differently. For Gallup
(1997), they were time, job tenure and business cycle etc, but for Schafghans 
(1998, 2000), gender, failure to complete schooling and residence (urban or 
rural). Chung (2004) considered marital status, experience of training 
programmes and employment status (self-employed or otherwise), whereas 
Anderson, King and Wang (2003) years of on-the-job training, presence of a 
family business and residence (state and town).
Why are there differences in the selection of variables, though the studies 
started from the same theory and used the same data? The answer is obvious: it is 
not guided by the original theory (see also Chapter 2). Whatever data sets are 
used, numerous factors are brought in the econometric analysis in a rather 
flexible manner. Nonetheless, what all the applied studies suggest commonly is 
that Malaysia is full with deviations from the human capital theory, undermining 
its relevance in studying Malaysia’s (higher) education and labour markets. I 
investigate this issue in greater detail in the section to come.
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3.3 Relevance of the Human Capital Theory Questioned
The previous section indicated that all the applied studies took into account 
the ethnic factor in the Mincerian framework (see Table 3.1). This is the 
reflection that ethnicity plays a pivotal role in (higher) education and labour- 
markets. In this connection, Gallup (1997), who rather comprehensively 
addressed ethnic differentials in male earnings by using MFLS-2, deserves close 
scrutiny in this section.
First, I illustrate his empirical strategy (in section 3.3.1) and then the way of 
interpreting results (in section 3.3.2) in some detail, in order to emphasise the 
two points: (i) deviations from the underlying theory of Mincer (1958, 1974) are 
apparent and (ii) the human capital theory offers little to understand (higher) 
education and labour markets in Malaysia. This lays the foundation on which to 
assess the relevance of the human capital theory in the study of Malaysia’s 
higher education and labour markets. Further, it helps reveal their general 
features obscured by the application of the human capital theory and set up an 
alternative analytical angle for the chapters that follow.
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy of Gallup (1997)
Gallup identified the significance of the ethnic factor in the Malaysian context, 
by briefly looking at the implications of racial riots in 1969. He then considered 
the role of ethnicity in wage differentials following two approaches, in both of 
which he preserved the design of equation (2.1).
The first approach is to expand equation (2.1) and bring in ethnic dummies. He 
considered the following Mincerian equation:
In w = a 0 + a xs + a 2x + a 3x2 + a At + a 5Z + u
S  in equation (2.1)
where t is time in years, Z a vector of other individual characteristics and u error 
term (all the other variables are the same with equation (2.1) in Chapter 2). The 
variables in Z were ethnic dummies, job tenure (measured by the amount of time 
spent in particular jobs), business cycle (deviations from GDP trend), urban
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worker dummy, a dummy for earnings payment in kind, a dummy for part-time 
job holders, and the number of jobs held.
Crucially, the factors that initially fell in the error term (or, s )  in equation 
(2.1) are now decomposed into three parts in the above equation, namely t, Z and
u. Put another way, the variables listed in the previous paragraph like ethnicity 
were not presumed by Mincer (1958, 1974) but they are now formally considered 
in accordance with the design of Mincer’s equation (2.1). This clearly suggests 
that there are some factors which the underlying theory exclude but turn out to be 
crucial in the Malaysian context. Hence, they needed to be brought into the 
analysis to fit the Malaysian reality exemplified through the data. Since they are 
considered only in an empirical discourse, however, this procedure causes an 
inner logical inconsistency with the underlying theory and points to deviations 
from it as it is applied to the Malaysian reality.
The similar assessment can be made of the second approach: estimating 
separate regressions for Malays, Chinese and Indians. For example, a variable on 
years of schooling, or s in the above equation, was excluded, but instead three 
education dummy variables indicating level of education completed (primary, 
secondary and tertiary levels of education, with ‘no schooling’ as the reference 
group) were brought in. This is to capture the wage increments to these levels of 
education for the three ethnic groups. On the other hand, cohort dummies were 
included whilst keeping s instead of inserting the three dummy variables. It was 
done so for the purpose of obtaining more accurate estimates of ROR and 
accounting for ethnic wage gap more accurately.
In contrast to the first approach, ethnicity is now used as the unit with which to 
split the sample. Nonetheless, the essence remains unchanged: ethnicity plays a 
key role in determining type of education and/or type of labour* markets and 
wage differentials. Put differently, the three ethnic groups were deemed to have 
attained education differently and entered different labour markets. Combined 
with the arguments on the first approach, therefore, it can be argued that 
deviations from the original theory of Mincer (1958, 1974) become apparent as it 
is applied to Malaysia.
82
3.3.2 Addressing Education and Labour Markets?
Given the arguments thus far, some questions arise quite naturally. How did 
Gallup address Malaysia’s education and labour markets? More fundamentally, 
what do the ethnic factors in his study represent? Where do they come from? Do 
they reflect the differences in the level of human capital (as in perfect market 
setting) or education and labour market conditions (as in imperfect market 
setting) or both?
Having found ethnic differentials in earnings and their lifetime profiles, Gallup 
argued that at the time of survey “Malays had the highest rate of return to a year 
of schooling at all education levels (Gallup 1997, p. 9).”29 He attributed the 
reason for this to government education policy:
“The timing of these ethnic trends in education is exactly what one 
would expect lfom an effective affirmative action program coming on 
line in the 1970s. Changes in government policy in the 1960s and early 
1970s, an irritant to non-Malays which contributed to the May 13, 1969 
race riots, coincided with a stagnation in Chinese and Indian educational 
progress, and an acceleration in Malay attainment. In 1965, lower 
secondary school was made accessible to all students, but since 
government-supported Chinese-language secondary schools were 
abolished in 1961, this helped the Malays more than the Chinese. Starting 
in 1971, English-language schooling was phased out one school level per 
year until all public school classes were taught in Malay. Malays are 
given preference among university applicants {ibid)”
In general, the reference to government policy played a part in diverting our 
attention towards the relationship between government policy and ethnic
29 The findings on earnings differentials and profiles were obtained by the first and 
second approaches respectively. The first approach showed that “Malays and Indians 
still earned only 76 % and 83%, respectively, of Chinese earnings (Gallup 1997, p. 8).” 
The second approach demonstrated that “all three groups received their highest earnings 
at 18-19 years of work experience, but peak Chinese earnings were 5.6 times their initial 
earnings while peak Malay and Indian earnings were 2.3 and 2.9 times their initial 
earnings, respectively.” (ibid)
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differentials in education attainment. Yet, this point does not come as a surprise 
to those who have studied Malaysia. More importantly, there is a clear 
inconsistency between the way in which the estimates of ROR were obtained and 
the way in which they were explained. The role of government entered the scope 
of analysis in an informal discourse, once searching for the reason of Malays’ 
higher ROR. In other words, government policy was introduced in an ex post 
basis into the model that does not presume it, whilst preserving its generic form.
It must be stressed here that Gallup pointed to structural constraints placed by 
the government, within which individuals are to make schooling decisions. 
Indeed, policy intervention in favour of Malays, which clearly contradicts 
Mincer’s assumption of equal access to education, indicates that some Chinese 
and Indians may not invest in higher education due to the constraints. In light of 
the access made unequal by an exogenous government intervention, we have an 
imperfect market setting unlike the perfect market setting of Mincer. Ironically, 
then, Gallup suggests that higher education in Malaysia is not organized as the 
human capital theory presumes and that ethnicity plays a role in it.
Further, Gallup’s analysis obscures one crucial point: do the ethnic 
differentials in ROR mean that the human capital of Malays is on average 
superior to those of Chinese and Indians? Do the ethnic dummies in the first 
approach represent ethnic differences in human capital or different labour market 
conditions? If they indicate differences in human capital, it must be explained 
why an ethnic group’s human capital is superior or inferior to others’ with 
reference to both access to education and provision of educational services. 
Obviously, this would require him to go beyond the scope of his own analysis, 
but he did not say much about this.
Above all, Gallup addressed (higher) education in inappropriate manner. This 
is so because his empirical analysis (or regression) is based on a model 
discarding the historical and institutional contexts in which higher education is 
provided and organized. Consequently, the questions of why and how ethnicity 
gains significance in the realm of higher education are yet to be addressed 
appropriately. All these criticisms together pose serious challenges that
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undermine the relevance of the human capital theory in studying the peculiarities 
of Malaysia’s higher education.
The similar assessment can be made of labour markets. He found stagnating 
Malay earnings relative to Chinese and Indians, and then explained about it as 
follows:
“A possible cause of stagnating Malay earnings [despite their 
progress in education attainment] is the inability of Malays to break into 
the more lucrative occupations. If Malays are unable to move from rural 
agriculture to urban clerical, professional, or managerial work, their 
earnings profiles would remain low and flat over time.... Malays have a 
lower representation in the higher paying occupations than the Chinese, 
but they have moved in large numbers from agriculture into the military 
and police, clerical and sales jobs, and white collar jobs. So occupational 
segregation of Malays is not a likely explanation for the failure of Malays 
to catch up to Chinese earnings in the MFLS2 sample. Chinese 
occupations have been more stable, with some movement out of 
agriculture, into blue collar jobs, out of clerical and sales jobs, and into 
white collar jobs. Indians have become scarcer in agriculture, and more 
numerous in blue collar jobs (Gallup 1997, p. 10, parenthesis added).”
This reasoning undermines the relevance of the human capital theory in the 
study of Malaysia’s labour markets. Two points must be considered. First, there 
is an inconsistency between the way in which earnings differentials were 
estimated and the way in which they were explained. Here, Gallup took into 
account the association between the ethnic factor and labour market structures 
when looking for the causal factors behind the issue of interest (stagnated Malay 
earnings). It had been excluded in both Mincer (1958, 1974) and Gallp’s 
empirical strategy, but was later included to account for the Malaysian reality. He 
brought up the factor that had not been used in his own regression analysis but 
later turned out necessary to interpret the empirical results. This reflects upon the 
incapacity of the human capital theory to explain Malaysia’s labour markets.
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Second, when accounting for stagnating Malay earnings, Gallup pointed to 
varying functioning of labour markets that the three ethnic groups experience. 
This is a clear divergence from the Mincer’s assumption of perfect labour market 
that all labour markets work in an identical manner. It can follow that unlike the 
presumption of Mincer those with the same years of schooling may neither face 
the same labour market nor be rewarded similarly. Above all, Gallup suggested 
that Malaysia’s labour markets are not structured as the human capital theory 
presumes and that ethnicity plays a role in them. Indeed, why are Malays unable 
to obtain lucrative occupations? Why does it happen? Is it due to their inferior 
human capital or institutional factors in labour markets? Gallup did not say much 
about this.
The difficulty of answering these questions lies in the fact that ethnic 
differentials, or ethnic dummies in the first approach, cannot be clearly discerned 
either as representing human capital or as indicating other characteristics (recall 
the discussion in section 2.3.4). As far as labour markets are concerned, ethnic 
differences in human capital accumulation, for example, must be examined with 
reference to features of schools and the workplace. Why one ethnic group’s 
human capital is superior or inferior to another’s in terms of labour market 
rewards (i.e., wage) must be explained. However, it paradoxically opens up the 
need to understand pre-entry conditions and post-entry processes, which are 
indeed beyond the scope of the underlying theory. Here, the deviation from the 
perfect labour market assumption becomes evident since it admits the differing 
functioning of labour markets that each ethnic group enters. On the other hand, if 
ethnicity carries other characteristics and plays a role in explaining wage 
differentials, then the existence of imperfect labour markets, including ethnic 
discrimination, have to be accepted. Again, this points to the varying functioning 
of labour markets, which diverges from the initial assumption of the perfect 
labour market.
In sum, Gallup sought to examine the role of ethnicity in earnings differentials, 
by breaking down the error term of Mincer’s equation (2.1). At the statistical 
level, this allowed him to obtain more accurate estimates of ROR. In spite of the 
application, however, the way in which he addressed (higher) education and
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labour markets remains piecemeal. His ex post reference to government policy 
and differing labour markets does not help us to examine why and how ethnicity 
carries significance in (higher) education and labour markets. Needless to say, 
the reason for this was that little critical attention was paid to the fundamental 
deficiency of the human capital theory that sets aside the historical and 
institutional factors framing (higher) education and labour markets. As a 
corollary, the peculiarities of Malaysia’s higher education and labour markets 
can not be understood appropriately, as long as the analysis is based on the 
human capital theory.
These criticisms are further compounded by the fact that Gallup did not assess 
education and labour markets jointly. For example, some reference was made to 
the role of government in education, and it was implied in the informal discourse 
that ethnicity played a role in both education and labour markets. However, this 
was not explicitly treated, probably since Gallup’s analysis is based on the model 
presuming statistical independence among explanatory variables. Consequently, 
the role of government in education was addressed in isolation from labour 
markets, so that the persistence of the ethnic factor from education through to 
labour markets is overlooked completely.
The ethnic differentials in ROR or earnings do not come out of a vacuum. 
They can result from education or labour markets or, quite likely, both. To 
understand why and how they emerge, therefore, it is necessary to root the 
analysis of the role of ethnicity in (higher) education and labour markets within 
historical and institutional contexts. In this connection, the question of what 
government education and labour market policies aim at needs to be addressed 
appropriately. As is clear from the discussion so far, human capital theory offers 
little guidance in doing so. Obviously, the reason is that it incorporates the social, 
like ethnicity, in inappropriately manner. In order to illustrate the peculiarities of 
Malaysia’s higher education and labour markets, therefore, it is better to break 
with the human capital theory altogether.
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3.4 Conclusions
The fundamental flaws of human capital theory in the study of education and 
labour market peculiarities, as illustrated in Chapter 2, are compounded in the 
empirical application to the Malaysian case. The deviations from the initial 
theory became more apparent as it was applied, and the understanding of 
education and labour market peculiarities remains constrained by its neglect of 
historical and institutional elements. Rather than applying the human capital 
theory or remedying its analytical deficiencies in the Malaysian context, 
therefore, it is essential to break with it.
On the other hand, this chapter revealed some important features of Malaysia’s 
higher education and labour markets, such as ethnicity and the role of 
government. Due to government intervention from the 1970s, Malays have an 
institutional advantage in higher education enrolment. In addition, Malaysia’s 
labour markets work differently to each other, and Malays, Chinese and Indians 
appear to face differing labour markets. Consequently, it is indicated that the 
ethnic factor persists from higher education to labour markets and government 
policy seems to play a part.
These points, like ethnicity and government policy, lend themselves to 
defining the grounds for an alternative analytical framework. Instead of human 
capital theory, therefore, the next three chapters place the role of government and 
ethnicity at the centre of analysis. This political economy approach enables us to 
incorporate the historical and institutional contexts in which higher education is 
provided and labour markets are structured. Accordingly, our understanding of 
why and how ethnicity carries its significance in both higher education and 
labour markets becomes even deeper.
In Malaysia, it is of paramount importance to maintain social stability due to 
the ethnically heterogeneous population. The post-Independence period from 
1957 until 1969, which can be characterised by little government intervention, 
resulted in racial riots in 1969 (Crouch 1996; Means 1976, 1991). An emergency 
was declared for the entire nation and parliament suspended. The inter-ethnic
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socio-economic imbalances, which had worsened during the period, were judged 
to be the root cause of the riots, and consequently, the NEP was introduced in 
1971 to achieve and maintain social stability through the win-win principle 
(Bowie 1991; National Operations Council 1969). The government was 
empowered to intervene in various quarters of society, and education and labour 
market policies have been formulated and implemented to achieve the end 
(Faaland, Parkinson and Saniman 1990). Consequently, these policies have 
developed around the ethnic factor, and represent the underlying trade-off 
between efficiency (economic growth) and equity (inter-ethnic distribution).
As will be seen in Chapter 4, higher education policy has placed emphasis on 
(inter-ethnic) equity aspects, on which its general institutional framework was 
constructed. In terms of access, the ethnic quota system at public higher 
education institutions, which is in favour of Malays, was introduced in 1971 and 
remained in place until 2002. In line with this, the government has intervened in 
the way in which higher education services are provided. Although the higher 
education reforms were introduced from the mid-1990s primarily due to 
efficiency reasons, they were done so on the basis of rather than apart from the 
institutional framework already in place. Thus, higher education enrolment 
remains determined by ethnicity.
By contrast, the fundamental concern in labour markets is to more explicitly 
strike a balance between economic growth and inter-ethnic distribution (see 
Chapter 5). This is so because Malaysia needs economic growth to increase the 
pie to distribute and to achieve a win-win situation for all ethnic groups. For this 
purpose, the public sector is attached the distributional role of providing 
employment opportunities for Malays, whereas the primary concern in the 
private sector is to pump up economic growth. This suggests that the efficiency- 
equity trade-off lays the core foundation for the institutional framework of labour 
markets, setting the context in which public-private differentials in various 
aspects emerge. Inevitably, then, ethnicity tends to be associated with specific 
sectors of employment (i.e., public or private sectors).
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Above all, it can be easily surmised that government policy has played a vital 
role in perpetuating the ethnic factor from higher education through to labour 
markets (see Chapter 6). Put differently, the structural conditions and constraints 
set by the government constitute the environment in which various ethnic groups 
make different decisions on higher education enrolment and sector selection. On 
the one hand, this indicates that, due to government higher education and labour 
market policies, these decisions are made simultaneously rather than separately. 
On the other hand, it can follow that the fundamental cause of the graduate 
unemployment, which is concentrated amongst Malays, is the institutional 
framework established by the government for the purpose of maintaining social 
stability.
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Chapter 4
Higher Education: Equal Access for All?
4.1 Introduction
As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, the inter-ethnic equity concerns 
embodied in the NEP were the foundation of higher education policy in Malaysia. 
They have continued to be so even from the mid-1990s, when the higher 
education reforms driven by efficiency concerns were introduced whilst 
preserving the equity concerns. This chapter will argue that this results in a 
dualistic structure within higher education: public higher education with equity 
concerns and private higher education without it. Despite the introduction of the 
reforms, therefore, ethnicity has continued to assume significance in terms of 
access to higher education and provision of educational services. Above all, 
unlike the presumption of the human capital theory, both access to higher 
education and the provision of higher educational services are controlled by the 
government for the purpose of maintaining social stability.
This chapter primarily aims to explore the peculiarities of Malaysia’s higher 
education with a political economy approach that places the role of government 
at the centre of analysis. Hence, the thrust of this chapter is not to apply and/or 
develop human capital theory and to remedy its analytical deficiencies. The 
chapter starts from the position that higher education in Malaysia does not work 
as the theory suggests. By taking the political economy approach, it becomes 
possible to understand the historical and institutional context in which ethnic 
differentials in higher education participation emerge. Then, I attempt to find 
some indication of the extent to which Malaysia’s higher education policies have 
influenced the decisions of various ethnic groups.
Indeed, this chapter updates empirical findings on ethnic differentials in higher 
education enrolment in the 1990s. As Chapter 1 showed, government expenditure 
for higher education has increased from the 1990s. However, evidence on higher 
education enrolment by ethnicity has not been available from 1988 onwards. 
Some general information like the absolute number of higher education enrolees
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can be found in government publication such as five-year Malaysia Plans. Yet, 
empirical evidence on higher education enrolment broken down by ethnicity is 
absent in the literature. Against this background, this chapter offers some new 
empirical findings on higher education enrolment through analyzing the two 
percent random sample of the Population and Housing Census Malaysia 2000.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section looks at the 
historical and institutional backgrounds of higher education with reference to the 
role of government. It starts with the NEP period, which generally determines the 
direction of higher education in the 1990s. Here, particular reference is made to 
the shifting emphasis on equity, in terms of access to higher education and 
provision of higher educational services. Section 4.3 develops empirical strategy 
to investigate ethnic differentials in higher education enrolment. This chapter 
also explains the data sets and variables to be used. Section 4.4 discusses the 
empirical results. Section 4.5 summarises the main points of this chapter and 
concludes.
4.2 Historical and Institutional Backgrounds
Before starting to discuss higher education, it is worthwhile to understand 
briefly the overall education system in Malaysia.30 Students automatically move 
up to lower secondary schooling, at the end of which they sit in the Lower 
Secondary Assessment (Penilailan Mengah Rendah, PMR) that decides the type 
of upper secondary education (academic or vocational). At the end of upper 
secondary schooling, they progress to sit the exam of Malaysia Certificate of 
Education (Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia, SPM). To pass SPM is the requirement for 
continuing through to higher education. After SPM, some students move on to 
post-secondary schooling. At its end, they take the exam of Malaysia Higher 
School Certificate (Sijil Tinggi Pelajaran Malaysia, STPM) or matriculation 
exams, achievement in which determines their higher educational enrolment. 
According to Ministry of Education, the age cohort of higher education is 19-24 
years old.
30 This paragraph draws on Ministry of Education (2000, Chart 1).
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The rest of this section is divided into three parts. First, we examine the NEP 
period, starting from a brief overview of post-independence period. It is 
developed around access to higher education and provision of educational 
services. Next, we cover the 1990s, which is our primary area of research. Lastly, 
we look at previous findings on higher education enrolment in order to lay the 
foundation on which empirical studies are carried out from Section 4.3 onwards.
4.2.1 The NEP: Higher Education as Equity-Enhancing Device
At the time of Independence in 1957, Malaysia inherited an education 
structure which had been influenced by the British higher education system and 
ethnically segregated under the British colonial policy (Loh 1975; Rudner 1994; 
Selvaratnam 1985). Since the beginning, the issue of ethnicity in higher 
education enrolment has been contentious. The Federal Constitution prescribes a 
clause on the special rights of Bumiputera in higher education: Article 153 
argued for the reservation of quotas in terms of the public service, scholarships 
and other education or training privileges (Federation of Malaya and Singapore 
1957).
Indeed, the ethnic representation in higher education enrolment was a key 
issue. The country’s first university, namely the University of Malaya (UM), had 
been founded in Singapore in 1949, in response to the Report o f a Commission 
on University Education in Malaya published on 1 May 1948 (the Carr-Saunders
31Report). However, as Table 3.1 shows, the representation of Malay students at 
the UM remained low, although it had gradually increased over time. The 
majority of students continued to be Chinese, and the ethnic imbalance in terms 
of enrolment was quite apparent. Indeed, out of the total graduates between 
1959-60 and 1969-70, Malay graduates accounted for 25.9 percent only, and 
Chinese 59.5 percent (Malaysia 1971a: Table VII). The root cause of this ethnic 
imbalance was believed to be the exam-based admission selection which seemed
31 After Independence, the UM was separated into two divisions: KL division and 
Singapore division. Although the KL division was once closed in 1958, it was reopened 
and established as the UM in KL on 15 January 1959. On the other hand, the Singapore 
division was opened as the UM in Singapore. The latter became the University of 
Singapore (now the National University of Singapore) in January 1962, and the KL 
division continued to be the UM. See also Selvaratnam (1985).
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to favour Chinese (Takei, Bock and Saunders 1973). As seen shortly, this is 
where the government started to intervene to ensure that the ethnic distribution of 
higher education enrolment to a large extent reflects the population distribution.
Table 4.1 Student Enrolment at UM by Ethnicity. 1959/60-1969/70
Malay Chinese Indians Others Total
1959-60 19.3 60.6 12.7 7.4 100
1960-61 22.1 56.2 13.5 8.2 100
1961-62 21.5 57.9 11.9 8.7 100
1962-63 20.4 58.6 12.0 9.0 100
1963-64 20.6 60.0 12.2 7.2 100
1964-65 24.4 59.8 9.5 6.3 100
1965-66 25.4 58.9 10.3 5.4 100
1966-67 28.8 56.5 9.1 5.6 100
1967-68 30.7 56.1 8.3 4.9 100
1968-69 32.8 55.7 7.2 4.3 100
1969-70 35.6 52.9 7.7 3.8 100
Note: Others include Cyelonese, Eurasians and other ethnic groups. 
Source: Computed by author from Malaysia (1971a), Table I.
The racial riots in 1969 and the consequent introduction of the NEP brought 
about shifts in higher education policy. Since it was deemed that access to 
(higher) education had worsened inter-ethnic socio-economic disparity, the NEP 
marked a departure from the system assuming little governmental role and 
instead empowered the government to intervene in higher education 
(Selvaratnam 1985). Accordingly, higher education was attached the role of 
inter-ethnic redistribution under the goal of restructuring society, and expected to 
contribute to enhancing social mobility and multiplying income levels of 
Bumiputera (Faaland, Parkinson, and Saniman 1990).32 In parallel, to develop the 
country’s human resources in light of a growing economy was also set at the core 
of the education and training programmes (Malaysia 1976: 384-5). Given the 
NEP principle of win-win (see Malaysia 1971b, p. 1), however, more emphasis 
was placed on the inter-ethnic redistribution through education (Lee 2004).
32 Faaland was engaged in formulating the NEP between 1969 and 1971 under the NOC 
headed by Tun Razak.
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The NEP attached the core responsibility of resolving the inter-ethnic concerns 
to the government (Ministry of Education 1980, quoted in Selvaratnam 1985, p. 
493). The government reinforced its own position in higher education by passing 
the Constitution (Amendment) Act in 1971 and the University and Universities 
Colleges Act (UUCA) of 1971. The decision-power regarding a number of 
educational matters became centralised around the Minister of Education (Lee
3 31996). The Minister has now discretion over the general direction and 
administration of Malaysia’s higher education (ibid). And the Central University 
Admissions Unit (or Unit Pusat Universiti, UPU), established at the Ministry of 
Education, has handled all matters related to university admission based on 
ethnic quotas (ibid). They can include preparation of exam questions, and 
selection and allocation of candidates to public university.34 Unlike the pre-NEP 
period, the autonomy of higher educational institutions was eroded by the 
government initiatives of controlling higher education in line with the NEP.
Above all, higher education in Malaysia became institutionally framed by the 
emphasis on equity more than efficiency in order to ensure that the ethnic 
distribution of students at higher education institutions reflects the population 
distribution. This framework was further complemented, or strengthened, by the 
introduction of two instruments: ethnic quota system at public higher education 
institutions and government control over provision of higher educational services. 
The former was institutionalized to achieve the ethnic balance in higher 
education enrolment, whilst increasing the number of education opportunities 
through the establishment of public higher education institutions. In parallel, the 
government started to control very explicitly over the latter, namely provision of 
educational services, such as type of education (public or private), medium of
33 The Section 3, which is on “Responsibility of Minister”, stipulates that: “The Minister 
shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be responsible for the general direction of 
higher education and the administration of this Act, which shall be in accordance with 
the national policies, strategies and guidelines on higher education formulated or 
determined by an authority established under any written law for such purposes 
(Malaysia 2002, p. 4).”
34 In 2004, the Ministry of Education was divided into the Ministry of Education and the 
Ministry of Higher Education. Now the Unit is under the latter ministry. In an 
anonymous interview (conducted on 8 August 2005), an official close to the admission 
revealed to me that the Unit still handles all matters regarding local public higher 
education and that ethnic factor constitutes an important element of the admission 
process.
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instruction, curriculum and student activities. These together reinforce the 
institutional framework of higher education, which, unsurprisingly, gives rise to 
ethnic differentials in higher education enrolment.35
Ethnic Quota System: Unequal Access to Higher Education
The government started to explicitly control access to public higher 
institutions for inter-ethnic equity concerns. In particular, it aims to make sure 
that the distribution of higher education enrolees reflects the population 
distribution of various ethnic groups. This suggests that if various ethnic groups 
enrol higher education equally or if the enrolment is randomly determined then 
the distribution of students at higher education institutions is the same with the 
population distribution. Hence, it can be argued that divergence from equal 
enrolment ratios is the contention of higher education policy in Malaysia. 
Against this background, I define ‘advantage’ and ‘disadvantage’ in higher 
education enrolment by divergence from equal enrolment ratios.36
Indeed, the main reason for introducing the quota system was that during the 
post-Independence period Chinese were over-represented at the UM, thereby 
limiting educational and economic opportunities for Malays. Malaysia (1971a) 
made proposals to the government to introduce a quota system in university 
admission (ibid, pp. 44-5). Accordingly, the government passed the Constitution 
(Amendment) Act in 1971 and the Universities Colleges Act of 1971, which also 
required all higher institutions to give more admissions to Bumiputera (mainly 
Malay) students. Although there were demands opposing the introduction among
35 Although from a different analytical perspective, Wang (1977, 1978, 1980, 1983) also 
argued that the environment created by the government influenced the decisions of 
ethnic groups differently.
36 Some may counter-argue that divergence from equal enrolment ratios is a reflection of 
different underlying choice structures across ethnic groups, not ‘advantage’ and/or 
‘disadvantage’. Though this could be one possibility, this argument does not necessarily 
help us to investigate the effects of higher education policies such as the quota system on 
the pattern of higher education enrolment. The main reason is that this argument does 
not explicitly consider the institutional context (or environment) in which individuals 
make schooling decisions. There are indeed many elements of demands, but the issue of 
government intervention is most crucial in my research context, since, as seen later in 
the main text, it influences the decisions of non-Bumiputeras. For analytical purposes, 
therefore, I follow the aim of government policy when interpreting divergence from 
equal enrolment ratios.
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the Chinese community (Kua 1999), the component parties of the ruling coalition, 
Barisan Nasional (BN), reached an agreement on quota in 1979: 55 percent for 
Bumiputera, 35 percent for Chinese, and 10 percent for Indians and others (Boo 
1998, p. 52).
This does not mean that the government did not increase the number of higher 
education opportunities. On the contrary, they did so. Through increased public 
expenditure for education (see Table 1.2), new university campuses and new 
universities were constructed, increasing the number of higher institutions 
throughout the NEP period. After the country’s second public university, the 
Science University of Malaysia (Universiti Sains Malaysia, USM), was 
established in 1969, five new public universities were constructed up to 1990.37 
In addition, two public colleges were also established.38 Accordingly, the number 
of student enrolments in higher education increased (see Table 1.3).
The introduction of the ethnic quota system meant that the new opportunities 
would be distributed in favour of Bumiputeras, mainly Malays. Indeed, the new 
higher education institutions established were publicly run since, as seen later, 
private involvement in higher education was banned during the NEP period. In 
this sense, access to higher education was institutionally made unequal for all. 
Further, one of the new colleges, namely MARA Institute of Technology (MIT), 
was constructed exclusively for Bumiputeras (see Ibrahim 1987).39 It was given 
an aggressive role in pushing up the overall Bumiputera enrolments and 
contributing to lifting Bumiputera’s representation in higher education. For 
example, around 35 percent of the total Bumiputera students in local public
37 They were: (i) National University of Malaysia (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 
UKM) in 1970; (ii) Agricultural University o f Malaysia (Universiti Pertanian Malaysia; 
in 1999 re-named Putra University of Malaysia, Universiti Putra Malaysia, UPM) in 
1971; (iii) Technology University of Malaysia (Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, UTM) in 
1972; (iv) International Islamic University of Malaysia (Universiti Islam Antrabangsa, 
UIA) in 1983; and (v) Northern University o f Malaysia (Universiti Utara Malaysia, 
UUM) in 1984 (Malaysia 2005).
38 They were: MARA Institute of Technology in 1971 and Tunku Abdul Rahman 
College (TARC) in 1969 (Malaysia 2005).
39 The MIT had ten campuses in the ten states in the 1980s (Ibrahim 1987, p. 222). They 
were: Sabah, Sarawak, Perlis, Trengganu, Johor, Malacca, Pahang, Perak, Kelantan and 
Kedah. Most of them are Malay-dominated states.
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higher education institutions enrolled at the MIT in 1988 (Malaysia 1989, Table 
13-3).
Above all, the introduction of the ethnic quota system reflected the 
government’s emphasis on inter-ethnic equity. It has not only contributed to 
expanding higher education opportunities for Bumiputeras but played a 
significant role in consolidating the institutional framework of higher education.
Government Control over Provision of Higher Educational Services
The second instrument to facilitate inter-ethnic distribution came from the 
government control over provision of higher education services; types of 
education (public or private), medium of instruction, curriculum and student 
activities. Together with the quota system, this second instrument contributed to 
ensuring the position of Bumiputeras, especially Malays, in the sphere of higher 
education.
Firstly, private involvement in higher education was strictly limited and 
controlled by the government. The forms of private education in the 1970s were 
tuition classes or pre-university courses, while those in the 1980s extended to 
credit transfer or twinning programmes through the relationship between 
domestic private colleges and overseas universities (Tan 2002). There was a 
typical example to show the government’s reluctance to accept active private 
sector involvement. In 1968, various quarters of the Chinese community 
proposed to establish a privately funded university, Merdeka University (Kua 
1999). However, due to the ethnic nature of the university, the government 
rejected the proposal in 1979 (ibid).w It was not until the mid-1990s that the 
government fully began to allow private sector involvement. For Molly Lee,
40 In the 1970s, the Chinese Guilds and Associations submitted a memorandum to the 
Cabinet Review Committee on Education headed by the then Minister of Education 
(later the Prime Minister), Dr Mahathir, to approve the establishment of privately 
sponsored university (Kua 1999). The proposal to establish it aimed at solving part of 
this problem (ibid). For, due to the ethnic quota system, “out of about 250,000 [non- 
Malay] students enrolled in pre-University classes each year, only 20,000 managed to 
secure places in local universities (ibid, p. 110, parenthesis added by author).” For 
further detailed stories of this case, including legal battles in High Court, see Kua (1999, 
Chapter 9).
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“this [governmental approach] reflected a desire to maintain tight control over 
the education system in order to allow education to play a pivotal role in 
promoting the standards of the Malay community (Lee 2004, p. 455, parenthesis 
added).”
Secondly, the medium of instruction at higher education institutions was 
converted from English to Malay by 1983, completing the full conversion at all 
levels of schooling (Malaysia 1984, p. 348).41 For example, the UKM, 
established in 1970, was intended to use Malay as the medium of instruction 
from the inception. Only in exceptional cases where they are established under 
the Company Act, higher education institutions are allowed to adopt other 
languages such as English as the medium of instruction. Nonetheless, the consent 
of the Minister of Education is mandatory to even do this.42
The third component lies in curriculum, in which UUCA of 1971 plays a 
substantial part. By principle, it covers all universities and colleges in Malaysia, 
except UIA (Lee 1996). When higher institutions intend to start new curriculum 
or change existing curriculum, for example, they must obtain approval from the 
Minister of Education (Malaysia 2002). Further, the act states that private 
institutions were restricted to “diploma courses and degrees conferred by foreign 
universities through twinning programmes (Lee 1996, p. 319).” The government 
intervention was quite substantial in determining what was taught at higher 
education institutions.
Finally, Section 15 of UUCA also put a ban on the involvement of students 
and faculty members in political and trade union activities, whether or not in
41 This is related to the emphasis on language policy and development of Malaysian 
textbooks to achieve the NEP’s over-arching goal of national unity (see Mukherjee and 
Singh 1985; Thomas 1986). As to the language policy, “the then Minister of Education, 
Dato Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’akub, announced through national television that from 1 
January 1970 the final step would be taken toward the ‘full conversion’ of the English 
schools to Malay-medium, beginning with Standard 1, and Standards 1 and 2 in 1971, 
and so on, until 1983 or 1984 when all English-medium instruction up to the university 
would be converted to Malay-medium (Hon-Chan 1977, pp. 32-3).”
42 With reference to the language policy, Wang (1978) argues that converting to Malay 
as the medium of instruction intensified the disenchantment of Chinese.
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Malaysia or outside Malaysia (Malaysia 2002).43 The government intended to 
disallow their participation in public discourses (Lee 1996).
Together with the ethnic quota system, the government control over provision 
of higher education services was expected to resolve the ethnic imbalance in 
higher education enrolment. As Selvaratnam suggests, “[the social and] political 
expediency necessitated the state’s direct intervention in order to precipitate 
drastic changes in the structure and organization” of the higher education system 
(Selvaratnam 1985, p. 494, parenthesis added). In turn, both instruments have 
supplemented or reinforced the institutional framework of higher education, 
thereby forming the basis on which ethnic differentials in enrolment patterns 
emerge.
4.2.2 The 1990s: The Emergence of a Dualistic Structure in Higher 
Education44
Under the National Development Policy (NDP) which replaced the NEP in 
1991, education remained highly prioritized (Malaysia 1991, p. 157). However, 
the 1990s witnessed some important shifts in the history of higher education in 
Malaysia. The liberalisation and privatisation moves from the mid-1980s 
gradually affected higher education policy, finally leading to a set of reforms 
from the mid-1990s (Lee 2004). What drove these shifts? What changes did the 
higher education reforms bring to the institutional framework of higher 
education?
The introduction of the higher education reforms is a reflection of the 
combination of economic and industrial demands (efficiency) and educational 
demands from non-Bumiputeras (equity). Towards the end of the NEP era, the 
government had already recognized the negative effects of the NEP. It diverted 
some affluent non-Bumiputera students away from domestic higher education 
(Selvaratnam 1988), accelerating the outflow of foreign exchange and
43 The Section 16 of UUCA stipulates that the power “to suspend or dissolve any 
organization, body or group of students” lies in the Vice-Chancellor, appointed by the 
Minister of Education (Malaysia 2002, p. 14).
44 This part is also based on Aihara (2009).
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deteriorating the services account (see Malaysia 1991, p. 181). The accumulated 
frustration of non-Bumiputeras over the NEP and their increased demand for 
education, which had caused the economic problem, prompted the government to 
gradually open up the higher education sector (Lee 2004; Tan 2002). As 
discussed earlier, for example, it started to allow private twinning programmes 
with foreign higher education institutions from the 1980s (Malaysia 1991, p. 
181). But it was not until the mid-1990s that the government allowed private 
sector involvement in various aspects of higher education.
Indeed, the reforms were expected to “cut the country’s overseas education bill 
of 2.5 billion ringgit ($1 billion) a year (International Herald Tribune, 13 
February 1996).” This would be in line with the macroeconomic strategy of 
achieving fiscal balance (Malaysia 1991, p. 40). By the same token, they were 
also expected to open up the opportunity for private companies to engage in 
higher education. For example, the then Minister of Education, Najib Razak, said 
that “the government was willing to consider all applications from private 
Malaysian companies that were capable of setting up universities {International 
Herald Tribune, 13 February 1996).”45 Foreign universities were now enabled to 
set up branch campuses and expand their business in Malaysia. Above all, 
positive impacts on expanding places at higher institutions and producing a 
qualified labour force to match economic and industrial demands were expected 
(Malaysia 1996, p. 339).
In 1996, the Parliament passed and the government enacted five acts. The 
Education Act 1995 deals with the overall education system, whereas the 
amendments to the UUCA of 1971 the corporatisation of public universities 
(Malaysia 1996, p. 334). The corporatisation was expected to improve the 
management and autonomy of public universities {ibid), but did not necessarily 
bring the expected results due to the difficulty in securing fiscal sources (Soda
45 Najib Razak is the son of late Tun Razak, the country’s second Prime Minister. After 
leaving the Minister of Education to Hishamddin Hussein, who is a relative member of 
Najib and the chief of UMNO Youth (as of February 2008), Najib, as of February 2008, 
has been the Minister of Defense since then and become the Deputy Prime Minister in 
2004 under Dr Mahathir’s successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (Koy and Koroh 2005).
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2006). The opposition against raising tuition fees for this purpose was believed to 
be an important cause of funding problems.
In parallel with this, private sector involvement in higher education was 
formally allowed. From the mid-1990s, the government started to have clear 
policies on private higher education with the three acts: Private Higher 
Educational Institutions Act (PHEIA), National Council of Higher Education Act, 
and National Accreditation Board Act (NABA) (Lee 1999). Doors were opened 
for the private sector to participate in higher education, creating new education 
opportunities, but private higher education institutions are required to 
complement the public sector (ibid).
It will be argued below that these reforms brought new additions to the 
existing institutional framework of higher education but neither altered 
fundamentally nor diminished the NEP regime. Rather, they were introduced in 
accordance with it, so that, as seen shortly, the NEP’s instruments remain 
preserved. In this sense, it can be argued that the scope and scale of government 
intervention broadened with the introduction of the reforms (see also Aihara 
2009). Indeed, the UUCA still provides for the role of the government in 
managing higher education. Crucially then, this suggests that ethnic differentials 
in enrolment pattern would be more complex since the equity-efficiency trade-off 
takes the additional form of public-private differentials in higher education.
Is Access to Higher Education Equal Now?
Throughout the 1990s, the government has been in the mode of expanding 
higher education in order to cater for economic and industrial demands as well as 
educational demands. For example, it was expected during the Sixth Plan period 
(1991-95) that “with the completion of new facilities and expansion of existing 
facilities, the intake into tertiary level education will increase substantially 
(Malaysia 1991, p. 175).” Such expansion mode was also accompanied by the 
higher education reforms, especially the rise of private higher education. For 
example, the number of private universities increased from 0 in 1995 to 16 in 
2001 (Kementerian Pendidikan Tinggi 2000, quoted in Lee 2004, p. 444). The 
number of private colleges also jumped from 156 in 1992 to 690 in 2001 (ibid).
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Accordingly, the total number of public higher education institutions and the 
total enrolment increased over the decade (see Chapter 1).
Does this mean that the government outstripped the quota system? Is access to 
higher education made equal now? Not really. The quota system was still 
maintained in the public stream, and it remained so until 2002, when the 
government replaced it with a meritocracy system.46 At the same time, further 
higher education participation of Bumiputeras was promoted by “the expansion 
in capacity and the introduction of new courses at ITM [or MIT] (Malaysia 1996, 
p. 331, parenthesis added).” This means that the NEP regime concerned with 
equity did not disappear after 1991 since the ethnic distribution of enrolees at 
public higher educational institutions was still the focal point of higher education 
policy.
Crucially, the way in which the government introduced the reforms led to a 
dualistic structure in terms of government policy on access. That is, the quota 
system is applied to the public stream, while the private stream is free from it. 
This mirrors the importance of reconciling economic and educational demands, 
whilst preserving the institutional framework set in place.47 Put another way, the 
underlying trade-off between efficiency and equity has also started to manifest 
itself in public-private differentials.
46 In fact, the ultra UMNO Youth criticized the disadvantage of the meritocracy system 
and submitted a proposal to the Ministry of Higher Education regarding the matter (New 
Straits Times, 23 May 2005). In fact, they and the influential UMNO Johor strongly 
advocated for the re-introduction of the quota system to keep places for Bumiputeras, 
mainly Malays (The Star, 13 June 2005; Bernama 9 July 2005).
47 However, there were some political attempts to extend the quota system to the private 
stream, although it finally failed in the end. The issue was picked up in Parliament due 
to demands from Malay members of parliament (International Herald Tribune, 13 
February 1996). According to Soda (2006) that analysed the parliamentary proceedings, 
this issue was favourably raised not only by Malay opposition members such as Parti 
Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and Semangat 46 but by a member from UMNO. But the 
application of the quota system to private institutions was overtly opposed by both ruling 
and opposition Chinese parties (namely, MCA and DAP). Given these oppositions, the 
quota system was not introduced to private institutions.
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Has the Government Control over Provision of Educational Services Gone?
Higher education reforms since the 1990s have dismantled the strict 
government ban over private sector involvement in higher education. Similarly, 
some shifts were seen in terms of the medium of instruction and curriculum, but 
student activities in politics and unions remain strictly banned at both public and 
private higher education institutions (Soda 2006). Most crucially, all these 
changes were introduced in accordance with the existing institutional framework 
of higher education, causing a dualistic structure in terms of the way in which 
higher education services are provided.
By principle, Bahasa Malaysia remains the medium of instruction at higher 
institutions, but there are some signs of changes from the NEP period. Though 
the consent of the Minister of Education is mandatory in all cases, the 
government allows the switch from Bahasa Malaysia to English. However, there 
is a clear difference between public and private higher education institutions. In 
the case of the former, the use of English is restricted to medicine and technical 
subjects alone (Alias 1997). By contrast, according to PHEIA, private higher 
education institutions can use other languages such as English to teach all 
subjects once approved by the Minister (Samuel and Lew 1997). Presumably, 
this public-private difference resulted from political awareness of the leaders, 
especially the then Prime Minister Dr Mahathir, who saw the importance of co­
opting non-Bumiputeras since most of the newly constructed private institutions 
accommodated the educational demands from non-Bumiputeras (Lee 2004; Tan 
2002). By the same token, using English as the medium of instruction was 
believed to be useful in terms of efficiency concerns since English learning 
would be more useful in securing employment (Lee 2004).
In contrast, the government control over curriculum or programs offered 
remains despite the introduction of the reforms. For example, the UUCA and 
PHEIA stipulate the final decision power resides with the Minister of Education 
with regard to curriculum or programs offered (Lee 1999; Tan 2002). In addition, 
NABA aims to set up an accreditation board to oversee the quality of private 
education (Lee 1999). Through analysis of ministerial speeches and documents 
as well as a number of interviews with educationalists, Tan (2002) similarly
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argues that these legislations were “designed to open up access higher education 
on the one hand, and to place Malaysian private higher education under 
regulatory control with respect to quality and in compliance with the national 
education philosophy on the other (ibid, p. 81).”
Quite obviously, the government control over provision of higher educational 
services did not decline. For, the government did not quite touch upon the realm 
of the existing institutional framework constituted under the NEP. Rather, the 
reforms gave rise to a dualistic structure in higher education (in terms of access 
and provision of its services), as the result of preserving the existing environment. 
Naturally, there emerges a public-private divergence in the way in which higher 
education is provided (Wilkinson and Yussof 2005). In terms of access, all this 
suggests that Bumiputera students are likely to enrol public higher education 
institutions with equity concerns, non-Bumiputera private ones without them (see 
also Noran and Ahmad 1997 quoted in Tan 2002, p. 92; Pong 1995).
4.2.3 Ethnic Differentials in Higher Education Enrolment: Previous 
Findings
As the discussion so far suggests, the government intervention in higher 
education, which ostensibly aimed at maintaining social stability, has constituted 
the institutional context in which various ethnic groups make schooling decisions. 
It influences various elements of demands, determining outcomes of their 
schooling decisions. It seems obvious to see the Bumiputera (or Malay) 
advantage in enrolling public higher education institutions due to the quota 
system. In turn, it can be surmised that numerous non-Bumiputera students 
pursued overseas education during the NEP period, but switched to domestic 
private higher education from the mid-1990s. Clearly, this points to unequal 
access to higher education, which takes place due to the nature of higher 
education policy in Malaysia.
Table 4.2 presents the enrolment trend until 1988, after which similar data 
becomes unavailable. It reveals three interesting, but hardly surprising, findings. 
First, we can observe the advantage of Bumiputeras at local higher education 
institutions. Since the private higher education was strictly restricted during the
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NEP period, it can tautologically follow that Bumiputeras constituted the 
majority group at public higher education institutions. For example, Bumiputera 
accounted for 53.7 percent of the total enrolments at domestic higher education 
institutions in 1970, but the share jumped to 65.3 percent in 1988.
Second, a number of Chinese and Indian students chose overseas education 
institutions, primarily due to the preferential treatment of the NEP (Young and 
Ng 1994). For Selvaratnam, many non-Bumiputera “candidates who are qualified 
on academic criteria to enter the country’s local universities were rejected on 
ethnic grounds and are therefore forced to seek an overseas higher education 
(Selvaratnam 1988, p. 189).” The total number of Malaysian students in overseas 
higher institutions amounted to 29,731 in 1980 (Malaysia 1984, Table 14-3), and 
it reached at 60,544 in 1988 (Malaysia 1989, Table 13-3). Yet, the dominance of 
non-Bumiputera students was evident. For example, 56.5 percent and 12.7 
percent of the students studying abroad as of 1988 were Chinese and Indians 
respectively, while Malays accounted only for 29.8 percent (see Table 4.2). 
Throughout the 1980s, Chinese and Indians represented at least two-thirds of 
Malaysian students studying overseas.
Finally, one very interesting point can be found from Table 4.2. When 
combined all types of higher education (local and overseas) together, we can see 
the under-representation of Bumiputeras and the over-representation of Chinese 
in higher education enrolment. When looking at higher education irrespective of 
its type (i.e., domestic or overseas), Chinese and Indians accounted for 39.6 and
8.4 percent of the total enrolees in 1988 respectively (see the last row of Table 
4.2). Indeed, the figure for Chinese is higher than the overall population share of 
around 31.8 percent (Malaysia 1989, Table 4-1). On the other hand, the Malay 
share of the total enrolees in 1988 was 51.2 percent, which was lower than the 
population share of 57.6 percent (ibid). This suggests that the Malay advantage 
in higher education enrolment, especially relative to Chinese, was absent during 
the NEP, when overseas higher education figures are accounted for.
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The first two points are fairly obvious. In particular, the first point is consistent 
with the finding of Agadjanian and Liew (2005) that used MFLS-2 data and 
found the Malay advantage in post-secondary (including higher) education 
enrolment during the NEP period. However, the last point that emerged from 
Table 4.2 contradicts the finding of Agadjanian and Liew (2005). Part of the 
reason for this is the sample coverage of MFLS-2 (see also Table 3.1). It only 
covers Peninsular Malaysia and does not contain information on higher education 
enrolment. Indeed, the ethnic distribution of the sample used by Agadijanian and 
Liew (2005) does not represent the true population distribution. In their sample 
compiled in 1988, Malays accounted for 46,8 percent, Chinese 28.9 percent and 
Indians strikingly 24.3 percent. In fact, this sample under-represents Malays and 
over-represents Indians. For example, in 1991, Bumiputeras accounted for 61.3 
percent of the total population (Malays 50.7 percent and other Bumiputeras 10.6 
percent), and Chinese 27.5 percent and Indians 7.8 percent (Swee-Hock 2007 
Table 5.2).48 This coverage problem not only questions the credibility of their 
finding, but also points to the following hypothesis on the basis of Table 4.2:
Hypothesis 1: During the NEP, the Malay advantage in enrolling higher 
education, especially relative to Chinese, was absent when combining all types of 
higher education together, but Indians have lagged behind Malays in terms of 
higher education access.
Unfortunately, it is impossible at this stage to depict the ethnic distribution of 
higher education enrolees after 1988 since all Malaysia Plans after Malaysia 
(1989) stopped publishing the figures given in Table 4.2. There are no studies in 
the literature that have examined this, but the next section will be the first 
attempt to look into the hypothesis using a representative data set.
Further, section 4.2.2 showed that the reforms from the mid-1990s started to 
allow private sector involvement in higher education, thereby increasing 
opportunities. Aihara (2009) found that the main beneficiaries of the private 
sector involvement were non-Bumiputeras, and that they accounted for around
48 The rest are other Malaysian citizens.
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80 percent of the enrolees at private higher education institutions. Since private 
higher education institutions played a large part in increasing the number of 
enrolment, we can surmise, in relation to the first hypothesis, the following 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: In the 1990s, the ethnic differentials in higher education 
enrolment, especially Malay-Chinese and Malay-Indians, reversed or narrowed.
The empirical investigation of this hypothesis, together with the first one, enables 
us to depict the time-series trend of the ethnic differentials, which has never been 
done in the literature.
The empirical study that follows is the first attempt in the literature to examine 
ethnic differentials in higher education enrolment from the NEP period until 
2000. Nonetheless, some notes on public-private choice in higher education must 
be made before proceeding. Numerous studies have pointed to the ethnic 
differences in enrolment pattern between public and private streams in the 1990s, 
but without concrete evidence (for example, Alias 1997; Lee 1996, 1999, 2004; 
Samuel and Liew 1997; Tan 2002). This is another crucial issue to examine, but 
the rest of this chapter does not treat it since it is more concerned with higher 
education enrolment in general. Instead, Chapter 6 examines the public-private 
choice in higher education together with the public-private employment choice, 
in order to complement the findings of this chapter.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
4.3.1 Data
The rest of this chapter is based on empirical analysis of the two percent 
random sample of Population and Housing Census Malaysia 2000, and aims to 
test the two hypotheses established above.49 The census data was released from
49 Hirschman (1972, 1979) used the two percent random sample of Population and 
Housing Census Malaysia 1957 and 1970 respectively, but did not look at higher 
education enrolment.
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the Department of Statistics (DOS) on November 2006 for the purpose of this 
study. The original size of the sample is 435,300 individuals.
The census data is collected every ten years, and there have been five censuses 
from the country’s Independence. It is representative nationally, and stands out 
from other surveys such as MFLS-2 in that it covers both Peninsular and Borneo 
(see also Table 3.1). What the government calls ‘the Census day’ was 5 July 
2000, and all individual information was collected according to their usual place 
of residence rather than the place on the night of the Census day. Further, 
individual records were collected in hierarchical way: starting with enumeration 
block, living quarter, household and then individuals (Department of Statistics 
2000a).
The present data set is given in three separate forms: living quarter, household 
and individual sample tapes. The living quarter and household sample tapes 
include current information on various physical facilities of houses and living 
materials. On the other hand, the individual sample tape contains current 
information on socio-economic backgrounds of residents, ranging from 
educational backgrounds, labour force and employment status. Unfortunately, 
income and expenditure data are not included in this census data.50
I attempted to integrate the three samples by creating an identifier and 
matching them with it. However, it was unsuccessful since the data was inserted 
differently between Peninsular Malaysia and Borneo. On the one hand, the 
Peninsular data is divided by each living quarter, under which the household and 
individual data are listed. On the other hand, the Borneo data is not done so. 
Several living quarters are listed altogether, followed by all households and then 
individuals. This makes it impossible to match each living quarter with 
household and individuals in the Borneo case. This problem with the Borneo data 
cannot be solved since the raw information was not made available by the DOS.
50 The release of these data was rejected due to sensitivity.
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Rather than integrating the three samples, therefore, it seems more reasonable 
to use the individual sample. There is a reason to justify it. The living quarter and 
housing samples contain only current information at the time of census. In 
contrast, schooling decisions were already made before the time of census. 
Therefore, inclusion of the two sample tapes can cause serious endogeneity since 
the facilities and living materials at the time of census may well be the 
consequences rather than causes of schooling decisions. Thus, we stick to the 
individual sample which can still allow us to look into the entire nation, 
including Borneo that has long been outside the attention of study in the 
literature.
The individual sample tape includes a wide range of residents. But we focus 
on Malaysian citizens bom in Malaysia, and on the three major ethnic groups: 
Malays, Chinese and Indians. The three ethnic groups still constitute around 90 
percent of all Malaysian citizens. The reason for focusing on Malaysians born in 
Malaysia is that those bom overseas are highly likely to enrol in overseas 
education and are outside the scope of the NEP. In contrast, Malaysia-born 
citizens may have chosen domestic or overseas higher education in response to 
the NEP, or decided not to enrol higher education. Since the primary focus of this 
empirical study is to look into how the domestic population reacted to 
government policy and thus the ethnic differentials in access to higher education, 
it is useful to control for this from the beginning.
Further, we focus on those who are between 20 and 49 years old at the time of 
census. Following King and Lillard (1987) and Pong (1993) who examined the 
effects of government preferential policy on (upper) secondary school attainment, 
the sample is divided into several age cohorts. In particular, we construct six 
five-year cohorts: 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44 and 45-49. When and where 
necessary, these cohorts are made into three ten-year cohorts, namely 20-29, 30- 
39 and 40-49, in order to highlight the effects of the NEP on schooling decisions.
The selection of these age cohorts is based on three reasons. First, those above 
20 years old are eligible to enrol higher education, either domestic or overseas 
(see Ministry of Education 2000). Thus, it is assumed for analytical purposes that
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individuals enrol in higher education at the age of 20. Second, 50 years is 
generally the retirement age of women in Malaysia, although men’s retirement 
age by 2000 was 55 years old. This allows us to cover the working age 
population. Finally, and very importantly, those between 30 and 49 years are 
assumed to have entered higher education during the NEP era (1971-1990) since 
they were bom between 1951 and 1970. This makes it possible to analyze the 
effects of government policy on enrolment by comparing them with the younger 
cohort (20-29 years old).
Nonetheless, there remains a question of selectivity bias in the data sets. Some 
Chinese and Indians, having enrolled overseas higher education and continued to 
stay overseas, are excluded from the data set. This bias may be larger for the 
older than the younger cohorts, in light of government policy during the NEP 
period. However, this bias can not be overcome by the present data per se, and 
the absence of relevant empirical materials in the literature makes it more 
difficult to ascertain the magnitude of the bias. Thus, some reservation must be 
made when interpreting the results for the older cohorts.
Above all, the sample size is reduced to 140,551 individuals, and the ethnic 
distribution is 58.7 percent for Malays, 31.9 percent for Chinese and 9.3 percent 
for Indians (Table 4.3). Needless to say, this ethnic breakdown is totally different 
to the one of Agadjanian and Liew (2005), where Malays accounted for 46.8 
percent, Chinese 28.9 percent and Indians 24.3 percent. Given the fact that the 
Census data is the source of data on population distribution in government 
publication, the present data must be judged more reliable in terms of sample 
coverage than the MFLS-2.
Table 4.3 The Sample Distribution by Ethnicity
Frequency Percent
Malays 82,562 58.7
Chinese 44,876 31.9
Indians 13,113 9.3
TOTAL 140,551 100.0
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4.3.2 Estimation Strategy
The previous studies on the probability of educational access in Malaysia 
employed a logit model, either a binary logit (Agadjanian and Liew 2005; Pong 
1993) or a multinominal logit (Sudha 1997).51 Nonetheless, it is only Agadjanian 
and Liew (2005) who analysed the transition to post-secondary schooling, 
including higher education. They used a binary logit model with a dichotomous 
variable that equals 1 if you have entered post-secondary education given the 
completion of upper secondary education and 0 if not. For this reason, I follow a 
similar method and aim to update the findings on higher education enrolment.
With a dichotomous variable as the dependent variable, the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) yield inefficient estimates due to the following assumptions 
(Gilbert 1993; Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000; Maddala 1983, 2001). First, it is 
assumed that the error term has a constant variance. When the dependent variable 
is dichotomous, however, it is violated since the error term does not follow 
normal distribution. Consequently, the coefficient estimates are no longer the 
best linear unbiased (BLUE). Second, it is assumed that the dependent variable 
takes any values on the real line, which is inconsistent with the nature of a 
dichotomous variable of taking either 0 or 1. A dichotomous variable follows an 
extreme value distribution rather than normal distribution, with the latter being 
assumed in the OLS estimates. Hence, a logit model uses the maximum 
likelihood estimators that yield smaller standard errors in the case of non­
constant variance of the binary outcome (Agresti 2002).
Consider the following probability of one’s enrolling higher education52:
T _ ExP{a  + + A*2 + -  + PjXj )
[l + Exp\p + + P2X2 + ... + PjXj )]
51 King and Lillard (1987) did not look into the probability of educational access in 
econometric form. Rather, they generally looked at the pattern of high school enrolment 
rates through descriptive analysis of age cohort. Hence, as is the same with the present 
chapter, they used age cohort to capture the effects of government policy on enrolment 
pattern.
52 This paragraph is written with reference to Long and Freese (2006, pp. 177-181).
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TCL e t 5 which is the odds of the two probabilities, be denoted by Q . Take the
\ ~ n
natural logarithm of the odds, namely logit, and the equation (4.1) can be written 
in the following linear form:
ln^—— j = In Q (x) = a  + J3{xx + J32x2 +... + J3jXj (4.2)
where X  = x . The logit model helps us to describe the effects of each
explanatory variable on the dependent variable. This is particularly so because it 
yields odds ratio by transforming the above regression. By taking the exponential 
of the equation (4.2) with regard to both xx and jq +1 (a unit increase), holding 
all others constant, and then dividing them, we get the odds ratio:
n(X,xt) ~
It means that a unit change in jq leads to a change in the odds through exp ( jq). 
The STATA package reports odds ratios for each explanatory variable together 
with the 95 percent confidence interval.
Indeed, the property of logistic regression in obtaining odds ratio is extremely 
useful in looking into the ethnic differentials in higher educational enrolment. By 
comparing odds ratios for Chinese and Indians, for example, it becomes easy to 
investigate the inter-ethnic (or between-group) differences in the probability of 
enrolling higher education.
At this stage, it must be stressed that the purpose of this empirical study is not 
to find the ‘best fitted’ econometric model to support any theory. Indeed, the 
potential data deficiencies in terms of the number of available variables make it 
difficult to do so. Rather, it aims to examine the trends of ethnic differentials in 
higher educational enrolment by illustrating the effects of various factors like 
ethnicity on the probability of enrolling higher education institutions. As
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mentioned earlier, the government publications and the previous studies treated 
the NEP period, but left the 1990s unanalyzed. This is where this study has 
something to offer by using the similar method to them. While ascertaining the 
ethnic differentials, emphasis is also put on their historical trend with reference 
to the NEP period and the 1990s. This enables us to observe the effects of 
government policy shifts on enrolment decisions of each ethnic group.
4.3.3 Variables
The variables used for the present empirical study and their definitions are 
presented in Table 4.4. The dependent variable for the present study is a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether or not you have entered higher 
education given the completion of upper secondary education: it equals 1 if you 
have done so and 0 otherwise.
The explanatory variables indicate individuals’ characteristics. CHN and IDN 
are ethnic dummies representing whether you are Chinese or Indians, with 
Malays the reference group. GENDER is also a dummy variable equalling 1 if 
female and 0 if male. There are also five age cohort dummies, indicating 1 if the 
individual belongs to the cohort and 0 if not. The reference group is set for the 
youngest 20-24 age cohort. We also have four geographical dummies that can, 
albeit roughly, represent economic backgrounds of individuals. With reference to 
Malaysia (2001, Tables 5.1 and 5.3), they are classified into KX & Selangor, 
BORNEO, NORTH, SOUTH and WEST. According to it, KL & Selangor, 
which is the reference group, is the richest region in terms of per capita GDP, 
followed by WEST, SOUTH, NORTH and BORNEO.53
The selection of variables was done by reference to both previous studies and 
constraints of the present data. By employing ethnicity, gender, age, and family 
backgrounds such as parental education and income, Lillard and Willis (1993), 
Pong (1993, 1995) and Sudha (1997) investigated secondary school attainment, 
and Agadjanian and Liew (2005) post-secondary education including higher
53 1 used data from Malaysia (2001, Tables 5.1 and 5.3) and computed the average per 
capita GDP of these regions (in RM million): 24,045 for KX & Selangor, 17,326 for 
WEST, 13,210 for SOUTH, 12,239 for NORTH, and 10,939 for BORNEO.
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education.54 However, due to data constraints, there is one noticeable difference 
between these studies and my study: no variables on family backgrounds are 
employed here. This is because the present data sets do not contain information 
on parental socio-economic backgrounds such as education, occupation and 
income. Yet, the four geographical dummies are additionally included as 
explanatory variables in order to roughly see the effect of economic backgrounds 
on higher education enrolment decisions.
54 They all used MFLS-2.
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4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Descriptive Results
Table 4.5 shows higher education enrolment by ethnicity and the results of 
Chi-squared test. 14.1 percent of those between 20 and 49 years old have 
enrolled in higher education, and, as expected, there are ethnic differences. 
Chinese marked the highest of 16 percent, followed by Malays (13.7 percent) and 
Indians (10.3 percent). And the test statistics clearly indicate that the two 
variables are associated. Nonetheless, these findings must be investigated further 
since they do not control for other elements such as gender and age cohort effects. 
Indeed, in the Malaysian context, the age cohort effects must be adequately 
captured since the impacts of government policy on schooling decisions are 
substantial.
Table 4.5 Higher Education Enrolment by Ethnicity
Enrolled Higher Education TotalYes No
Malays 13.7 86.3 100.0
Chinese 16.0 84.0 100.0
Indians 10.3 89.7 100.0
TOTAL 14.1 85.9 100.0
Chi-square DF Value Probability
Pearson 2 296.4 .000
Likelihood Ratio 2 306.2 .000
Table 4.6 breaks down the proportion of higher educational enrolment by 
ethnicity and gender, and presents two interesting, but hardly surprising, results. 
First, there is a gender difference, though not necessarily substantial. The 
proportion of those having entered higher education is higher for men than 
women, and this trend applies with all the ethnic groups. Second, it should also 
be pointed out that, regardless of gender, the Chinese enrolment ratios are highest, 
followed by Malays and then Indians. For example, the enrolment ratio of
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Chinese women is higher than that of Malay men, and the enrolment ratio of 
Malay women is higher than that of Indian men.
Table 4.6 Higher Education Enrolment bv Ethnicity and Gender
Enrolled Higher Education
Yes No Total
Malays Male 14.7 85.3 100.0
Female 12.7 87.3 100.0
Chinese Male 16.7 83.3 100.0
Female 15.2 84.8 100.0
Indians Male 11.4 88.6 100.0
Female 9.1 90.1 100.0
TOTAL Male 15.1 84.9 100.0
Female 13.2 86.8 100.0
Significantly, the Chinese advantage in enrolling in higher education visible in 
Table 4.5 can not necessarily be found during the NEP period. It is seen from 
Figure 4.1. Overall, higher education enrolment expanded rather gradually during 
the NEP period, and the Chinese enrolment ratio was almost at par with Malay’s 
between 1971 and 1990. This seems consistent with our earlier findings from 
Table 4.2, but inconsistent with Agadjanian and Liew (2005). In contrast, when 
the NDP was put in place in 1991, the Chinese enrolment ratio started to increase 
from the mid-1990s. In effect, the proportion of Chinese who enrolled in higher 
education exceeded 30 percent by 2000. Similarly, Indians started to increase 
their enrolment ratio after 1991, but still lagged behind Malays.
This Malay-Chinese reversal can be understood by considering the policy 
shifts in the 1990s. As mentioned earlier, the liberalisation moves started to flow 
over to the terrain of higher education from the late 1980s, and they finally led to 
a series of higher education reforms in the 1990s. It can be easily surmised that 
many of Chinese and Indian students opt for private rather than public streams 
since the latter applies the ethnic quota system. Using the same data source, for 
example, Aihara (2009) found that around 80 percent of the students at private 
higher education institutions were non-Bumiputeras while Bumiputeras
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accounted for 70 percent of the total students at public higher education 
institutions.
Above all, Table 4.5 masks the opposing associations found in Figure 4.1 
since it does not control for the policy effects. Instead, it can be argued that the 
ethnic association with higher educational enrolment is influenced by age cohort 
reflecting the changing effects of government policy. Putt differently, the 
association between higher educational enrolment and ethnicity varies according 
to age cohort.
Figure 4.1 Trend of Higher Education Enrolment bv Ethnicity
Malay
Chinese
Indians
1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000
Year of Enrolment
4.4.2 Estimation Results: Between-Group Differences
Given the findings from Figure 4.1, I first estimate the equation (4.2) for the 
whole sample and then for three separate age cohorts: 20-29 years old, 30-39 
years old, and 40-49 years old. The latter two cohorts were the schooling-going 
cohorts during the NEP period, but the youngest cohort during the 1990s. Then, I 
compare the odds ratios across these cohorts and capture the impacts of 
government policy on enrolment decisions with reference to ethnicity.
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The result of the logistic regression (4.2) estimated for the whole sample is 
presented in Table 4.7.55 All explanatory variables are statistically significant at p  
< .01, and the log likelihood test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
on all the explanatory variables are jointly zero.56 It can be argued that they have 
effects on higher educational enrolment.
Three findings are immediately clear. First, there are ethnic differences in 
higher educational enrolment. Chinese were 25 percent more likely to enrol in 
higher education than Malays, whereas Indians around 30 percent less likely to 
do so. As elaborated later, this Malay-Chinese difference may not be surprising 
in light of the shifting higher education policies over the three decades. It will be 
found later that the Chinese advantage started to appear in the 1990s whereas the 
Indian persistently lagged behind Malays in terms of the likelihood of enrolling 
in higher education. Second, there is a gender difference as well. Women are 
around 15 percent less likely to enrol than men. Again, it will be found later that 
the gender gap has narrowed over time and women outstripped men in the 1990s. 
Third, expansion of higher education over time can be confirmed by the five age 
cohort dummies. For example, the 45-49 cohort dummy indicates that higher 
education opportunities increased by four-fold from early 1970s, and the 30-34 
dummy that they doubled from late 1980s.
These findings from Table 4.7 are fairly consistent with our arguments 
developed earlier, but it is necessary to break them down to depict the effects of 
government policy on schooling decisions. In particular, when considering the 
ethnic differentials in relation to the NEP, logistic regressions are estimated for 
three separate cohorts (see also Figure 4.1). Table 4.8 shows the results. For each 
cohort, two models were estimated. Since the sample is already controlled by age 
cohort, I exclude age-related variables. The restricted model includes ethnicity 
and gender dummies, and the reference group is Malay men. The full model
55 Long and Freese (2006, p. 181) note that when reporting odds ratios rather than 
coefficients, the 95% confidence interval of them is reported instead of the standard 
error.
56 There is no unique standard with which to choose a hypothesis test of coefficients, but 
statisticians seem to prefer the log-likelihood test to Wald-test (Long and Freese 2006, p. 
145).
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includes all the variables in the restricted model and further adds birthplace 
dummies. The reason for doing so is that birthplace dummies can, though 
roughly, reflect socio-economic elements as well as proximity to higher 
education institutions. The reference group for the full model is Malay men bom 
in Kuala Lumpur or Selangor.
Table 4.7 Result of the Logistic Regression for the whole sample (odds ratios)
Variable
Ethnicity
Chinese 1.25
(1.21, 1.29)
Indians 0.73
(0.68, 0.77)
Gender
Female 0.84
(0.81,0.87)
Age Cohort
25-29 0.65
(0.62, 0.68)
30-34 0.52
(0.50, 0.55)
35-39 0.42
(0.40, 0.44)
40-44 0.32
(0.30, 0.34)
45-49 0.25
(0.24, 0.27)
Log likelihood test
G-squared 3714.17
p-value 0.00
N. of Sample 140,551
All significant at p  < .01.
Figures in parentheses are the 95 percent confidence interval.
As seen from Table 4.8, the inclusion of the birthplace variables reduces the 
odds ratios of Chinese and Indian dummies. In particular, the magnitude of the 
change is largest for the youngest cohort. Rather surprisingly, this suggests that 
birthplace, which is the proxy for economic backgrounds of individuals, has 
become more important in determining higher education enrolment. On the other 
hand, the inclusion of those variables hardly changes the odds of the female
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dummy. Despite these findings, more interesting results can be found when 
looking specifically at ethnicity, gender and birthplace.
First of all, there exist the ethnic differentials in higher educational enrolment, 
although their magnitudes vary between Chinese and Indians. Equally 
importantly, it can be also found that government policy affects the schooling 
decisions of each ethnic group very differently.
During the NEP period, the Malay-Chinese difference was overall 
insignificant, whereas the disadvantage of Indians relative to Malays is 
significant (columns 1-4). Putting all types of higher education together, the 
Malay advantage in entering higher education is not evident, at least in 
comparison to Chinese. This finding supports Hypothesis 1, being consistent 
with Table 4.2. This finding is hardly surprising since a large number of Chinese 
students chose overseas education in response to the NEP.
The findings for the 1990s support Hypothesis 2. The odds ratio for Chinese is 
statistically significant, and their likelihood of enrolling in higher education 
exceeded that of Malays (see columns 5-6). They are around 50 percent more 
likely to enter higher education. This result coincides with higher education 
reforms in the 1990s, indicating that more Chinese now choose private streams 
of higher education without ethnic concerns while Malays choose public streams. 
On the other hand, Indians have persistently lagged behind, irrespective of 
government policy shifts in the 1990s. Although the gap with Malays has 
gradually narrowed over time, their disadvantage is still in the range of 20-30 
percent (columns 5-6). Above all, access to higher education is not equal given 
these ethnic differentials, and it is highly influenced by government policy.
Secondly, the persistence of gender differences can be seen. Female 
disadvantage in entering higher education was seen during die NEP period. They 
were around 45 percent less likely to attend higher education in the 1970s 
(columns 1-2), and more or less 30 percent in the 1980s (columns 3-4). However, 
women outstripped men in the 1990s. In spite of the small margin, they are now
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more likely to enrol in higher education (columns 5-6). Thus, this clearly points 
to the changing enrolment pattern of women.
Some tentative reasons for changing trends of women’s enrolment pattern can 
be considered, though comprehensive research on this topic is required in the 
future. One reason can be different fertility rates, which influence the proportion 
of women in the cohorts. However, a population economist, Swee-Hock (2005, 
Chapter 6), reports the male-dominated population structure in Malaysia, which 
requires us to consider another reason. In this regard, more reasonable reason can 
be that higher education expansion as well as social transformation with 
economic growth over time prompted more women to pursue higher education. 
Obviously, the investigation of this statement demands more detailed data sets 
that contain household-level as well as individual-level information. Yet, it is 
impossible to ascertain this issue at this moment, due to the deficiencies of the 
present data sets, such that this issue can be a future research topic. Nonetheless, 
it must be highlighted that access to higher education is in general uneven along 
gender lines as well. Although gender is not the primary policy target in 
Malaysia’s higher education, these findings complement the earlier findings on 
the ethnic differences.
Finally, the odds ratios of the four birthplace dummies, which roughly 
represent economic backgrounds of individuals, are all statistically significant, 
meaning that they have effects on higher educational enrolment. Generally, it is 
indicated that those bom in Kuala Lumpur or Selangor have enjoyed more access 
to higher education. In general, it can be stated that economic backgrounds 
influence higher educational enrolment.
It is also found that the effects of being from Kuala Lumpur or Selangor have 
become more evident in the 1990s. Columns 2 and 4 reveal slightly increased 
effects of birthplace on the binary outcome. By the 1980s, for example, those 
bom in Borneo states were 40 percent less likely to enrol higher education than 
those in Kuala Lumpur or Selangor. Even those from other states were also 
disadvantaged by the range of 15 to 20 percent. On the other hand, column 6 
demonstrates that those bom in Kuala Lumpur or Selangor are even more
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advantaged in accessing higher education. This suggests that the newly expanded 
opportunities in the 1990s are not equally enjoyed by the public and may be 
created in the developed states. For example, Lee (1999) points out that more or 
less half of the private institutions were concentrated in Kuala Lumpur or 
Selangor area.
Indeed, these results suggest the existence and persistence of not only inter- 
but intra-ethnic difference in higher education enrolment (see also Aihara 2009; 
Tzannatos 1991). Malay men born in Kuala Lumpur or Selangor are more likely 
to move on to higher education than, for example, those from Northern states. At 
the same time, they indirectly point to intergenerational reproduction of 
educational backgrounds. For, those having attained higher education are likely 
to reside in the developed states, such as Kuala Lumpur or Selangor, since there 
are a number of employment opportunities rewarding their educational 
backgrounds. That being the case, those staying in the less developed states can 
continue to have less access to higher education.
The present data sets do not allow me to further investigate these issues since, 
as mentioned in section 4.3, it does not contain individual data on income and 
expenditure. Nonetheless, the findings on birthplace strengthen rather than 
weaken our arguments that access to higher education in Malaysia is not 
necessarily equal for all. Contrary to human capital theory, access to higher 
education in Malaysia is institutionally arranged in favour of Malays. The ethnic 
differences in terms of higher education enrolment are evident, and they are 
indeed intensified by other factors.
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4.4.3 Estimation Results: Within-Group Differences
While having estimated the effects of ethnicity on higher education enrolment, 
we have also pointed to those of gender and birthplace. Though some caveats 
ought to be made due to the deficiencies of the present data sets, logistic 
regressions were separately estimated for Malays, Chinese and Indians in order 
to see with in-group differences. Table 4.9 presents the results. Most of the 
explanatory variables are statistically significant at p  < .01, and the log likelihood 
test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients on all the explanatory 
variables are jointly zero.57 They have effects on higher educational enrolment 
respectively. *
Three major points are found from the table. First, hardly surprisingly, there 
are clear gender differences in higher education participation. For all the three 
groups, women have less access to higher education than men. As discussed in 
section 4.4.2, the question of why gender differences exist within each ethnic 
group should be addressed in future research. Next, it is seen from the 
coefficients on age cohort dummies that access to higher education has 
broadened over time for Malays, Chinese and Indians. Importantly, however, the 
speed at which higher education has become accessible over time differs among 
the ethnic groups. Compared to Malays, for example, it can be said that Chinese 
and Indians benefited more from the higher education reforms in the 1990s. 
Chinese aged between 20 and 24 are twice as likely to enrol in higher education 
as those between 25 and 29 years old. The same tendency applies of Indians. 
Further, the older Chinese and Indians were far less likely to attain higher 
education. All this suggests that there is a large gap in terms of educational 
access between the young and older non-Bumiputeras. In contrast, it is seen that 
the gap for Malays is not as large as the one for non-Bumiputeras, primarily 
because of the NEP regime in favour of Malays.
57 There is no unique standard with which to choose a hypothesis test of coefficients, but 
statisticians seem to prefer the log-likelihood test to Wald-test (Long and Freese 2006, p. 
145).
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Table 4.9 Results of Separate Logistic Regressions bv Ethnicity (Odds 
Ratios)
Malays Chinese Indians
Gender
Female 0.83*** 0 8 7 *** 0  7 7 ***
(0.80, 0 .8 6 ) (0.83, 0.92) (0.69, 0.86)
Age Cohort
25-29 0 .7 9 *** 0.51*** 0.51***
(0.74, 0.83) (0.47, 0.55) (0.43, 0.60)
30-34 0.67*** 0.36*** 0.42***
(0.63, 0.71) (0.34, 0.39) (0.35, 0.50)
35-39 0.53*** 0.28*** 0.42***
(0.50, 0.57) (0.26, 0.31) (0.35, 0.50)
40-44 0.43*** 0 .2 1 *** 0.29***
(0.40, 0.46) (0.19, 0.23) (0.24, 0.36)
45-49 0.33*** 0.17*** 0.25***
(0.30, 0.36) (0.15, 0.19) (0.20, 0.32)
Birthplace
Borneo 0 .4 3 *** 0.72*** 1.24
(0.39, 0.48) (0.66, 0.78) (0.52,3.00)
Northern 0.63*** 0 .8 8 ** 0.69***
(0.59, 0.67) (0.78, 0.98) (0.54, 0.87)
Southern 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.80***
(0.69, 0.78) (0.68, 0.78) (0.69, 0.92)
Western 0  g9*** 0.84*** 0.87**
(0.64, 0.74) (0.78, 0.90) (0.75, 1.00)
Log likelihood test
G-squared 1562.97 2295.87 306.44
/7-value 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
N. of Sample 82,562 44,876 13,113
Note: Figures in parenthesis are the 95% confidence interval of the odds ratios; 
***/><.01, **p<.05.
Finally, it is found that for all the three groups those born in Kuala Lumpur or 
Selangor are the most advantaged in terms of educational access. More 
importantly, we can see that the within-group difference is larger for Malays than 
Chinese and Indians. Indeed, Malays bom in Borneo states are more than 50 
percent less likely to participate in higher education as those bom in Kuala 
Lumpur or Selangor. Also, Malays bom in Kuala Lumpur or Selangor are 30-40 
percent more likely to enrol in higher education that those in Northern, Southern 
and Western states. This result for Malays is surprising since it indicates larger 
within-group differences than are found in the Chinese and Indian cases. Indeed,
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for both Chinese and Indians, those born in Kuala Lumpur or Selangor are most 
likely to access higher education, but the gaps between the most advantaged and 
the least advantaged are narrower than the case of Malays. Unfortunately, the 
present data set does not contain information on socio-economic backgrounds of 
individuals so that it is impossible to further investigate this issue. Nonetheless, 
these findings are significant on their own, and call for more detailed 
examination of within-group differences in the future.
4.5 Conclusions
As far as higher education is concerned, the main thrust of the NEP was to 
resolve ethnic imbalance in higher educational enrolment, thereby contributing to 
improved socio-economic balance. Accordingly, the equity concerns exemplified 
in the NEP laid the firm foundation on which higher education policies were 
made and implemented, constituting the institutional framework further 
consolidated by the ethnic quota system and the government control over 
provision of higher education services. All this has made up the fundamental 
environment in which various ethnic groups made schooling decisions differently 
and ethnic differences in enrolment pattern emerged.
When the NDP replaced the NEP in 1991 and the higher education reforms 
were introduced from the mid-1990s, the situation has intrinsically remained 
unchanged. The reason for this was that the new changes, such as private sector 
involvement, were additionally made in accordance with the existing framework. 
The public higher education institutions remain concerned with equity 
considerations, whereas the private ones are free from them. Consequently, the 
reforms gave rise to a dualistic structure within the realm of higher education, 
and the equity-efficiency trade-off now manifests itself as the public-private 
differentials in higher education.
The empirical analysis using the Population and Housing Census Malaysia 
2000 revealed some interesting findings. The Malay advantage in enrolling in 
higher education during the NEP, especially relative to Chinese, is absent when
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treating all types of higher education together. From the 1990s, the enrolment 
ratios of Malays, Chinese and Indians all increased, but at different speeds. 
Chinese have outstripped Malays in terms of the likelihood of entering higher 
education, reversing the ethnic differentials. On the other hand, Indians have 
narrowed the gap with Malays, but continued to lag behind Malays. It can be 
surmised that the reason for these resulted from the nature of the higher 
education reforms. This in turn makes it necessary to explicitly investigate the 
ethnic differentials in public-private choice in higher education, to which Chapter 
6 returns.
While having demonstrated the ethnic differentials that are not presumed by 
human capital theory (see also Chapters 2 and 3), it was also found that gender 
and birthplace played crucial roles in determining higher education enrolment. In 
particular, the empirical findings suggest that they have gained more significance 
over the 1990s. These points are beyond the purpose of this research that focuses 
on ethnicity, but can be important future research topics to look into.
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Chapter 5
Labour Markets: Ethnicity and Sector Selection
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter found the persistence of the ethnic differentials in higher 
education enrolment over time, and suggested that there is the association 
between ethnicity and type of higher education (namely, public 01* 
private/overseas higher education). In the light of all this, this chapter proceeds to 
the study of the ethnic factor in labour market contexts, and particular concern is 
to investigate how inter-ethnic concerns are built into labour market policies and 
influence labour market decisions of various ethnic groups.
The interaction of ethnicity with government policy is of paramount 
importance in the context of Malaysia’s labour markets (see also Chapter 3). 
Government intervention after the introduction of the NEP mirrors social, 
political and economic conditions so that the fundamental concern in labour 
markets is to strike a balance between inter-ethnic distribution (equity) and 
economic growth (efficiency). Naturally, then, this efficiency-equity trade-off 
sets the core foundation for the institutional framework of labour markets. 
Employment practices and fringe benefits in the public sector are arranged in 
favour of Malays due to equity concerns, whereas the private sector is expected 
to expand the economic pie to distribute. Thus, the equity-efficiency trade-off in 
labour markets constitutes the environment in which public-private differentials 
emerge, affecting the sector selection decisions of various ethnic groups. Indeed, 
it will be seen later that there is a clear association between ethnicity and specific 
sectors of employment (i.e., public and private sectors).
Previous studies have indicated that Malays constitute the majority of public 
sector employees (Abdullah Sanusi, Mansor and Abdul Kuddus 2003; Aziz, 
Buan and Singh 1987; Lucas and Verry 1999; Salleh and Osman-Rani 1991). 
However, there is no comprehensive study that looks into the association 
between ethnicity and public-private choice in the Malaysian context. This is
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where this chapter has something new to offer. It is the first attempt to examine 
this issue through a combination of the political-economic approach with 
empirical analysis of the Population and Housing Census Malaysia 2000.
As is the previous chapter, some notes must be made at this juncture to avoid 
misunderstanding. The analytical thrust of this chapter is not to apply and/or 
develop human capital theory and remedy its analytical deficiencies. Rather, this 
chapter is devoted to investigating the peculiarities of Malaysia’s labour markets 
by putting the role of the government to the fore. This allows us to start with the 
position that Malaysia’s labour markets do not work as the human capital theory 
suggests. By taking the political-economic approach, it becomes possible to 
understand how and why, despite the same educational backgrounds, ethnic 
differences in labour market outcomes, such as sector selection, can emerge.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section examines the 
institutional framework of labour markets with reference to the efficiency-equity 
trade-off embodied in the NEP. It enables us to look into why and how ethnic 
differential within sector selection emerges, accompanied by evidence on it from 
the existing literature. Section 5.3 develops empirical strategy around the 
analytical framework. The main focus is on the ethnic differential in sector 
selection, which has never been analysed comprehensively in the literature. 
Section 5.4 discusses the empirical results, and Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Historical and Institutional Backgrounds
The post-Independence period witnessed the rise of structural problems in 
labour markets, leading to inter-ethnic socio-economic disparity. The youth 
unemployment was evident in the 1960s, and it concentrated in urban rather than 
rural areas (Blarke 1975; Malaysia 1965, p. 79). Its incidence for Malays was 
high particularly among those having migrated from rural to urban areas (Lim 
1973). And their socio-economic situation was not necessarily good since the 
majority still resided in the rural areas with fewer economic opportunities. Indeed, 
the average income growth of Malays relative to other ethnic groups was lower 
(see Jomo and Ishak 1986; Snodgrass 1980). This caused heightened political
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action to improve the socio-economic conditions of Malays from the mid-1960s 
onwards.
The racial riots in 1969, which led to the declaration of an emergency, put to 
the fore the role of government in rectifying the socio-economic imbalances. It 
was believed that they were the root cause of the riots so that the NEP 
empowered the government to correct them (Bowie 1991; National Operations 
Council 1969). On the one hand, as analysed in the previous chapter, the 
government has intervened in various quarters of higher education to achieve its 
end. On the other hand, the government constructed labour markets to address 
the inter-ethnic concerns whilst continuing to satisfy growth imperatives. This 
efficiency-equity trade-off forms the basis of the institutional framework for 
labour markets in which various regulations and laws were constructed.
5.2.1 Public-Private Differentials in Labour Markets
According to human capital theory, the wage is the outcome of a perfectly 
working labour market. It corresponds with years of schooling and experience. It 
follows that higher education graduates of whatever ethnic origins would choose 
the sector and/or occupation with the same wage level. However, this is not the 
case in Malaysia’s labour markets. Instead, it has been reported that the public 
sector, on average, offers a lower wage than the private sector (for example, 
Abdullah Sanusi, Mansor and Abdul Kuddus 2003; Osman-Rani and Salleh 
1994; Salleh and Osman-Rani 1991).58 For Lucas and Verry:
“In very broad terms, the real entry level wage in public service has 
followed a very clear ratchet, falling horn 1976 to 1980, then falling again 
after the new peak. Taken over the twelve years from 1976 to 1988, there is 
no clear upward trend running through this ratchet. Thus, to the extent that 
public service competes with the private sector through entry level pay, the 
public sector should have become less attractive through time (Lucas and 
Verry 1999, p. 236).”
58 Since no clear-cut data on public-private wage levels are available, I refer to previous 
studies. Also, I requested the Department o f Statistics for releasing such census-related 
data, but was refused due to the sensitivity.
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Public sector wage revisions were made twice in the 1970s and the government 
revised the wage schedule in 1980 (Jomo and Todd 1994; Salleh and Osman- 
Rani 1991). But it was not until the early 1990s that the public sector employees 
received increased remunerations in the form of the New Remuneration Scheme 
(NRS) announced in 1992 (Jomo and Todd 1994). The NRS was more 
favourable for the employees of higher grade (ibid), but it is still not as attractive 
as the private sector (Abdullah Sanusi, Mansor and Abdul Kuddus 2003).
On the other hand, the Bumiputera dominance in public sector employment is 
well documented by the same observers (Abdullah Sanusi, Mansor and Abdul 
Kuddus 2003; Lucas and Verry 1999; Salleh and Osman-Rani 1991). Table 5.1 
shows that there is a clear ethnic differential in sector selection. Overall, higher 
education graduates were almost equally represented in the public and private 
sectors. However, Bumiputera graduates were more likely to choose the public 
sector with the lower wage, while non-Bumiputeras (Chinese and Indians, etc) 
the private sector. Indeed, 66.4 percent of the Bumiputera graduates were 
employed in the public sector, while the corresponding figures for Chinese and 
Indian graduates were 18.3 percent and 36.1 percent only. This ethnic differential 
in sector selection is also reported by Lucas and Verry (1999), who add that 
“growth of the public sector has been a very major vehicle for restructuring 
Bumiputera employment (Lucas and Verry 1999, p. 234).” Hence, even though 
they have completed the same level of education, different ethnic groups tend to 
choose different sectors.
Table 5.1 Distribution of Higher Education Graduates by Ethnicity and Sector of 
Employment f%U982-3
Public Private Total
Bumiputeras 66.4 33.6 100
Chinese 18.3 81.7 100
Indians and Others 36.1 63.9 100
Total 47.6 52.4 100
Source: Hamid-Don et al (1987), Table 3.2
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Thus, it can be argued that wages are not the sole determining factor in 
selecting sector of employment. These facts also indicate that public and private 
sectors function differently, and that the labour markets do not work as the 
human capital theory assumes. Indeed, the capacity to explain the Bumiputera 
dominance in the public sector despite the lower wage requires a careful 
understanding of the institutional framework of Malaysia’s labour markets. In 
this connection, the role of government in labour markets is to be understood 
appropriately. For inter-ethnic concerns and thus social stability, the government 
intentionally intervened in labour markets to secure employment for Bumiputeras. 
Under the win-win principle of the NEP, the public sector has been expanded 
primarily to employ them, and the private sector is expected to pump up 
economic growth. As seen below in detail, the equity-efficiency trade-off forms 
the basis of the institutional framework for Malaysia’s labour markets.
Public-Private Differentials in Employment Practices
To understand how and why the ethnic differences in sector selection surfaced, 
it is useful to start with Article 153 of the Constitution prescribing the special 
rights of Bumiputeras in public sector employment. It touches on the association 
of both scholarship provision and employment (and recruitment) with ethnicity.
The government’s scholarship policy, which automatically binds the holders to 
the public sector employment, is arranged in favour of Bumiputeras. Article 153 
also provides for the special rights of Bumiputeras in scholarship provision. 
From the 1970s until the late 1990s, the government provided qualified students 
with scholarships for their undergraduate studies, which in turn required them to 
work in the public sector for a specific period (Abdullah Sanusi, Mansor and 
Abdul Kuddus 2003). Ethnic backgrounds rather than merit seemed to be 
stressed in the selection process. Mehmet and Hoong (1986) researched five local 
universities in early 1980s and found that almost 80 percent of the total 
scholarships went to Malays (see also Mehmet and Hoong 1985). It is also found 
that more than 80 percent of the recipients were employed in the public sector 
(Mehmet and Hoong 1986). Thus, the scholarship policy played a crucial role in 
both constructing labour markets for the purpose of inter-ethnic distribution and 
accelerating the Bumiputera (Malay) dominance in the public sector. These facts
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point to the persistence of the ethnic factor from higher education through to 
labour markets, and demonstrate that the public sector in Malaysia does not work 
as human capital theory assumes.
Besides the scholarship provision, a large number of employment 
opportunities have been created in the public sector to absorb the increased 
number of graduates. The government created new job opportunities at the 
existing government offices, and also set up a considerable number of new public 
enterprises (Salleh and Osman-Rani 1991). In effect, the number of public 
enterprises jumped from 83 in 1969 to at least 736 in 1986 and then to 1189 in 
1993 (Rugayah 1994, pp. 231 and 241). In particular, the largest increase in the 
growth of public sector employment was marked among Group A officers that 
correspond to managerial and professional posts and require higher educational 
qualifications (Abdullah Sanusi, Mansor and Abdul Kuddus 2003; Hai 2006; 
Osman Rani and Salleh 1994). The proportion of this group mounted from 4.6 
percent in 1971 to a peak of 9.4 percent in 1985 before slightly declining to 9.2 
percent in 1990 (computed by author from Osman Rani and Salleh 1994, Table 
7.4; Salleh and Osman Rani 1991, Table 3.5).59 Thus, higher education graduates 
were continuously absorbed as Group A officers until 1983, and the public sector 
even created new posts for them (Osman Rani and Salleh 1994).60
The quantitative expansion of the employment opportunities matched well 
with the Constitution, and the recruitment process is generally in favour of 
Bumiputera candidates. According to Abdullah Sanusi, Mansor and Abdul 
Kuddus (2003), the interviews and discussion are conducted in Malays more than
59 The figures for both 1971 and 1985, computed from Salleh and Osman-Rani (1991, 
Table 3.5) include federal posts only. On the other hand, the figure for 1990 includes 
federal and state level posts. However, as Salleh and Osman-Rani (1991) argues, the 
majority o f posts created newly were at the federal level intended to absorb Bumiputera 
graduates. Thus, it is important here to interpret the general trend rather than the specific 
figures.
60 Before the New Remuneration System (NRS) took effect in January 1992, the 
structure o f the classification was as follows: Division I (or Group A) requiring 
university degree, Division II (or Group B) college diploma/ higher school certificate, 
Division III (Group C) school certificate, and Division IV (Group D) lower school 
certificate and below (Abdullah Sanusi, Mansor, and Abdul Kuddus 2003, p. 23).
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English. Fluency in English, where Bumiputeras are generally believed to be 
handicapped, is not a major factor in the selection process.
Above all, ethnicity is of paramount importance in public sector employment. 
It is primarily for inter-ethnic equity purposes. Furthermore, the job security in 
the public sector is believed to play a role in accelerating the Bumiputera 
dominance (Abdullah Sanusi, Mansor and Abdul Kuddus 2003). For example, 
adjustments during the mid-1980s recession and the Asian financial crisis were 
done either by restricting new intakes or by reducing or freezing wage increases 
(Horton, Kanbur and Mazumdar 1991; Jomo and Hwok-Aun 2001; Osman-Rani 
and Salleh 1994). The option of cutting off existing staff was rarely chosen 
probably for equity concerns.
By complete contrast, the private sector is concerned with economic growth 
(efficiency) more than inter-ethnic equity. As envisaged in the NEP, this is for 
expanding the overall economic pie to distribute. Thus, ethnic considerations are, 
in general, of secondary importance in private sector employment.
This can be understood by reference to the institutional arrangements in the 
private sector. To pump up economic growth, the export-oriented moves became 
evident with the Investment Incentives Act 1968, the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) Act 
1971 and the Licensed Manufacturing Warehouses (LMWs) Act 1971 (Jomo and 
Edwards 1993). In parallel, the Employment (Employment of Women) (Shift 
Workers) Regulations was introduced in 1970 to strengthen further Employment 
(Employment of Women) (female Conductors) Regulations 1958, which allows 
the night shift for female workers (Rasiah 1995b). This attracted foreign 
manufacturing firms, which were expected to bring employment and income 
effects locally.61 In line with the NEP, however, the Industrial Coordination Act 
(ICA) 1975 requiring an employment quota of 30 percent for Bumiputeras took 
effect in 1976. But it was frequently revised by the mid-1980s due to mounting 
oppositions from the non-Malay local business community, which had repeatedly
61 The employment effect of exports is quantitatively confirmed by Wah (1997).
62 A legal expert, Yasuda (1991), points out that the ICA aims to regulate manufacturing 
activities in Malaysia but nowhere is the objective of the NEP declared in the Act.
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complained of its negative effect on their economic activities (Bowie 1991; 
Yasuda 1991).63
The export promotion strategies played an important role in bringing the 
Malay female labour force from the rural sectors (Ariffin 1992, 1994). Though 
having some implications for the goal of restructuring society, it was primarily 
for constraining labour costs and seeking economic growth through export 
activities. The pursuit of economic growth accelerated in the 1980s with the 
Industrial Master Plan in 1985 and the Investment Promotion Act (IPA) 1988 
(see for example, Jomo 1989; Rasiah 1995b). After the late 1980s, therefore, less 
emphasis was placed on ethnic considerations in the private sector.
With regard to employment practices, private sector employers can 
institutionally resort to retrenchment, re-contracting and temporary shutdowns 
(Salih and Young 1989 quoted in Kuruvilla and Arudsothy 1995). This contrasts 
with the public sector. For example, Lucas and Verry (1999) looked into the 
retrenchment during the mid-1980s recessions, and found that private sector 
employees were more likely to be retrenched than public sector counterparts.64 
Since the mid-1980s, Malaysian manufacturing witnessed “a shift away from 
employment security and a shift of employment risk away from companies to 
workers (Standing 1993, p. 43).”
Something similar happened during the Asian financial crisis. When it hit the 
economy, the government advised the private companies to adjust employment 
by temporary layoff, voluntary separation scheme and pay cuts in order to curtail 
adverse employment and income effects. The Employment Act 1955 was 
amended, and the guidelines encouraging pay offs, working hour reductions and 
part-time employment were implemented (Jomo and Hwok-Aun 2001). 
Nonetheless, severe employment downturns were recorded in the private sector,
63 Its effects on foreign capital were not substantial partly because the government 
reassured that export processing foreign firms could be exempted from the ICA (see 
Bowie 1991, pp. 100-8; Rasiah 1995a).
64 See also Mazumdar (1993), who investigates wage rigidity in the mid-1980s with 
reference to institutional factors such as contractual length (normally more than two 
years) and seniority-based wage-setting practice. These arguments already indicate that 
Malaysian labour markets do not function as a perfect market.
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such as manufacturing and services sectors (ibid). As Bank Negara Malaysia 
(1998, p. 96) reports, the private sector employment cut-off was affected by 
demand contractions, which reflects its efficiency concerns.
In general, the public-private differentials in employment practices reflect the 
trade-off between equity and efficiency, which develops around ethnicity. The 
public sector with equity (and thus ethnic) concerns sharply contrasts the private 
sector with efficiency (and thus growth) concerns. Both are complementary in 
maintaining the social stability, but this trade-off has significant implications on 
labour markets. Unsurprisingly, then, it forms the basis of the institutional 
framework in which the ethnic differences in sector selection emerge.
Public-Private Differentials in Fringe Benefits
The arguments so far indicate that the equity-efficiency trade-off gives rise to 
the public-private differentials in employment practices, thereby constituting the 
institutional framework of labour markets. As seen below, the public-private 
differentials in fringe benefits further intensify the arguments, by intertwining 
with those in employment practices. In fact, the wage level of the public sector is 
lower but it offers more favourable benefits in terms of “the non-contributory 
pension scheme, low-interest rate loans for housing, conveyance and computer 
and the opportunities for specialist training or post-graduate studies (Abdullah 
Sanusi, Mansor and Abdul Kuddus 2003, p. 87).” This is for equity concerns that 
are imperative for maintaining social stability, and besides the employment 
practices, can induce Bumiputera graduates to work in this sector,65
To avoid misunderstanding, some reference is made back to the human capital 
theory before proceeding (see also Chapter 3). In the light of the findings and 
arguments that follow, those who are wedded to it would make modifications to 
the left-hand side of the Mincerian function in order to explain Bumiputera 
dominance in public sector employment: wages are augmented by fringe benefits
65 According to an opinion survey of government officers conducted in 1999, fringe 
benefits can compensate for the lower wage (Abdullah Sanusi, Mansor and Abdul 
Kuddus 2003, pp. 97-8).
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to better reflect the earnings of individuals since the public sector offers the 
lower wage level but more favourable sets of those benefits. However, my 
argument that the human capital theory contributes little to an understanding of 
the functioning and structures of Malaysia’s labour markets remains unchanged. 
The proponents bring in the fringe benefits that do not necessarily reflect the 
marginal productivity of workers, contradicting the initial assumption of the 
perfect labour market. Differently functioning labour markets, namely the public 
and private sectors in this case, are brought into the model that assumes 
identically working labour markets. This highlights the deviation from the 
underlying theory. Further, the way in which modifications are made conceals 
rather than reveals why and how the public sector offers favourable sets of fringe 
benefits. Above all, the following arguments are not made to develop remedies to 
the human capital theory but to reinforce the political economy approach taken 
so far.
Having said so, the differentials in training, social security and pension are in 
turn discussed in what follows. This helps us to deepen the historical and 
institutional context in which the ethnic differentials in employment patterns 
emerge.
Training
The first differential is in training. In the case of the public sector, the 
successful candidates, before being formally appointed, go through free training 
programmes at the National Public Administration Institute (Institut Tadbiran 
Awam Negara, INTAN) (Abdullah Sanusi, Mansor and Abdul Kuddus 2003). 
And after starting to work, the option of further study is available:
“The training award is normally on full-pay study leave which 
entitles the holder to a training allowance, tuition fees, passage (if 
overseas) for student and family as well as the monthly salary. During the 
study leave, promotion prospects will not be jeopardised (Abdullah 
Sanusi, Mansor and Abdul Kuddus 2003, p. 89).”
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This sharply contrasts with the private sector, which usually does not have an 
institutionalized training programme. From the employees’ perspective, it is up 
to the employers whether to provide training and what types of training despite 
some government efforts. For example, the government established the Human 
Resource Development Fund (HRDF) in 1992, to which firms contribute one 
percent of the employees wages monthly (Malaysia 1996, pp. 119).66 Upon 
application by private firms, the HRDF reimburses for training courses approved 
by Human Resources Development Council (HRDC). However, Malaysia (1996, 
p. 120) points to “employers preferences for in-plant training over training 
offered by external training providers” such as those by HRDC, and also finds 
that some sectors and small firms do not even utilize the fund or claim the 
reimbursement due to the nature of their production methods. In effect, the 
participation rates of the total workers in the manufacturing and services sectors 
were extremely low: 7.2 percent in 1998 and 4.3 percent in 1999 (Ragayah, 
Hwok-Aun, and Abdul-Rahman 2002, p. 146).
67Social Security
The second differential lies in social security. The Social Security 
Organization (SOCSO) was established in 1971 to administer the Employees’ 
Social Security Act 1969 and the Employees’ Social Security (General) 
Regulations 1971. The SOCSO offers two schemes: the Employment Injury 
Insurance Scheme and the Invalidity Pension Scheme. The former offers 
“protection for industrial accidents, occupational diseases and commuting 
accidents”, and the latter provides “a 24-hour coverage in the event of invalidity 
or death resulting from whatever cause (Ministry of Human Resources Malaysia 
2008, p. 77).”
66 Originally it covered manufacturing firms with 50 or more employees, but it was 
revised later to include those with 10 to 49 employees and also firms in service sectors 
such as “hotel industry, air transport, tour operating business and travel agency business, 
telecommunications, freight forwarders, shipping, postal and courier services, 
advertising and computer services (Malaysia 1996, p. 119).”
67 Unless specified, this paragraph builds on Ministry of Human Resources Malaysia 
(2008) as well as Ragayah, Hwok-Aun and Abdul-Rahman (2002), who 
comprehensively compile information on Malaysia’s social security system through 
annual reports and government publications.
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The Employment Injury Insurance Scheme is based on monthly contributions 
by both employers and employees. The benefits under the Invalidity Pension 
Scheme are paid out with reference to the level of earnings. Significantly, the 
coverage of the schemes does not cover social insurance or assistance and is 
confined to “provision of injury and incapacitation benefits (Ragayah, Hwok- 
Aun, and Abdul-Rahman 2002, p. 130).” Furthermore, when the abuse of the 
scheme became evident in the 1990s, the government replaced the Act with the 
Occupational Health Safety Act 1994. Consequently, more discretion and 
responsibility have shifted to employers.
This contrasts with the public sector. As mentioned earlier, jobs in the sector 
are assured even during a recession, which can offset the absence of an 
institutionalized social insurance and assistance. And the benefits offered are 
non-contributory. For example, it provides the employees and also their family 
members (parents, spouses and children) with all the medical allowances if they 
are treated in public hospitals (Japan Institute of Personnel Administration 1997). 
And as examined below, the differentials in pension provision also highlight the 
difference between the public and private sectors.
Pension after retirement
The third differential is in pension after retirement. While the Employees 
Provident Fund (EPF) requiring contributions of the employees is the only option 
for private sector employees, the public sector employees have an additional 
choice of the pension scheme introduced by the Government Pension Ordinance 
1951 (Abdullah Sanusi, Mansor and Abdul Kuddus 2003).68 Such advantage in 
choice is also compounded by the content of the pension scheme. In contrast to 
EPF, it is non-contributory and financed by tax revenues (Ragayah, Hwok-Aun,
68 According to the Articles 40-43 o f the Employees Provident Fund Act 1991, all 
employers registered under the Companies Act 1965 are legally required to register their 
employees with the EPF, and both the employers and the employees jointly make 
monthly contributions on the basis of wages (see Act 452). The contribution rate of the 
employee’s salary has been shared by them: 10 percent between 1952-1974 (5 percent 
from each); 13 percent between 1975 and 1979 (7 percent from employers and 6 percent 
from employees); 20 percent between 1980 and 1992 (11 percent from employers and 9 
percent from employees); 22 percent between 1993 and 1995 (12 percent from 
employers and 10 percent from employees); and 23 percent since 1996 onwards (12 
percent from employers and 11 percent from employees) (Thillainathan 2003, Table 2).
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and Abdul-Rahman 2002). The pension scheme was revised in 1976, which 
made itself more attractive from the employees’ perspective. Specifically, the 
Special Cabinet Committee on Public Sector Salary headed by the then Deputy 
Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, demanded: “the extension of the pension 
scheme to the beneficiaries of the retiree after his death; to his widow for life, 
and to his children until the age of eighteen years, or twenty-one, in case of 
college-going children (Abdullah Sanusi, Mansor and Abdul Kuddus 2003, p. 
229).” Unsurprisingly, “such ‘beyond the grave’ pension scheme to an employee 
is not only unavailable in the Malaysian private sector but in public sector of 
other countries as well (ibid)” In 1980, the scheme was formally amended by the 
Pensions Act 1980, which further provides “income protection for all employees 
in the public sector (Ragayah, Hwok-Aun, and Abdul-Rahman 2002, p. 134).” 
The benefits that it carries are widespread, including “those relevant to 
employment injury, disability, superannuation or gratuity payment upon 
retirement and dependents’ pension in the event of death while in service and 
death after retirement (ibid)” Needless to say, these benefits are not available in 
the private sector.
Public-Private Differentials in Trade Union Activities
There are also public-private differentials in trade union activities, although 
they are not as vast as the differentials in employment practices and fringe 
benefits. In fact, trade union activities are controlled in both sectors. Nevertheless, 
it is meaningful to look at them since they also reflect the equity-efficiency trade­
off in Malaysia.
Historically speaking, trade union activities have been marginalized politically 
around the Trade Union Ordinance (TUO) 1959 and the Industrial Relations Act 
(IRA) 1967 (Arudsothy 1990).69 On the one hand, the TUO 1959 empowers the 
Registrar of Trade Unions, or presently the Director General of Trade Unions,
69 The British colonial government established the Malayan Trade Union Council in 
1950 dominated by Indians (later the Malaysian Trade Union Congress since 1963, or 
MTUC), in order to emasculate the economic and political challenges posed by unions 
associated with Chinese Communist Party (Rowley and Bhopal 2006). The ethnically 
concentrated membership “not only undermined the horizontal (class) organising 
principles o f trade unionism, but also had the potential to bring the new labour 
movement into conflict with its potential future membership (ibid, p. 101)”.
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with strong and wide-ranging decisions regarding the registration of unions 
(Syed Ahmad 2002). Hence, unionisation itself was tightly restricted by the 
government. On the other hand, trade union federations are registered as societies 
under Societies Act 1966 rather than as unions under Trade Unions Act 1968 so 
that they are institutionally prohibited from even holding pickets (Jomo and Todd 
1994).
The NEP further accelerated this trend. In particular, the ethnic focus of the 
NEP “attributed trade-union issues of distribution as secondary, if not 
detrimental, to the development process (Rowley and Bhopal 2006, p. 102).” 
Hence, the government has reinforced its grips over the unionisation of workers 
so that firms can keep labour costs down for economic development (Kuruvilla 
1996; Kuruvilla and Arudsothy 1995; Kuruvilla and Venkataratnam 1996).70 At 
a broader level, however, behind these government strategies there was “the need 
for the retention of state legitimacy or political support in a political structure 
dominated by an ethnic discourse, which itself is constructed as fundamental to 
the construction of legitimacy (Rowley and Bhopal 2006, p. 108).” Therefore, 
the government policies on unions are the reflection of the underlying principle 
of the NEP so that ethnic considerations in this sphere are important in 
connection to the equity-efficiency trade-off.
In the public sector, the umbrella body, namely the Congress of Union of 
Employees in the Public and Civil Service (CUEPACS) established as a trade 
union in 1957, was disaffiliated in 1980 from MTUC, which in turn 
acknowledged the former as “a national trade union centre representing 
employees in the public sector (Jomo and Todd 1994, p. 157).” This successfully 
reduced the bargaining powers of CUEPACS and MTUC, and entrenched the 
government control over unions (Jomo and Todd 1994; Osman Rani and Salleh 
1994). Nonetheless, the public sector employees can have the various benefits 
mentioned earlier, which can offset their weakened position, while the private 
sector counterparts do not. This indicates the crucial public-private difference 
deemed to come from the government’s ethnic concerns.
70 For a broader literature on East Asian economic growth trajectories, see Deyo (1989).
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By complete contrast, the pursuit of economic growth was brought to the fore 
in the case of the private sector. For example, it is well documented that 
unionisation was banned in the foreign-dominated export-oriented electronics 
industry until 1988 for cost containment purposes (Bhopal and Rowley 2002; 
Rasiah 1995b). The Look East Policy announced in 1983 emphasised work ethic 
without such incentives as lifetime employment and seniority systems (Jomo 
1989). Given international human rights pressures including from the US 
Congress, the government accepted in-house unions in electronic industries (for 
details, see Jomo and Todd 1994, pp. 153-6), but they never changed the stance 
favouring economic growth vis-a-vis labour interests. In the face of MTUC’s 
opposition to the in-house unions, the government further marginalised MTUC 
by setting up the government-backed Malaysian Labour Organization (MLO) in 
1988 to segregate the labour movement (Rowley and Bhopal 2006). And in the 
1990s, the government advised the MLO to dissolve itself and join the MTUC so 
that internal divisions were intentionally created within MTUC to weaken its 
bargaining position (Bhopal 2002; Bhopal and Rowley 2002). As such, the 
government consistently and deliberately attempted to marginalize trade union 
activities in the private sector. Although there is a sign of involving unions in 
policy-making scene after the Asian financial crisis, its real effects remain 
unknown and this government attitude has been open to doubt in terms of 
sustainability (see Peetz and Todd 2000). The focus is still on economic growth 
and efficiency (for details, see Frenkel and Kuruvilla 2002; Peetz and Todd 
2000).
In parallel, the structures and activities of unions, even once registered, are 
tightly controlled by the government (Jomo and Todd 1994). The Essential 
(Industrial Relations) Regulations 1969 and the Essential (Trade Unions) 
Regulations 1969 were passed so that the government would be able to 
“segregate the unionisation of different classes of workers and workers from 
different trades, occupations and industries (Syed Ahmad 2002, p. 64).” As a 
consequence, the union density was estimated at less than 10 percent in 1990 
(Jomo and Todd 1994). The number of unions declined from 250 in 1957 to 241 
in 1971 and then increased to 301 in 1988 (Jomo and Todd 1994, Table 2.1).
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Furthermore, on the industrial relations front, there is little room for either strikes 
or industrial disputes (Jomo and Todd 1994; Kuruvilla and Erickson 2002). 
Much discretion pertaining to industrial relations institutionally resides with the 
Minister of Human Resources (which was named as Minister of Labour until 
July 1990), whilst the Industrial Relations Act 1968 strictly prohibits types of 
matters to bargain (Jomo and Todd 1994).
When looking at these historical trends together with public-private 
differentials in employment practices and fringe benefits, the role of the equity- 
efficiency trade-off in labour markets is evident. The public sector, though its 
wage level is lower, is full with a number of non-wage benefits, which to some 
extent offset the weakened bargaining position of CUEPACS. On the other hand, 
trade union activities in the private sector have been consistently sacrificed in 
pursuit of economic growth, which is considered important for social stability.
5.2.2 Ethnic Differentials in Sector Selection: Previous Findings
This part looks at previous findings on trends in public and private sector 
employment. From the discussion so far, it will be presumed that Bumiputeras, 
or Malays, are dominant in public sector employment but non-Bumiputeras, 
namely Chinese and Indians, are well represented in private sector employment.
As seen shortly, there are a number of studies that looked into the association 
between ethnicity and public sector employment. However, there is no study that 
investigated ethnicity and sector selection, conditional on educational 
backgrounds. Nonetheless, it is meaningful to start from the previous findings in 
order to set up empirical hypotheses that are consistent with the political- 
economic arguments and to highlight the contributions this chapter delivers. First, 
we look at trends of total employment, followed by public and private sector 
employment.
Trends of Total Employment
Table 5.2 uses Economic Report published annually by the Ministry of 
Finance, and roughly shows the trend of the public-private distribution of total 
employment from 1970 until 2000. Before proceeding, it must be emphasised
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that ‘the public sector’ in this table represents ‘public administration’ only and it 
excludes other public sector jobs, such as teachers and medical officers. Thus, it 
is necessary to interpret the table with some reservation.
With these caveats in mind, two points can be found. First, it can be argued 
that the absorptive capacity of the public sector appears limited. Its share 
fluctuated between 10 and 15 percent, and it has declined from the mid-1980s 
onwards. Second, when it comes to the private sector, the share of agriculture has 
continuously declined over the three decades, but the shares of the manufacturing 
and service sectors have increased. This is as is documented in the literature on 
the structural changes the economy went through (Hill 2005; Jomo 1990; Salleh 
and Meyanathan 1993; Zainudin Salleh and Osman 1982).
In light of the purpose of this chapter, however, this table is not sufficient. 
This is because it does not disclose the ethnic association with sector. In effect, 
the public sector is a large employer of Malays, which can be discerned by Table
VI5.3. In 1990, the Bumiputera share of public sector employment was 14.6 
percent, which is greater than the Chinese and Indian shares of 9.8 percent and
12.3 percent, respectively. When compared with Table 5.2, it can be argued that 
Bumiputeras were well represented in the public sector and non-Bumiputeras in 
the private sector. In tandem with Table 5.1, this corresponds well with the 
expected findings mentioned earlier.
71 Before Malaysia (1991), no Malaysia Plan treats this explicitly. Malaysia (1996, Table 
3-2) and Malaysia (2001, Table 3-7) describe employment by sector and ethnicity, but 
both unfortunately add up public service together with private and community services. 
Thus, they overstate the ethnic differential in sector selection so that I ignore them in 
constructing Table 5.3.
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Table 5.2 Public-Private Distribution of Total Employment (in percentile), 1970-
2000
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Public Sector 11.9 12.9 13.3 14.6 12.7 10.9 10.6
Private Sector 88.1 87.1 86.7 85.4 87.3 89.1 89.4
Agriculture 53.2 47.6 39.5 31.3 28.3 18.7 15.2
9.0 11.1 15.6 15.2 19.9 25.3 27.6
Manufacturing
Services 20.6 22.1 23.6 30.5 34.5 35.7 38.1
Others 5.3 6.3 8.0 8.4 4.6 9.4 8.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Major sectors o f the private sector were chosen to be consistent with the tables to 
follow later. Services include transport, trade and finance sectors, and Others contain all 
the other private sector industries.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Report, various issues.
Table 5.3 The Ethnic Differential in Sector Selection in 1990 fin percentile)
Public Private Sector TotalSector Subtotal Agriculture Manufacturing Services Others
Bumiputera 14.6 85.4 36.7 17.0 19.0 12.7 100.0
Chinese 9.8 90.2 13.5 21.8 39.9 15.0 100.0
Indians 12.3 87.7 21.8 28.0 25.8 12.1 100.0
Note: See Note for Table 4.2.
Source: Computed by author using Malaysia (1991, Table 1-11).
Public Sector Employment
As mentioned earlier, the NEP period saw the persistence of the Bumiputera 
(or Malay) dominance in public service. In 1990, for example, the Bumiputera 
proportion of the public sector employment was 65.9 percent, which exceeded 
the proportion of the total employed, 57.8 percent (Malaysia 1991, Table 1-11). 
Such ethnic association with public service remained unchanged even after the 
NDP was introduced in 1991. To capture this, it is useful to refer to Abdullah 
Sanusi, Mansor and Abdul Kuddus (2003) since two of the authors are former 
senior civil servants and have privileged access to unpublished evidence. 
Unfortunately, however, evidence on educational profiles of civil servants in the
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1980s is not provided elsewhere, including Lucas and Verry (1999) who had 
rather privileged access to unpublished data sources.72
Table 5.4 breaks down public service by type of occupation with reference to 
ethnicity. First, it must be stated that public administration alone does not make 
up public sector employment (recall the argument on Table 5.2). Next, the table 
clearly points to the Malay dominance in public service. They amounted to 68.7 
percent of the total civil servants, which is greater than its proportion of the total 
employed as of 2000, 51.5 percent (Malaysia 2001, Table 3-7). In particular, 
their dominance is obvious among ‘Pegawai Tadbir dan Diplomatik’ (PTD, or 
Diplomatic and Administrative Officers) who serve at federal ministries and 
state-level governments and engage in policy formulation and implementation. 
They accounted for 87 percent of its total. By contrast, when it comes to medical 
officers, the Malay dominance is far less evident and Chinese and Indians 
together accounted for 46 percent of the total. Yet, the general trend is that, over 
time, fewer Chinese and Indians prefer the public sector to the private sector 
(Abdullah Sanusi, Mansor and Abdul Kuddus 2003). This suggests that the 
Malay dominance has accelerated throughout the 1990s.
In light of the importance of PTD in national policy-making, it seems 
meaningful to examine it a little further. Table 5.5 shows the ethnic and gender 
distribution of candidates for PTD in public service in 1995. Unsurprisingly, the 
table indicates that the majority of applicants were Malays and men were well 
represented, and also that Malay men accounted for more than half of the 
applicants called for test and interview. According to Abdullah Sanusi, Mansor 
and Abdul Kuddus (2003), many applicants were from the developed states such 
as Selangor and Kuala Lumpur and also from the Malay-dominated states such as 
Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu. These facts clearly indicate that even at the 
time of application the Malay dominance is apparent.
72 Lucas and Verry (1999) stated that it was impossible to obtain the evidence for the 
1980s.
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Table 5.4 Managerial and Professional Officers by Type of Service and Ethnicity,, 
1999
Malays Chinese Indians Total
PTD 86.8 7.1 6.1 100
Accountants 81.5 15.6 2.9 100
Medical 53.7 22.1 24.2 100
Engineers 73.9 23.9 2.2 100
Legal 87.3 7.3 5.4 100
Total 68.7 17.5 13.8 100
Note: Figures in parenthesis are the proportions of the total (in percentile). 
Source: Computed from Abdullah Sanusi, Mansor and Abdul Kuddus 
(2003, Table 4.1)
Table 5.5 Distribution of Candidates for PTD by Ethnicity and Sex (in %L 1995
Malay Chinese Indians
Male Female Male Female Male Female JLOUll
CT 54.8 37.4 1.1 0.9 3.6 2.2 100
CW 55.4 36.1 1.4 1.0 3.8 2.3 100
Note: CT denotes “called for written test”, and CW “called for interview”.
Source: Adapted and Computed from Abdullah Sanusi, Mansor and Abdul Kuddus 
(2003, Table 4.2)
Private Sector Employment
Reflecting the fact that the public sector employment is dominated by Malays, 
it can be easily surmised that non-Bumiputeras, namely Chinese and Indians, are 
well represented in private sector employment. This is shown in Table 5.6, 
adapted from Lucas and Verry (1999) who had privileged access to Economic 
Planning Unit (EPU) of the Prime Minister’s Department. Before looking into 
this, however, it must be stated that they did not seem to obtain evidence on the 
ethnic association with educational background in addition to the ethnic 
differential in sector selection as well as figures on agriculture.
Two interesting findings are found from Table 5.6. First, the highly educated 
do not necessarily opt for employment in manufacturing, transport and trade 
sectors. Indeed, those with secondary educational backgrounds were better 
represented in these sectors. By contrast, those with higher education were well 
represented in finance sector employment. In 1987, around 16 percent of the 
employees in the sector have attained higher education, which is greater than
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their total proportion of the whole workforce, 5.1 percent. Second, except in the 
transport sector, Malays were under-represented in private sector employment. It 
can be stated that they opted for the public sector or agricultural employment. In 
contrast, Chinese were well represented in manufacturing, trade and finance 
sectors. In particular, their presence in the latter two sectors is evident. But, for 
the case of Indians, no confirmed references can be made due to data 
unavailability.
Similar evidence on the 1990s is not available. For example, the annually 
published Labour Force Survey Report does not provide the total number of the 
employed by each ethnic group. Neither does it supply similar information on 
educational backgrounds. All this makes it difficult to compute and derive a 
similar table with Table 5.6.
Table 5.6 Private Sector Employment by Educational Background and Ethnicity 
fin percentile!. 1980 and 1987
Manu- ______________ Services______________  Malaysia
factoring Transport Trade Finance Total
1980 1987 1980 1987 1980 1987 1980 1987 1980 1987
Education
None/unknown 8.0 6.5 7.0 4.4 12.2 8.9 5.6 0.9 8.8 12.6
Primary 42.2 34.7 46.4 38.3 43.5 35.5 20.6 12.6 43.6 37.3
Lower 27.3 30.6 22.4 26.0 24.8 27.5 17.9 12.7 18.0 22.1
Secondary 
Upper Secondary 18.9 23,4 21.2 26.5 16.9 23.9 38.3 47.0 14.6 20.3
Post Secondary 1.5 2.2 1.1 2.6 1.5 2.5 7.8 11.0 0.4 2.6
Tertiary 2.1 2.6 2.1 2.1 1.1 1.7 9.8 15.8 3.6 5.1
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Ethnicity
Malay 37.8 41.4 48.3 46.0 32.7 32.2 41.4 37.3 47.8 44.9
Chinese 50.1 41.4 35.0 34.0 56.9 55.1 38.8 46.2 33.5 33.1
Other* 12.1 17.2 16.7 20.0 10.4 12.7 19.8 16.5 18.7 22.0
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Transport (transport, storage and communications), Trade (wholesale and retail 
trade, and hotels and restaurants), and Finance (banks and financial houses, insurance, 
real estate and property management, business services such as brokers, consultants and 
accountants, and other financial services); Other* includes Indians since according to 
Lucas and Verry (1999) no separate data was available from the EPU.
Source: Adapted from Lucas and Verry (1999, Table 6.2 and Table 7.1)
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Ethnicity and Sector Selection
As expected from the discussion in section 5.2.1, previous findings suggest 
that Bumiputera, or Malays, were over-represented in public sector employment, 
and that the public sector is a large employer of higher education graduates. 
These two different findings are significant on their own, but they would be more 
so if we investigate all this comprehensively. However, there is no study 
analysing the association between ethnicity and sector selection, conditional 
upon higher education achievement. This is unfortunate since, presumably, the 
lack of such study has made it difficult to consider the labour market 
implications on graduate unemployment that is concentrated amongst Malays 
(recall Chapter 1).
This is where this chapter has something new to offer. First, it aims to 
investigate to what extent ethnic differences in sector selection exist despite the 
same higher educational backgrounds, through the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Malays are more likely to go into the public sector than Chinese 
and Indians, conditional on higher education achievement and gender.
This hypothesis refers to between-group differences in sector selection, and 
allows us to test if Malay graduates are most likely to go into the public sector.
Second, this chapter also aims to investigate within-group differences in sector 
selection which have also been never analysed in the literature. To set up a 
hypothesis on this, however, two points deserve attention. First, Chapter 4 found 
the changing pattern of women’s higher education enrolment. In particular, 
women outstripped men in terms of the probability of higher education 
participation over the 1990s (see Table 4.8). Second, despite the lack of 
quantitative evidence, it has been noted that men constitute the majority group of 
public sector employees (Aiiffin 1992, 1994; Khasnor 1984). Unfortunately, 
however, there are no studies that have investigated gender differences in public 
sector employment together with those in higher education enrolment. In this 
regard, we will examine these within-group differences through the following 
hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 2: Men are more likely to go into the public sector than women, 
conditional on higher education achievement and ethnicity.
As will be discussed in section 5.3.2, we must be cautious when testing these 
hypotheses. The prime reason for this is that there are issues of participation in 
the labour force and wage employment (i.e., public or private sector 
employment). Econometrically speaking, both are not necessarily alternative 
choices to each other. This means that the observed sample of the wage 
employed, like the ones for Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.5, is not necessarily random 
since some individuals are already screened when choosing not to be wage- 
employed. When testing the conditional hypotheses such as these, therefore, it is 
necessary to set up an empirical strategy to control for this sample selection 
problem (I shall look at this in section 5.3.2).
Above all, by testing the two hypotheses, it becomes possible to complement 
the previous chapter and examine the relationship between higher education 
achievement and sector selection in labour markets. In parallel, the rest of this 
chapter presents some basic information on general features of Malaysia’s labour 
markets, let alone the (ethnic) profiles of public sector employment.
5.3 Empirical Strategy
5.3.1 Data
The rest of this chapter is developed by analysing the two percent random 
sample of the Population and Housing Census Malaysia 2000, and seeks to test 
the two hypotheses. Similar to Chapter 4, the individual sample is used since our 
focus is on individual characteristics and labour market structures.
As far as labour markets are concerned, the present data set has two merits. 
First, it contains information on both education backgrounds and labour market 
status, like labour force participation (LFP) and employment. This enables us to 
analyze the roles of ethnicity and education in labour markets. Second, it 
contains information on sector of employment, namely public or private sectors,
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which is not available in other government publications, including all the 
previous censuses. This allows us to investigate ethnicity and sector selection by 
controlling for educational backgrounds. Obviously, this data set has some limits. 
It does not include household-level information such as land ownership and 
income. Also, it is a cross-section data so that it is impossible to track the trend 
of labour market features. Nonetheless, the rich coverage is extremely useful in 
examining features of labour markets in Malaysia.
Similar to the previous chapter, I focus on the three major ethnic groups of 
Malaysian citizens bom in Malaysia but, in this chapter, only those aged between 
25 and 49 years old are considered. Those above 25 years old of age are assumed 
to have completed formal education. For example, the Ministry of Education 
(2000) defines 24 years old as the upper bound age of the school-going cohort. 
Similar to Chapter 4, the upper bound is set for 49 years, since 50 years is 
generally the retirement age of women in Malaysia. The sample size is thus 
reduced to 113,249, and the ethnic distribution is 58.6 percent for Malays, 32.1 
percent for Chinese and 9.4 percent for Indians (see Table 5.7).
Table 5.7 The Sample Distribution by Ethnicity
Frequency Percent
Malays 66,313 58.6
Chinese 36,314 32.1
Indians 10,622 9.4
TOTAL 113,249 100.0
5.3.2 Estimation Strategy
There are a number of studies on public-private employment selection in other 
countries (for example, Assaad 1997; Christofides and Panos 2002; Tansel 2005; 
Terrell 1993). When it comes to the literature on Malaysia, however, there is no 
study that investigated public-private employment choice. It is for this reason 
that it is necessary to reconcile the purpose of this empirical study with the nature 
of the present data sets. In this connection, some discussion of the previous 
studies on similar topics is useful in order to identify the best possible strategy.
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Previously, a few studies have investigated LFP (Chescher 1989 cited in Lucas 
and Verry 1999; Milanovic 2005) or self-employment choice (Deremy and 
Chesher 1993). However, the main aim of these previous studies was not to lay 
bare the peculiarities of Malaysia’s labour markets like this study, but to use the 
selection equation as the first-stage condition for estimating Mincerian equations. 
This is based on Heckman type estimation method to control for sample selection 
bias in estimating Mincerian equations (Heckman 1974, 1979).
Although their empirical motives are different to mine, their empirical 
strategies can set the starting-point from which to determine our empirical 
technique. Generally speaking, they used two techniques that can be candidates 
for our study. On the one hand, a probit technique was employed by Deremy and 
Chesher (1993) and Milanovic (2005). For example, Milanovic (2005) generated 
the binary choice LFP equation, and estimated it with a probit technique.73 
Deremy and Chesher (1993) estimated a binary choice equation between self and 
paid employment with a probit technique.74 In both studies, a single-step decision 
of binary rather than multiple choices is assumed.
On the other hand, Chesher (1989, cited in Lucas and Verry 1999) considered 
a single-step decision of multiple choices by using a multinominal logit (MNL) 
model estimating the probability of choosing one of the three alternatives: waged 
employment, unpaid family work and non-LFP. Thus, the MNL models can be 
another candidate.
However, the problems with MNL models are well documented in the 
literature (see Greene 2003; Long 1997; Long and Freese 2006). In particular, the 
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption, which means that 
the odds ratio concerned is independent of the remaining outcomes or that adding 
or deleting any one of the alternatives does not change the odds among the other
73 It was part of the World Bank’s “Inequality around the World” project.
74 One major difference between Milanovic (2005) and Deremy and Chescher (1993) is 
that the former sums up income from paid employment with self employment whereas 
the latter does not. This reflects that Milanovic (2005) does not focus on the difference 
between them while Deremy and Chescher (1993) do.
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alternatives, is frequently violated since various factors influence the decisions 
on LFP and employment choice differently. To overcome this problem, attempts 
have been made by developing mixed logit models that can relax the IIA 
assumption by dividing the multiple choices into a hierarchy of decision levels 
(see Hensher and Greene 2001; Greene 2003). Yet, this in turn requires 
alternative-specific data that “have as many values for a variable as there are 
alternatives (Long and Freese 2006, p. 293).” Unfortunately, the generating 
process of the present data does not allow us to use mixed logit models. Our data 
set is case-specific data, which, irrespective of alternatives, includes only one 
value for each variable. This is inconsistent with the point that mixed logit 
models require alternative-specific data.
Above all, choice is to be made between a probit technique and MNL models. 
Before proceeding and selecting the best possible strategy, some notes deserve 
mention at this point. To apply the Mincerian approach, to remedy analytical 
deficiencies of human capital theory or to derive a ‘best-fitted’ econometric 
model is not the purpose of this study. Rather, the primary focus is to see what 
emerges out of the present data set in relation to the political-economic 
arguments developed earlier. Hence, this empirical study is illustrative, and 
compromise is made between testing the hypotheses developed in section 5.3.2 
and the nature of our data sets.
With these points in mind, it can be argued that the MNL model is not 
appropriate for our study due to two reasons. The first reason is empirical. As 
mentioned, the IIA assumption essentially requires that the choices be substitutes 
to each other. Yet, it is well-known that different factors are at work when 
determining labour force participation and sector of employment, so that these 
choices can not necessarily be treated as alternatives. I tested the empirical 
relevance of the MNL model using Hausman tests and Small-Hsiao tests of IIA 
assumption (see Long and Freese 2006, pp. 243-6 for details of these tests). But 
it failed to pass the two tests, suggesting that the decisions on wage employment 
participation and sector selection are not alternatives and that the MNL model is
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inappropriate for this case (see Appendix A).75 Indeed, it will be seen later in 
section 5.4 that various ethnic groups demonstrate different patterns of labour 
force participation and wage employment selection, supporting these arguments.
Besides this, there is another reason that further undermines the relevance of 
using the MNL model. If we still stick to the MNL model despite the empirical 
problem explained above, then we need to cut-off the raw data to create a sub­
sample that best fits its statistical requirement to pass Hausman and Small-Hsiao 
tests of IIA assumption. Needless to say, this econometric-driven approach 
causes some substantive problems. First, it requires us to sacrifice some data that 
would help us to depict important aspects of labour markets. Obviously, it does 
not coincide with the main purpose of this empirical research, which is to 
illustrate reality from the data sets. Second, by cutting some data, we would have 
to ignore the issues of participation in the labour force and wage employment, 
which is related to sector selection and thus contains some important information 
on Malaysia’s labour markets. Further, the sub-sample to be constructed for 
using the MNL model would not necessarily be a random sample of the entire 
population (section 5.4.1 also looks at this). The empirical strategy chosen by 
Milanovic (2005), who used a probit technique rather than the MNL models, 
indicates the severity of this problem. Above all, the MNL models do not 
necessarily match the nature of Malaysia’s labour market analysis.
By contrast, a probit technique has some merits for the present study. Without 
cutting some data, it can be extended to incorporate the two-step decisions to be 
in wage employment and to choose between public and private sector 
employment. Unlike the MNL models, therefore, this enables us to have two 
decisions that are different by nature but can be made simultaneously, whilst 
keeping the richness of the present data. Against this background, I consider the 
following sector selection with reference to Assaad (1997) and Christofides and 
Psahardes (2002):
75 None of the Hausman tests rejected the null hypothesis that the IIA holds, but all the 
Small-Hsiao tests did reject it.
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1 = engage in wage employment, if 7/ > 0
1 0 = not, otherwise
1 = work in the public sector, if Y2 > 0
0 = work in the private sector, otherwise
where 7/ and Y* are unobserved latent variables pertaining to the difference in 
individual decisions in wage employment and between public and private sector
employment. Non-participation in wage employment, or choosing zero in the 
first decision ( D x), includes self-employment as well as non-participation in 
labour force and unemployment. Specifically, the latent variables can be written 
in the following linear form:
where X  is a vector of various explanatory variables and s x and s 2 are zero- 
mean, constant-variance error terms:
Note that the error terms of the two equations in (5.1) are correlated. This is 
different to estimating two univariate probit models, which would assume no 
correlation between the error terms, p  accounts for the correlation between the 
two equations, and if it equals zero, the two equations can be estimated by the 
univariate probit technique (for details, see Greene 2003, pp. 710-2).
The technique of a bivariate probit with sample selection is used to estimate
(5.1). The reason for this is that the dependent variables for (5.1) are binary but 
Y2 is observed only if 7,* > 0. The sample for the second equation is censored 
such that at least one restriction variable that affects Y* but not Y2 is necessary
7,’ = a xX x + sx
(5.1)
£(* ,)=  £(*:,)= 0
Var(sx) = Var(e2 ) = 1 
C o v(s x, £ 2) ~  p
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(see Assaad 1997; Greene 1992; Tunali 1986; Van De Ven and van Praag 1981). 
This technique allows us to let the two decisions be made simultaneously and to 
observe a process in which ethnicity affects employment choice.
Above all, this study helps us to look into ethnic differences in sector selection 
using the political-economy arguments developed earlier. Nonetheless, two 
points deserve attention. First, it is presumed that human capital theory is not 
appropriate in understanding the Malaysian context. Second, the approach allows 
us to lay bare the peculiarities of Malaysia’s labour markets. It adds evidence on 
ethnicity and higher education in labour markets, which has been absent in the 
literature. In this connection, when interpreting estimation results of (5.1), 
particular attention is paid to ethnic differences, and thus to the signs of the 
coefficients more than magnitude of parameter estimates.
5.3.3 Variables
The dependent variables are binary, being created from the questions on labour 
force/employment status and sector of employment. WAGEEMPLOY 
corresponds with Yx , and equals 1 if the respondent is engaged in wage 
employment but 0 otherwise (namely, self-employment, unpaid family 
employment, unemployed or outside labour force). SECTORCHOICE 
corresponds with Y2 and equals 1 if the respondent stated that he or she works in 
the public sector but 0 otherwise (namely, the private sector).
Explanatory variables are selected on the basis of the arguments and findings 
so far as well as the constraints of the present data sets. Table 5.8 describe those 
included in X x and/or X 2 in (5.1), together with the dependent variables, and the 
summary statistics are presented in Tables 5.9a and 5.9b. The whole sample is 
divided into men and women since their patterns of LFP (or wage employment 
participation in our present context) are significantly different, as seen later.
Various factors are considered to influence the decisions on participation in 
wage employment and on sector selection. Ethnicity affects them as the result of 
the institutional framework of labour markets, which is developed around the
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ethnic factor. With Malays as the reference group, two ethnic dummies for 
Chinese (CHINESE) and Indians (INDIANS) are included. Besides ethnicity, the 
effects of age on the two decisions must be considered. Similar to the previous 
chapter, four five-year cohort dummies are included: 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, and 
45-49. These dummies can also incorporate the possibility that marriage and 
child-bearing can influence women’s decisions on wage employment 
participation and sector selection. Since the mean age of first marriage for 
women as of 2000 is 25.1 years old (Swee-Hock 2007, Table 7.1), it can be 
expected that their participation in wage employment goes downward from 25 
years old of age.
Besides the generic characteristics, we also consider socio-economic variables 
on education attainment, current residence, marital status and the status within 
household. Firstly, four dummies are created from a question on educational 
attainment, with higher education attainment as the reference: NONE (without 
schooling or completed primary schooling), LOWERSEC (completed lower- 
secondary), UPPERSEC (upper-secondary) and POSTSEC (post-secondary). 
These dummies enable us to observe the impacts of varying levels of education 
completed on wage employment and sector selection decisions. Further, 
participation of wage employment and sector selection can be affected by local 
labour market conditions, which are proxied by dummy variables on current 
residence. They include states in which respondents reside (CRBORNEO, 
CRNORTHERN, CRSOUTHERN, and CRWESTERN), and semiurban 
(SEMIURBAN) and rural (RURAL) areas. Though they may not necessarily be 
exogenous depending on mobility, they still can influence labour market 
decisions since industry and services sectors tend to be concentrated in 
developed states and urban areas. Finally, turning to household-related variables 
such as marital status and status within household, dummy variables indicating 
head of household (HHHEAD) and marital status (MARRIED) are included. 
These variables can, though rather indirectly, allow us to investigate to what 
extent household responsibilities influence labour market decisions.
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the census data do not contain 
information on parental and household backgrounds as well as income and
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expenditure. This makes it difficult to have some restriction variables in (5.1). 
Examples can be land ownership, father’s occupational status (i.e., self- 
employed) or husband’s occupational status (i.e., self-employed), none of which 
is available in the present data sets. Therefore, as the second-best solution, it is 
necessary to create restriction proxy variables out of the variables at hand. In this 
connection, we have two candidates. First, when estimating (5.1) for all ethnic 
groups, an interaction term (CHINESENONE) that is created through 
multiplying CHINESE by NONE can be used. The reason for this is that Chinese 
without schooling or with primary schooling are likely to be outside wage 
employment (see also Deremy and Chescher 1993). If so, then their wives are 
also considered to be self-employed. Second, when separately estimating (5.1) 
for Malays, Chinese and Indians, another interaction term (FEMALENONE) that 
is created by multiplying FEMALE by NONE can be used. It is because women 
without schooling can be considered to be outside wage employment and 
engaged in household responsibilities. As mentioned, these two restriction 
variables are included in the first selection equation where necessary, but it must 
be borne in mind that they are not necessarily perfect proxies.
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Table 5.9a Descriptive Statistics o f Variables
Variables
Wage employment 
Public sector Private sector
Outside wage 
employment
Ethnicity
MALAY 0.867 (0.340) 0.499 (0.500) 0.576 (0.494)
CHINESE 0.084 (0.278) 0.362 (0.480) 0.352 (0.478)
INDIANS 0.049 (0.215) 0.139 (0.346) 0.072 (0.259)
Gender
Male* 0.600 (0.490) 0.647 (0.478) 0.354 (0.478)
Female 0.399 (0.490) 0.353 (0.478) 0.646 (0.478)
Age Cohort
25-29* 0.173 (0.378) 0.290 (0.454) 0.173 (0.379)
30-34 0.208 (0.406) 0.230 (0.421) 0.202 (0.401)
35-39 0.231 (0.421) 0.203 (0.402) 0.217(0.412)
40-44 0.227 (0.419) 0.160 (0.367) 0.215(0.411)
45-49 0.162 (0.368) 0.117(0.322) 0.193 (0.395)
Education Attainment
None 0.067 (0.250) 0.217 (0.412) 0.399 (0.490)
Lowersec 0.114(0.317) 0.214(0.410) 0.252 (0.434)
Uppersec 0.438 (0.496) 0.384 (0.486) 0.285 (0.451)
Postsec 0.083 (0.275) 0.045 (0.208) 0.028 (0.165)
Higher* 0.299 (0.458) 0.139(0.346) 0.037(0.188)
Current Residence
(State)
CRKLANGV* 0.245 (0.430) 0.368 (0.482) 0.235 (0.424)
CRBORNEO 0.109 (0.312) 0.068 (0.251) 0.090 (0.286)
CRNORTHCRN 0.222 (0.416) 0.120 (0.325) 0.233 (0.423)
CRSOUTHERN 0.269 (0.443) 0.262 (0.440) 0.270 (0.444)
CRWESTERN 0.155 (0.362) 0.182 (0.386) 0.172 (0.377)
Current Residence
(Area)
URBAN* 0.509 (0.500) 0.638(0.481) 0.458 (0.498)
SEMIURBAN 0.265 (0.441) 0.175 (0.380) 0.215(0.411)
RURAL 0.226 (0.418) 0.187 (0.390) 0.326 (0.469)
Household
HHMEMBERS* 0.434 (0.496) 0.513 (0.500) 0.731 (0.443)
HHHEAD 0.566 (0.496) 0.487 (0.500) 0.269 (0.443)
Marital Status
NOTMARRIED* 0.117(0.321) 0.276 (0.447) 0.146 (0.353)
MARRIED 0.883 (0.321) 0.724 (0.447) 0.854 (0.353)
Restriction Variable
FEMALENONE 0.011 (0.107) 0.075 (0.264) 0.269 (0.444)
No. of Observations 14,723 41,748 56,778
Note: * indicates the reference group, and figures in parenthesis are standard deviations.
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5.4 Em pirical Results
5.4.1 Descriptive Results
Before examining estimation results, descriptive results obtained from the 
present sample are presented. All the tables point to the situation in year 2000. 
This aims to add some basic information on employment choice, but for 
analytical purposes, those related to public-private choice are presented here. The 
tables on unemployment are placed in Appendix B and C, in order to avoid 
misunderstanding of the main purpose of this empirical study (to test the 
hypotheses developed in section 5.2.2).
Unsurprisingly, LFP rates differ among ethnic group and gender. The overall 
rate is 70.6 percent, but the rates for Malays, Chinese and Indians are 69.3 
percent, 72.2 percent and 73.7 percent respectively. It can be said that the ethnic 
differential is not necessarily large. By contrast, there is a large gender 
differential (see Table 5.10). It is immediately found from the last row that the 
LFP rate of women is 45.0 percent, which is extremely low relative to 96.9 
percent of men. More interestingly, the table indicates that in the case of women 
there is an association between LFP rate and educational backgrounds. It shows 
that the higher the educational background the more likely to participate in the 
labour force. Indeed, the LFP rate of women with higher educational 
backgrounds is 88.1 percent, which is not so different from 96.8 percent of men 
with same educational backgrounds. In contrast, the LFP rate for men is high for 
all educational categories. Above all, all these findings can be the empirical 
rationale for estimating equation (5.1) for men and women.
When it comes to employment and unemployment rates, there is no marked 
ethnic difference (see Table 5.11). Since the present sample is restricted to those
76 The labour force refers to persons “who were either employed or unemployed during 
the last seven days before the date of interview (Department of Economics 2000b, xxi).” 
According to Census, the employed persons are defined as: “those who were working at 
least one hour during the reference week for pay (in cash or kind), profit or family gain. 
Included in this category are those who did not work during the reference week due to 
illness, injuiy, handicapped / disability, bad weather, vacation, labour dispute and social 
or religious reasons but having a job to return to (ibid, xxii).” Thus, those who are not 
employed but are in the labour force are defined as the unemployed.
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aged between 25 and 49 years old, the result is different from Table 1.4. This 
finding from Table 5.11, however, does not mean that the three ethnic groups opt 
for similar jobs. As seen shortly, Malays are more likely to be employed in the
* 7 7public sector, but Chinese and Indians tend to work in the private sector.
Table 5.10 LFP Rate bv Educational Attainment and Gender
Male Female Total
None/Primary 95.0 29.5 57.7
Lower Secondary 97.4 33.7 66.7
Upper Secondary 98.0 52.6 75.6
Post Secondary 97.0 65.9 81.5
Higher 96.8 8 8 .1 93.0
Total 96.9 45.0 70.6
Table 5.11 Employment and Unemployment Rates by Ethnicity
Employed Unemployed Total
Malay 97.7 2.3 100.0
Chinese 97.7 2.3 100.0
Indians 97.8 2.2 100.0
Total 97.7 2.3 100.0
Now turning to type of employment, which is the primary focus of this chapter, 
the relationship between ethnicity and type of employment is presented in Table 
5.12. At the first sight, it is seen that rates of participation in wage employment 
differ among the three ethnic groups. It indicates that the ways in which Malays, 
Chinese and Indians enter the sample of the wage employed are non-random. 
Besides the findings on LFP from Table 5.10, therefore, these findings justify the 
use of bivariate probit with sample selection technique (see section 5.3.2).
77 In order to concentrate on the main research topic here (namely, public-private 
employment choice), the tables on unemployment using the same sample are listed in 
Appendix B and C. They reveal some interesting findings on unemployment. First, it is 
found that the younger you are the more likely to be unemployed. This is particularly 
true of Malays. Second, it is found that those with lower level of education attained are 
more likely to be unemployed. This clearly holds true of Chinese and Indians. Yet, in the 
case of Malays, those with upper secondary schooling suffer most from unemployment.
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In parallel, we can see several findings from Table 5.12. First, it is shown that 
slightly less than 20 percent of the total employed is employed by the public 
sector. The proportions of private sector employment and self employment are
7J?53.5 percent and 27.7 percent respectively. Overall, wage employment absorbs 
72.3 percent of the total employed. Second, as expected, the Malay dominance in 
public sector employment can be seen. More or less 30 percent of Malays 
employed are in the public sector, whereas the corresponding figures for Chinese 
and Indians are just 4.9 percent and 9.3 percent. Third, Chinese seem to be over­
represented in self-employment and Indians in private sector employment. Above 
all, ethnic differences in sector selection are clearly found.
Table 5.12 Ethnicity and Type of Employment
Wage Employment
Public Sector Private 
Sector
Self
Employment Total
Malay 28.5 46.5 25.0 100.0
Chinese 4.9 58.9 36.2 100.0
Indians 9.3 76.0 14.7 100.0
Total 18.8 53.5 27.7 100.0
Next, the relationship between educational backgrounds and type of 
employment is presented in Table 5.13. It demonstrates two interesting findings. 
First, it is indicated that the higher the educational background the more likely 
the worker is to be employed in the public sector. Together with the findings 
from Table 5.12, it follows that the public sector is a large employer of Malays 
with higher educational backgrounds. To see if this is true of all ethnic groups, 
however, this point is to be investigated further in section 5.4.3. Second, we can 
see that the lower the educational background the more likely to be self- 
employed. For example, 45 percent of those without or with primary schooling 
are self-employed, but only 9.6 percent of those with higher educational
78 The self-employed person is “a person who works on his own and does not employ 
workers although he may have assistants comprising family members (Department of 
Statistics 2000b, xxiii).”
169
1_
backgrounds are. It suggests that Chinese workers without or with primary 
schooling are most likely to be self-employed. By contrast, there is no clear 
pattern between educational backgrounds and private sector employment.
Table 5.13 Educational Backgrounds and Type of Employment
Wage Employment
Public Sector Private Sector
Self
Employment Total
None/Primary 5.4 49.6 45.0 1 0 0 .0
Lower Secondary 10.4 55.4 34.2 1 0 0 .0
Upper Secondary 22.5 55.9 2 1 .6 1 0 0 .0
Post Secondary 32.3. 50.4 17.3 1 0 0 .0
Higher 38.9 51.5 9.6 1 0 0 .0
Total 18.8 53.4 27.7 1 0 0 .0
Before carrying out econometric analysis of public-private employment choice, 
it is useful to look at two more tables that complement the findings from Tables 
5.12 and 5.13. Now, we look at public sector employment. Table 5.14 follows 
Table 5.6 to update the information, though it must be borne in mind that the 
present sample includes those aged between 25 and 49 years old only. The table 
shows a number of interesting points, but I focus on those related to higher 
education and ethnicity in order to maintain the analytical consistency with the 
rest of this chapter.
First, Malays are, as expected, over-represented in public sector employment, 
accounting for 86.7 percent of the public sector jobs. Second, Chinese and 
Indians opt for private sector employment, but the pattern between them is not 
necessarily the same. Chinese are the majority group in trade and finance sectors, 
but Indians are over-represented in agriculture and manufacturing sectors. Lastly, 
it is seen that those with higher educational backgrounds are over-represented in 
the public sector and the finance sector. It can be surmised that Malay graduates 
tend to choose public sector employment whereas non-Malay, especially Chinese, 
graduates are likely to work in financial sector.
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Having established the finding on the Malay dominance in public sector 
employment, Table 5.15 breaks down public sector jobs by ethnicity and gender. 
First, the dominance of Malay men is striking in that they accounted for more 
than half of the public sector employees. Second, the extremely high 
representation of Malays is found in public administration jobs, amounting to
91.5 percent (see also Table 5.4 that presumably used a wider sample than the 
present one). Indeed, the share of Malay men in this category was as high as 70.1 
percent. Finally, when it comes to education (teachers etc) and health (doctors 
and nurses etc), women’s proportion exceeded men’s. For example, women 
accounted for 61.8 percent of the education jobs, and 61.1 percent of the medical 
jobs. This suggests that the education and medical services provide women with 
job opportunities.
Table 5.14 Public and Private Sectors Employment bv Ethnicity and Gender
Public Private Sector Malaysia
Sector Agriculture Manu­
facturing Transport
Services
Trade Finance
Total
Education
None/Primary 6.7 58.9 22.3 22.5 2 2 .1 5.0 28.9
Lower Sec 11.4 19.8 23.8 25.5 25.4 8 .1 2 2 .0
Upper Sec 43.8 16.2 40.1 38.6 40.5 44.6 34.2
Post Sec 8.3 1 .2 4.0 4.0 4.6 8 .0 4.2
Higher 29.9 3.9 9.8 9.3 7.4 34.5 10.9
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Ethnicity
Malays 86.7 54.3 55.7 58.1 34.2 44.4 58.6
Chinese 8.4 17.6 24.8 25.2 55.3 44.7 32.1
Indians 4.9 28.1 34.9 16.7 10.5 10.9 9.4
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Note: The type of industry was selected to be consistent with Table 5.6.
i
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Table 5.15 Ethnicity. G ender and Public Sector Jobs
Malay Chinese Indians Total
T M F T M F T M F
Public Administration 91.5 4.3 4.3 1 0 0 .0
70.1 21.3 2.5 1.7 3.6 0.6
Education 82.6 13.2 4.2 1 0 0 .0
33.6 49.0 3.2 10.0 1.3 2.8
Health 82.5 9.8 7.7 1 0 0 .0
33.0 49.5 3.0 6.8 2.9 4.8
Other Public Services 81.8 9.5 8 .8 1 0 0 .0
53.4 28.4 4.1 5.4 7.4 1.4
All Others 82.8 1 0 .1 7.1 1 0 0 .0
59.9 22.9 6.0 4.1 5.8 1.3
TOTAL 86.7 8.4 4.9 1 0 0 .0
53.7 33.0 3.2 5.2 3.1 1.8
Note: T (total), M (male), F (female); Other Public Services include community social 
and personal service activities, private household with employed persons, and extra­
territorial organization and bodies; All Others include agriculture, mining/quarrying, 
manufacturing, electricity/gas/water, construction, wholesale and retail, and 
transport/communications etc.
5.4.2 Estimation Results: Between-Group Differences
Hypothesis 1 is tested by estimating equation (5.1), and the results for men and 
women are presented in Table 5.16. Having estimated separately for men and 
women, the first column gives the results for the first selection equation 
(participation in wage employment) and the second column the substantive 
equation (sector selection). And for both men and women, log-likelihood tests 
reject the null hypothesis that all variables are jointly zero. For men, the log- 
likelihood Chi-squared statistic is 5727.15 with 18 degrees of freedom, which is 
significant at 1 percent level of significance. For women, it is 6161.73 with 18 
degrees of freedom, and is similarly significant at 1 percent level of significance.
Turning to the correlation between the selection equation and the substantive 
equation, it is found that for both men and women the error terms of the two 
equations are correlated. In the case of men, the log-likelihood test rejects at 1 
percent level of significance the null hypothesis that p  (rho) equals zero. In the 
case of women, it does so at 5 percent level of significance. This clearly 
demonstrates that the two decisions are not made separately. At empirical level, 
this justifies the two-stage bivariate probit estimation by controlling for sample 
selection. At analytical level, this suggests that, when making decisions, various
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ethnic groups take into account government labour market policies that are 
formed on the basis of the equity-efficiency trade-off. Alternatively, it can be 
argued that expectations to secure waged jobs influence their decisions to 
participate in wage employment.
Several interesting points, though not surprising in light of the arguments and 
findings so far, are immediately found from the table. First of all, there are clear 
ethnic differences in sector selection for both men and women. Since the 
reference group is Malays with higher educational backgrounds, it can be argued 
that Malays are most likely to go into the public sector, conditional on higher 
education backgrounds and gender. Put differently, it is Malay graduates who are 
most likely to take public sector jobs, and the government is a large employer of 
them. These findings support Hypothesis 1.
By contrast, it is found that Chinese and Indians choose private rather than 
public sector employment. Interestingly, the signs of the coefficient on 
CHINESE in the first selection equations are negative for both men and women. 
This indicates that government labour market policies divert some Chinese 
graduates away from wage employment and consequently, they are self- 
employed, unemployed or outside the labour force. On the other hand, the 
corresponding signs for Indians are positive, meaning that Indian graduates are 
more likely to be wage-employed than Malays. But, the results from the sector 
selection equations show that Indian men and women tend to work in the private 
sector even though they enter wage employment. Above all, all these findings 
point to a strong association between Malay graduates and public sector 
employment, and supplement the finding that Malay graduates are most likely to 
work in the public sector.
Unsurprisingly, then, we can see for men and women that the higher the 
attainment the more likely workers are to be in wage employment and in public 
sector employment. All the signs of the coefficients on the education dummies 
are negative for men and women. This complements the finding that Malay 
graduates are most likely to go into the public sector. When it comes to the 
magnitudes of the coefficients, they are larger for women than for men. In a
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sense, this implies the presence of gender difference in labour market decisions, 
but it ought to be tested in the next section by estimating separate regressions by 
ethnicity.
Turning to the coefficients on age cohort dummies, two points are found. The 
first point is that the older the worker the more likely the worker is to be outside 
wage employment. In general, this tendency holds true of both men and women, 
but the magnitudes of the coefficients on these dummies in the participation 
equations are larger for men than women. On the one hand, most of the men who 
chose to be outside wage employment appear to be self-employed in the light of 
their high LFP rates and low unemployment rates for the entire sample (see 
Tables 5.10 and 5.11). On the other hand, it may mean that most of the older 
women, who are outside wage employment, seem to be outside the labour force 
when taking into account low LFP rates for women found from Table 5.10. It can 
follow that marriage and child-bearing might influence women’s decisions to 
enter the labour force. The second point that emerges from the age cohort 
dummies is that, when choosing wage employment, the older the worker the 
more likely the worker is to choose public sector employment. It is particularly 
so with women more than men. The tentative explanation is that the public sector 
provides job opportunities for the older workers and also the married women. 
Indeed, for the latter, the sign of the coefficient on MARRIED in the women’s 
sector selection equation indicates it.
The signs of the coefficients on HHHEAD and MARRIED are to some extent 
illustrative of the effects of household responsibilities on labour market decisions, 
though the constraints of the present data do not allow us to investigate them in 
detail. The male heads of the household, most of whom are usually married, are 
likely to be wage employed and generally choose public rather than private 
sector employment. This may indicate that job security in the public sector is an 
important factor for them when making labour market decisions, since self- 
employment and private sector employment are more influenced by economic 
cycles. In contrast, the female heads of the household are likely to be in wage 
employment, but no clear pattern is observed in terms of sector selection. Indeed, 
the coefficient on HHHEAD in the women’s sector selection equation is
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statistically insignificant. On the other hand, when it comes to marriage, an 
interesting story can be seen. The econometric results show that married women 
tend to be outside wage employment, but once in wage employment, they are 
more likely to be in the public rather than the private sector. Taking into account 
the lower LFP rates for women (see Table 5.10), this may indicate that if the 
prospects of securing public sector jobs are high, then married women choose to 
join the labour force and enter wage employment.
Finally, turning to current residence dummies, a similar result is found for both 
men and women. The public sector provides more employment opportunities in 
less developed states (CRBORNEO and CRNORTHERN) and semiurban 
(SEMIURBAN) and rural (RURAL) areas than does the private sector. This is 
hardly surprising since the private sector jobs are concentrated in more 
developed states and urban areas. Nonetheless, these dummies must be 
interpreted with some caution. For, the reported place of residence may be the 
consequence rather than cause of labour market decisions. That is to say, these 
individuals reside in less developed and rural areas because of their jobs. Since 
the present data does not contain information to investigate the causal 
relationship between place of residence and labour market status, the question of 
the causality must be investigated comprehensively in future.
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Table 5.16 Results for the Sector Selection Equation: C oefficient Estim ates
Men Women
Participation 
in Wage 
Employment
Sector Selection
Participation
in Wage Sector Selection 
Employment
Constant 1 .2 1 1 *** -0.702*** 1.695*** -0.430***
(0.025) (0.044) (0.028) (0.036)
CHINESE -0.508*** - 0  9 7 1 *** -0.074*** -1.018***
(0.015) (0.066) (0.016) (0.040)
INDIANS 0.255*** -0.685*** 0.394*** -0.709***
(0 .0 2 2 ) (0.028) (0 .0 2 0 ) (0.044)
30-34 -0.154*** 0.236*** -0 .1 2 1 *** 0.256***
(0.018) (0.024) (0.018) (0.031)
35-39 -0.240*** 0.463*** -0.132*** 0.496***
(0.019) (0.025) (0.018) (0.032)
40-44 -0.321*** 0.738*** -0 .1 1 0 *** 0.840***
(0.019) (0.027) (0.019) (0.037)
45-49 -0.390*** 0.819*** -0.246*** 1 .0 2 2 ***
(0 .0 2 1 ) (0.028) (0 .0 2 1 ) (0.041)
None -0.907*** -0.596*** -1.698*** -1 987***
(0.025) (0.067) (0.027) (0.184)
Lowersec -0.618*** -0.407*** -1.566*** -1.413***
(0 .0 2 2 ) (0.044) (0.025) (0.152)
Uppersec -0.410*** -0.192*** -0.990*** -0.750***
(0 .0 2 1 ) (0.028) (0.023) (0.082)
Postsec -0.322*** -0.061 -0.613*** -0.294***
(0.034) (0.038) (0.034) (0.057)
CRBORNEO 0.029 0.697*** -0.145*** 1.056***
(0 .0 2 2 ) (0.039) (0.024) (0.045)
CRNORTHERN -0.328*** 0.494*** -0.281*** 0.571***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.019) (0.036)
CRSOUTHERN 0.013 0.232*** 0 .0 0 1 0.317***
(0.016) (0 .0 2 2 ) (0.017) (0.031)
CRWESTERN 0.018 0.274*** 0.037** 0.238***
(0.018) (0.026) (0.018) (0.035)
SEMIURBAN -0.162*** 0.292*** -0.149*** 0.382***
(0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.029)
RURAL -0.478*** 0 191*** -0.183*** 0.176***
(0.016) (0.025) (0.017) (0.033)
HHHEAD 0.218*** 0.127*** 0.213*** 0.019
(0.016) (0.028) (0.025) (0.042)
MARRIED 0.132*** 0.060** -0.752*** 0.465***
(0.018) (0.028) (0.017) (0.051)
CHINESENONE 0.236*** -0.168***
(0.026) (0.029)
Rho ■0.697 -0.295
(0.531) (0.113)
Log-Likelihood -48,616.79 -38,863.36
No. of 55,967 35,870 57,282 20,601
Observations
Note: Figures in parenthesis are standard errors; *** p  < .01, ** p  < .05, * p  < .10.
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5.4.3 Estimation Results: Within-Group Differences
Hypothesis 2 is tested through separately estimating equation (5.1) by
ethnicity, and the results are presented in Table 5.17. Having estimated
separately for the three ethnic groups, the first column gives the results for the 
first selection equation (participation in wage employment) and the second 
column the substantive equation (sector selection). For all the ethnic groups, log- 
likelihood tests reject the null hypothesis that all variables are jointly zero. The 
log-likelihood Chi-squared statistics are 5562.02 for Malays and 2084.92 for
Chinese with 17 degrees of freedom respectively, and both of them are
significant at 1 percent level of significance. For Indians, the log-likelihood Chi- 
squared statistic is 519.01 with 16 degrees of freedom, since CRBORNEO was 
automatically dropped due to collinearity.79 It is also statistically significant at 1 
percent level of significance.
Turning to the correlation between the selection equation and the substantive 
equation, it is found for all the ethnic groups that the error terms of the two 
equations are highly correlated and that the log-likelihood test rejects at 1 percent 
level of significance the null hypothesis that p  (rho) equals zero. This confirms 
the earlier argument that the two decisions are made simultaneously rather than 
separately. Once again, this fact justifies using the technique of a bivariate probit 
with sample selection. Further, it can be stated in terms of the high magnitudes of 
p  (rho) that prospects of waged jobs are very important, especially for Indians, to 
decide whether they choose to be wage-employed. On the other hand, it is less so 
for Chinese, many of whom choose to be self-employed (see Table 5.12).
It is immediately seen from the female dummy that Hypothesis 2 does not hold 
true for all the ethnic groups. This is an interesting finding, which contradicts the 
previous argument in the literature that men were over-represented in public 
sector employment (Ariffin 1992, 1994; Khasnor 1984). Indeed, our estimation 
results demonstrate that, once controlling for sample selection problem, women 
are more likely to go into the public sector than men, conditional on higher 
education achievement and ethnicity. This indicates that female graduates are
79 The STATA package automatically drops the variables that suffer from collinearity. 
For this reason, the coefficient estimates on the variable are not listed in the table.
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most likely to work in the public sector, irrespective of ethnic backgrounds. This 
is also supported by the coefficients on the education dummies (None, Lowersec, 
Uppersec and Postsec), which are either negatively signed or statistically 
insignificant. They show that the higher the educational background the more 
likely the person is in wage employment and works in the public sector.
Taking into account the findings on Hypothesis 1, it can also be argued that 
Malay female graduates are most likely to work in the public sector. Presumably, 
this tendency seems to apply in recent times, since the probability of higher 
education enrolment becomes higher for women than men (see Chapter 4). 
Further, these findings carry more significance when turning our eyes to the 
results for the first selection equations. For Malays, Chinese and Indians, all the 
signs of the coefficients on the female dummy are negative, indicating that 
women enter wage employment given the expectations to obtain public sector 
jobs, such as teachers and nurses etc (see Table 5.15). It points to the significance 
of public sector employment for female graduates, since their labour market 
status can be influenced by job opportunities in the public sector.
Some other points, though of secondary importance against the purpose of this 
research, are to be raised in relation to the findings from Table 5.16. Perhaps this 
is useful to highlight some future research topics on Malaysia’s labour markets. 
First, the earlier findings on age and sector selection hold true of all the ethnic 
groups. For Malays, Chinese and Indians, it is that the older the worker the more 
likely the worker is to be outside wage employment. When choosing wage 
employment, however, the older the person the more likely the person chooses 
public sector employment. Although the reason for this remains unknown from 
the present data set and has to be investigated in the future research, this may 
indicate that the older individuals prefer stable public sector jobs or that the 
public sector used to absorb a larger proportion of the labour force.
In contrast, when it comes to current residence, there is no clear pattern. 
Earlier, we found that the public sector provides more employment opportunities 
in less developed states (CRBORNEO and CRNORTHERN) and semiurban 
(SEMIURBAN) and rural (RURAL) areas than does the private sector. This
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tendency is true of Malays and Chinese, but it is not so clear in the Indian case. 
The reason for this is unknown from the present data sets, and has to be 
investigated in future research.
By the same token, mixed results are found for the effect of HHHEAD. It was 
found earlier that the male heads of the household generally choose public sector 
employment but no clear pattern is observed for female heads of the household. 
Table 5.17 shows that, regardless of ethnic background, being the head of the 
household reduces the likelihood of being in public sector employment. By 
contrast, it is seen from the coefficients on MARRIED that married individuals 
are more likely to be outside wage employment, but when choosing it, they are 
more likely to work in the public sector. This coincides with the earlier finding 
on married women, but contradicts with the one on married men (see Table 5.16), 
All these mixed findings on HHHEAD and MARRIED suggest that the 
relationship between household responsibilities and labour market decisions be 
researched comprehensively in future.
5.5 Conclusions
As far as labour markets are concerned, the fundamental concern of the 
government has been to strike a balance between inter-ethnic distribution 
(equity) and economic growth (efficiency). The institutional framework of labour 
markets is grounded on the equity-efficiency trade-off, where the public-private 
differentials in terms of employment practices, fringe benefits and trade union 
activities are arranged in favour of Malays. Naturally, then, all this constitutes 
the environment in which various ethnic groups make different labour market 
decisions.
The empirical analysis using the Population and Housing Census Malaysia 
2000 revealed two major findings on ethnicity and educational background in 
labour markets. First, there are, hardly surprisingly, ethnic differences in sector 
selection, and Malays graduates are most likely to go into the public sector. 
Importantly, this fact suggests that the fundamental cause of the graduate 
unemployment concentrated amongst Malays is the institutional framework set
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up by the government (see also Chapter 1). Since the absorptive capacity of the 
public sector is rather limited relative to the private sector (see Table 5.12), many 
Malay graduates are likely to be queuing up for public sector employment. This 
can mean that increased government expenditure for higher education on the 
ground of the existing institutional framework of higher education and labour 
markets may generate more Malay unemployed graduates.
Further, it was also found that women are more likely to work in the public 
sector than men, conditional on higher educational achievement and ethnic 
background. This is a surprising but interesting result since the previous studies 
in the literature pointed to the male dominance in public sector jobs. If we 
combine this result from the finding on ethnic differential in sector selection, it 
can be argued that it is indeed Malay female graduates who are most likely to 
choose public sector employment. Since women are now more likely to enrol 
higher education than men (see Chapter 4), the extent to which the public sector 
creates job opportunities not only for Malays but also for women will be crucial 
as far as graduate unemployment is concerned.
This chapter also found that many other factors, such as age, current residence, 
household and marital status, also played pivotal roles in labour market decisions, 
though its main purpose is to investigate the role of ethnicity in Malaysia’s 
labour markets. Indeed, the findings on some of these factors are mixed, and 
therefore, they can be important future research topics in order to further deepen 
our understanding of Malaysia’s labour markets.
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Chapter 6
Public-Private Choice in Higher Education and Labour Markets 
with Reference to Ethnicity
6.1 Introduction
As seen in Chapters 4 and 5, the role of government in higher education and 
labour markets is of paramount importance in the Malaysian context. Primarily 
based on inter-ethnic concerns, the government constructs and manages higher 
education and labour markets. On the one hand, the role of higher education in 
maintaining social stability is highlighted, so that it is located as an important 
device of achieving inter-ethnic equity (see Chapter 4). The equity concerns form 
the institutional basis on which such instruments as the ethnic quota system and 
the government control over provision of higher educational services are put in 
place. Despite the introduction of the higher education reforms from the mid- 
1990s, the fundamental environment did not change. The role of government did 
not decline but rather expanded, giving rise to the dualistic structure within 
higher education: the public higher education institutions with ethnic concerns 
and the private higher education institutions without them.
And the same with the labour markets (see Chapter 5). The government’s 
equity and efficiency concerns lay the foundation on which the institutional 
framework of labour markets is constructed. The public sector is attached 
importance in terms of equity concerns, whilst the private sector efficiency 
concerns. Consequently, various public-private differentials are observable in 
employment practices, fringe benefits and trade union activities, all of which in 
general favour Malays.
Above all, Malaysia’s higher education and labour markets, especially the 
context in which ethnicity carries much significance in determining access to 
higher education and sector of employment, cannot be understood adequately 
without considering these institutional frameworks. The ethnic differences in
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higher educational enrolment are persistently evident, though the content and 
magnitude of the differences have varied over time. Further, the 1990s witnessed 
a dramatic change in the landscape of higher education, indicating that an ethnic 
divide in enrolment patterns between public and private/overseas higher 
education started to emerge very clearly (see Chapter 4; Aihara 2009). On the 
other hand, Malays have continued to be over-represented in public sector 
employment but Chinese and Indians in private sector employment. Indeed, the 
higher the educational background the more likely the workers are employed in 
the public sector, and Malay graduates are indeed most likely to work in the 
public sector.
These arguments and findings on the ethnic differentials in higher education 
enrolment and sector selection in labour markets are significant on their own. 
They would be more so when analysed jointly rather than separately. It is for this 
reason that this chapter is devoted to the study of the persistence of the ethnic 
factor from higher education through to labour markets. Human capital theory 
neglects the role of government, which indeed has profound implications in the 
Malaysian context. The ramification is that it does not have the capacity to 
explain why and how the ethnic factor persists from higher education through to 
labour markets. Hence, it is essential to start by putting the role of government to 
the fore.
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section looks at the persistence 
of ethnicity from higher education through to labour markets with reference to 
both the findings so far and previous studies. Accordingly, it aims to set up two 
empirical hypotheses. Section 6.3 develops empirical strategy to test them, and 
Section 6.4 discusses the empirical results. Section 6.5 summarises the main 
findings and concludes.
6.2 The Persistence of Ethnicity from Higher Education through to Labour 
Markets
In general, the NEP was built on the equity-efficiency trade-off, and was based 
on win-win principle that it is not necessary to rob Peter to pay Paul. To correct
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the inter-ethnic socio-economic imbalances that had resulted in the racial riots in 
1969, it empowered the government with distributing the economic pie that the 
private sector was expected to increase. The government’s equity concerns mean 
that the socio-economic position of Bumiputeras, in particular Malays, should be 
brought up to that of non-Bumiputeras, namely Chinese and Indians. Higher 
education and labour market policies were attached great significance towards 
the end (see Chapters 4 and 5). Put differently, this suggests that the ethnic factor 
continues to carry significance from higher education through to labour markets.
Some previous studies point to the persistence of the ethnic factor from (higher) 
education through to labour markets, though they are not as explicit as in this 
chapter. Wang (1977) investigated final year students at some upper secondary 
schools in Penang and nearby areas in the early 1970s, and suggested that the 
selection of subjects at upper secondary and higher levels of schooling is 
influenced by government policy. It was argued that Malays and non-Malays are 
well aware of public-private differentials in terms of labour market opportunities 
and that their choice of subjects reflected this. In the 1980s, Buan, Kim and Yong 
(1987) used a sample of students at upper secondary schools nationwide and 
found that Bumiputeras chose the government as the future employer after 
university more than did non-Bumiputeras. Similarly, the Malay tendency to 
choose public service was also reported by Yoong, Haron and Marimuthu (1987) 
who surveyed final year undergraduates at five local public universities. These 
findings suggest that the decision on higher education enrolment is related to the 
decision on sector selection in future labour markets.
When it comes to the 1990s, some studies suggested in informal discourse that 
Malays opt for public higher education whereas Chinese and Indians private 
higher education (for example, Alias 1997; Lee 1996, 1999, 2004; Samuel and 
Liew 1997; Tan 2002). Further, Noran and Ahmad (1997, cited in Tan 2002, pp. 
92) looked at the patterns of employment after graduation, and indicated that 
Bumiputeras, mainly Malays, work in the public sector.
As such, previous studies are indicative of the persistence of the ethnic factor 
from (higher) education through to labour markets. But the relationship between
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the type of higher education and sector selection in labour markets is yet to be 
addressed explicitly. Presumably, part of the reason is that type of higher 
education, either public or private/overseas, was not the primary policy target in 
the 1970s and 1980s, when private sector involvement in higher education was 
heavily restricted. Nonetheless, it is unfortunate that there are no studies on this, 
especially because Malaysia went through a series of higher education reforms 
from the mid-1990s. The decade witnessed the emergence of a dualistic structure 
in higher education, especially between public and private/overseas education 
(see Chapter 4; Aihara 2009). This is where the present chapter has something 
new to offer by putting to the fore the persistence of ethnicity from higher 
education through to labour market decisions.
As seen in Chapters 4 and 5, the government has shaped higher education and 
labour markets to make sure that the output of higher education is rewarded in 
labour markets in order to satisfy the government’s equity concerns. This 
suggests that the institutional frameworks of higher education and labour markets 
set structural conditions and constraints which various ethnic groups take into 
account when making decisions on higher education enrolment and sector 
selection. Besides the findings in Chapters 4 and 5, these arguments point to two 
hypotheses that correspond to both sides of the same coin:
Hypothesis 1: Malays enrol in public higher education institutions, and work in 
the public sector.
Hypothesis 2: Chinese and Indians enrol in private or overseas higher education 
institutions, and work in the private sector.
These hypotheses indicate that ethnicity plays an important role in making 
higher education and sector selection decisions, and also that these decisions are 
mutually related or likely to be made simultaneously. The inter-relationship 
between higher education and sector selection decisions can be explained in two 
ways. First, labour market prospects can influence the decisions on type of higher 
education (i.e., public or private). For example, some Malays may have chosen 
public higher education with public sector jobs in mind. Alternatively, some
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Chinese and Indians may have enrolled at private higher education institutions 
with private sector employment in mind. Second, type of higher education 
attained (i.e., public or private) can determine type of sector of employment. 
Other Malays work for the government because of their choice of public higher 
education. An example of this is government scholarship. Those who receive 
government scholarship are required to work in the public sector for some years 
after graduation, and Malays were the majority of the scholarship holders 
(Mehmet and Hoong 1985). In parallel, other Chinese and Indians may have 
decided to work in the private sector because of their qualifications from private 
higher education institutions. Above all, the institutional frameworks of higher 
education and labour markets influence the thought processes through which 
various ethnic groups go. Therefore, it is necessary to set up an empirical 
strategy to fit the nature of the two hypotheses, to which section 6.3.2 returns.
6.3 Empirical Strategy
6.3.1 Data
The empirical part of this chapter is developed around Population and 
Housing Census Malaysia 2000 which includes questions on both type of higher 
education and sector of employment. This is the first census that collects such 
information. This fact itself points to the significance of this data set.
The objective of the study is to examine the two hypotheses and illustrate the 
persistence of the ethnic factor from higher education through to labour markets. 
For this purpose, the entire sample is manufactured as follows. First, Malaysian 
citizens bom in Malaysia are selected. The focus is on the three major ethnic 
groups, namely Malays, Chinese and Indians. This allows us to investigate how 
the domestic population responds to government higher education and labour 
market policy. Second, the 25 to 49 years age groups are included. What is 
examined is the active labour force, which has attained higher education. Indeed, 
individuals are to complete formal education by the age of 24, and the retirement 
age of women is 50 years old. Third, those reporting the type of higher education 
(i.e., public, private or overseas) and type of sector (i.e., public or private sectors) 
are included. For analytical purposes, both private and overseas higher education
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are treated altogether since they are substitutes for public higher education (see 
Chapter 4). Above all, we focus on those with higher educational backgrounds. 
As a result, the size of the present sample is reduced to 8,408 individuals (see 
Table 6.1). The ethnic distribution of the sample slightly differs from Chapters 4 
and 5, since the present chapter is concerned with higher education graduates 
only.
Table 6.1 The Sample Distribution hv Ethnicity
Frequency Percent
Malays 5,165 61.4
Chinese 2,721 32.4
Indians 522 6.2
TOTAL 8,408 100.0
6.3.2 Estimation Strategy
The nature of this empirical study is illustrative. The presence of ethnic effects 
on sector selection is empirically tested by controlling for other observed 
variables like educational achievement and gender. Thus, I do not necessarily 
aim to obtain structural parameters or identify causal relationships. Nor do I 
intend to find a ‘best-fitted’ econometric model by considering various 
econometric issues, such as endogeneity. Rather, emphasis is placed upon how 
the ethnic factor persists from higher education through to labour market 
decisions.
With this motive in mind, it is necessary to consider the discussion in section
6.2 when setting up an estimation method: it is highly likely that the decisions on 
higher education enrolment and sector selection are mutually related or likely to 
be made simultaneously. Here, recall that the public sector plays a key role in 
terms of graduate unemployment and that the choice of public sector 
employment is influenced by a vector of variables, such as ethnicity, education 
achievement, including type of higher education, and gender (see Chapter 5). On 
the other hand, the decision on higher education enrolment or achievement, or 
type of higher education achieved in the present context, is affected by a set of 
variables like ethnicity and gender (see Chapter 4). As such, there is a possible
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simultaneous relationship between higher education and labour market decisions, 
which ought to be taken into account in an empirical framework. Failure to do so 
may produce biased and inconsistent parameter estimates in an econometric 
equation (Greene 1996). Thus, I first consider the following selection problem 
similar to Chapter 5:
A i
1 = enrol public higher education institutions, if y;  > 0
0 = enrol private/overseas higher education institutions, otherwise
1 = work in the public sector, if Y* > 0 
0 = work in the private sector, otherwise
where Y* and Y2 are latent, unobservable variables pertaining to the difference 
in decisions between public and private higher education institutions and 
between public and private sector employment. They can be expressed in the 
following general form:
Y* = a lX l +el
Y * = a 2X 2 + s2 (6.1)
where X  is a vector of various explanatory variables and sx and s2 are zero- 
mean, constant-variance error terms:
£ fo )  = £(* ,) = 0
Var(sx) = Var(s2) = 1 
Cov(ex,£2) = p
It must be noted here that equation (6,1) is different to equation (5.1) since, 
unlike equation (5.1), the sample for D2 in (6.1) is not censored. Here, Y2 is 
observed regardless of the first-stage choice. More importantly, equation (6.1) 
needs to be modified to incorporate the possible simultaneous relationship in the 
Malaysian context. As mentioned above, the decision on sector selection is 
influenced by various factors such as ethnicity and type of higher education. In
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other words, Y* in equation (6.1) influences the decision on Y*. With reference 
to Greene (1996, 1998, 2003), Grosjean and Kontoleon (2009) and Maddalla 
(1983), therefore, equation (6.1) is transformed into the following recursive, 
simultaneous form in order to fit the Malaysian context:
Yx =SxX x+ux i f7 t*> 0  .
Y2 — 0YX + S2X 2 + u2 if Y2 > 0 (6.2)
where Yl enters the decision on employment sector, Y2 . Sx and S2 are the 
parameters of X x and X 2, both of which correspond to a vector of explanatory 
variables, and ux and u2 are error terms.80 Unlike (6.1), the error terms in (6.2) 
are correlated since the decision on sector of employment is dependent on the 
decision on type of higher education. The application of ordinary least squares 
(OLS) to this model yields inconsistent and inefficient estimates, since this is a 
binary choice problem and also since the error terms are correlated (Greene 
2003). Indeed, (6.2) is estimated by full information maximum likelihood 
(FIML) technique suggested by Greene (1998), which is automatically performed 
by computer programmes such as NLOGIT.
6.3.3 Variables
The dependent variables are binary, being created from the questions on type 
of higher education and sector of employment. TYPEHE equals 1 if the 
respondent attended local public higher education, and it 0 otherwise (namely, 
either local private or overseas higher education). SECTOREMP equals 1 if the 
respondent stated that he or she works in the public sector, and it 0 otherwise 
(namely, the private sector).
Explanatory variables are selected on the basis of the arguments and findings 
so far as well as the constraints of the present data sets. As pointed out in the 
previous two chapters, the census data does not contain information on income- 
related and parental backgrounds. Table 6.2 presents the summary statistics of
80 If unobserved heterogeneity exists and factors influencing it are correlated, then the 
error terms follow a bivariate distribution (see Greene 1996, 1998 for details).
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those included in X x and/or X 2 in (6.2), together with TYPEHE and 
SECTOREMP.
Firstly, as seen in Chapter 4, the choice of type of higher education is 
influenced by ethnicity, gender and birthplace. In light of the ethnic concerns in 
higher education that are manifested as the ethnic quota system etc, both Chinese 
(CHINESE) and Indian dummies (INDIANS) are included to investigate the 
ethnic difference in higher education decision. Further, a female dummy 
(FEMALE) and four birthplace dummies, namely BORNEO, NORTHERN, 
SOUTHERN and WESTERN, are included. The reference group in the first 
equation is Malay men bom in either Kuala Lumpur or Selangor. Furthermore, 
the inclusion of age cohort dummies enables us to capture the effects of policy 
shifts on selection of type of higher education (see also Chapter 4).
Besides the ethnic and gender dummies together with age, the second equation 
includes other variables that can influence labour market decisions (see Chapter 
5). Local labour market conditions reflect the availability of job opportunities for 
higher education graduates, and they are proxied by the current residence 
dummies by state (CRBORNEO CRNORTHERN CRSOUTHERN and 
CRWESTERN) and by area (SEMIURBAN and RURAL). Here, the state 
dummies are believed to capture some relevant spatial heterogeneity that is not 
explained by the area dummies. It can be expected that those residing in less 
developed areas are employed in the public sector, since private sector jobs tend 
to be mainly offered in more developed areas. Furthermore, household-related 
variables available in the present data must be considered since they can impact 
on employment decisions. From the available information, the dummies 
indicating head of the household (HEADHH) and marital status (MARRIED) are 
included to see the effects of household responsibilities on sector selection. 
Nonetheless, some caution is required in interpreting all these variables, since 
they may be endogenous variables and thus the outcomes of labour market 
decisions. Yet, the aim of this empirical study is not econometric but illustrative 
to confirm the persistence of the ethnic factor from higher education through to 
labour market decisions. Although such issues as the role of residence and
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household responsibilities in influencing labour market decisions are important 
on their own, therefore, I leave them aside for analytical purposes. I continue to 
focus on the role of ethnicity in higher education and labour market decisions.
Above all, the two hypotheses developed in the previous section are tested by 
(i) if the sign of the coefficient on and marginal effect of TYPEHE are positive 
and statistically significant and (ii) if the estimated signs of the coefficients on 
and the marginal effects of CHINESE and INDIANS are negative and 
statistically significant. If (i) is true, then it indicates support for Hypothesis 1 
since Malays, being the reference group, are over-represented at public higher 
education institutions and, therefore, are highly associated with TYPEHE = 1. 
Similarly, if (ii) is true, then it indicates support for Hypothesis 2.
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6.4 Em pirical Results
6.4.1 Descriptive Results
Before engaging in econometric analysis, it is useful to present some 
descriptive findings. Table 6.3 presents the association between type of higher 
education and sector of employment. Three points are immediately found. First, 
those enrolling in public higher education institutions are more likely to work in 
the public sector. In contrast, the majority of those having attained private or 
overseas higher education are employed in the private sector. Second, as can be 
computed from the table, around 90 percent of the public sector workers have 
attained public higher education. In contrast, when it comes to those engaged in 
private sector employment, those with public and private/overseas education are 
equi-proportionately represented. The Pearson and likelihood ratio tests reject the 
null hypothesis that type of higher education and sector of employment are 
independent to each other. This suggests that the two decisions are related to 
each other, indicating that type of higher education influences sector selection.
Table 6.3 Public-Private Choice in Higher Education and Sector of 
Employment
Type o f  Higher Education
Sector of Employment Tnf0l
Public Private L O tS ll
Public 3,141 2,513 5,654
(55.6) (44.4) (100.0)
Private/Overseas 335 2,419 2,754
(12.2) (87.8) (100.0)
Total 3,476 4,932 8,408
(41.3) (58.7) (100.0)
Chi-square DF Value Probability
Pearson 1 1.4e+03 .000
Likelihood Ratio 1 1.6e+03 .000
Those findings are significant on their own, but must be further scrutinized in 
relation to ethnicity. When looking at the ethnic distribution of those having 
completed public higher education in this sample, it is found that Malays account 
for 76.1 percent, Chinese 18.9 percent and Indians 5 percent. It indicates the
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Malay dominance in public higher education since its share is larger than the 
population share, 61.4 percent (see Table 6.1). Findings from Table 6.4 
supplement these points. First, the strong association between Malays and public 
higher education is found. More than 80 percent of Malays chose public higher 
education. On the other hand, the Chinese choice of private or overseas over 
public education is apparent. Indians are in-between Malays and Chinese but are 
closer to the latter. More than half of Indians chose public higher education, but 
their proportion is much lower than the overall proportion of 67.2 percent (see 
the last row). Compared to Malays, therefore, it can be argued that Chinese and 
Indians opt for private or overseas higher education. Furthermore, it is also found 
that women tend to choose public higher education more than men, irrespective 
of ethnic groups. The total share of women having attended public higher 
education institutions is 71.3 percent, which is higher than 64.3 percent of men 
(see the last row). The same tendency holds with all the three ethnic groups.
Table 6.4 Ethnicity. Gender and Type of Higher Education
Private and Overseas
Public
Sub-total Localprivate Overseas
Total
Malay Male 80.5 19.5 5.7 13.8 1 0 0 . 0
Female 87.1 12.9 4.6 8.3 1 0 0 . 0
Sub-Total 83.3 16.7 5.2 11.5 1 0 0 . 0
Chinese Male 36.2 63.8 36.5 27.3 1 0 0 . 0
Female 43.5 56.5 38.6 17.9 1 0 0 . 0
Sub-Total 39.3 60.7 37.4 23.3 1 0 0 . 0
Indians Male 48.4 51.6 31.3 20.3 1 0 0 . 0
Female 63.6 36.4 22.3 14.1 1 0 0 . 0
Sub-Total 54.4 45.6 27.8 17.8 1 0 0 . 0
Total Male 64.3 35.7 17.2 18.5 1 0 0 . 0
Female 71.3 28.7 16.9 1 1 . 8 1 0 0 . 0
Grand Total 67.2 32.8 17.1 15.7 1 0 0 . 0
Turning to public-private choice in sector selection, Table 6.5 shows that 
Malays are more likely to work in the public sector whereas Chinese and Indians 
the private sector. Besides the findings from Table 6.4, this finding corroborates 
the two hypotheses established earlier. For example, more than half of Malays 
work in the public sector, but the proportions for Chinese and Indians are just
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16.2 percent and 29.1 percent. Similar to higher education decision, Indians are 
situated in between Malays and Chinese. And interestingly, it is also found that 
women chose public sector employment more than men, regardless of ethnic 
backgrounds. Above all, all the findings from Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 indicate 
that the two hypotheses developed in section 6.3.2 seem to be true.
Table 6.5 Ethnicity. Gender and Sector of Employment
Sector of Employment
Public Private
Malay Male 48.1 51.9 100.0
Female 66.5 33.5 100.0
Sub-total 55.8 44.2 100.0
Chinese Male 9.7 90.3 100.0
Female 24.8 75.2 100.0
Sub-total 16.2 83.8 100.0
Indians Male 19.3 80.7 100.0
Female 44.2 55.8 100.0
Sub-total 29.1 70.9 100.0
Total Male 34.0 66.0 100.0
Female 51.4 48.6 100.0
Grand Total 41.3 58.7 100.0
6.4.2 Estimation Results
Given the descriptive findings, equation (6.2) was estimated to further 
investigate the effects of the ethnic factor on higher education and labour market 
decisions. The results are presented in Table 6.6. As expected, it is discerned that 
higher education and labour market decisions are correlated. The log-likelihood 
test rejects at 1 percent level of significance the null hypothesis that p  (rho) 
equals zero. It indicates that the two decisions are made simultaneously, and 
provides support for using a recursive bivariate probit technique.
The estimation results for the first TYPEHE equation support the arguments in 
Chapter 4. Firstly, it is seen that Malays and women are more likely to choose 
public higher education. In contrast, the negative signs on the coefficients of 
CHINESE and INDIANS suggest that Chinese and Indians are more likely to 
choose private/overseas higher education. These findings are consistent with
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Chapter 4, and also with Aihara (2009) who found the over-representation of 
Malays at public higher education institutions and that of Chinese and Indian 
students at private higher education institutions. Secondly, the age cohort 
dummies roughly suggest that the older the individual the more likely he or she is 
to choose public higher education, which reflects that private sector involvement 
in higher education was not allowed during the NEP period (see Chapter 4).
Lastly, the coefficients on birthplace dummies demonstrate that those bom in 
Kuala Lumpur or Selangor are least likely to enrol in public higher education 
institutions. In contrast, those from northern states are most likely to do so. 
Above all, it is indicated that private/overseas higher education is chosen by 
those from more developed states. These results are not so surprising, since those 
from developed states such as Selangor may afford and have nearer access to 
private or overseas higher education. For example, Lee (1999) points out that 
more or less half of the private higher education institutions were concentrated in 
Kuala Lumpur or Selangor area. That being the case, students from the urban 
areas, most likely Chinese, have the advantage of entering these institutions.
Turning to the second SECTOREMP equation, we see the results consistent 
with Chapter 5. Here, three points deserve special attention. First, the coefficient 
on TYPEHE is significant and its magnitude is largest in the SECTOREMP 
equation. This means that having attained public higher education increases the 
likelihood of working in the public sector. Besides the findings on the Malay 
dominance at public higher education institutions, it follows that Malay 
graduates are most likely to go into the public sector with all other things being 
equal. This is consistent with the finding in Chapter 5, and indicates support for 
Hypothesis 1. Second, the signs of the coefficients on CHINESE and INDIANS 
are negative, but the coefficient on INDIANS is statistically insignificant. This 
means that being Indian does not necessarily influence the choice of public sector 
employment. Nonetheless, it can be argued that Hypothesis 2 is not rejected.
Finally, it is indicated from the coefficient on FEMALE that women with 
higher educational backgrounds are more likely to choose the public sector than 
their male counterparts. Since the reference group is Malays, this suggests that
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Malay female graduates are most likely to choose public sector employment, 
conditional on all other things. This finding is consistent with Chapter 5, and one 
of the reasons is presumably that public education and health services provide 
them with job opportunities.
The two hypotheses established in section 6.3.2 ought to be tested further. The 
raw coefficients presented in Table 6.6 do not necessarily tell actual effects of the 
explanatory variables on choosing public sector employment, particularly 
because the form of the estimated equation is recursive (Greene 1996, 1998, 
2003; Grosjean and Kontoleon 2008; Long and Freese 2006). Indeed, the 
variables of my concern produce both direct and indirect effects on the choice of 
public sector employment. Consider ethnicity. Since the ethnic dummies like 
CHINESE and INDIANS enter the SECTOREMP equation, they produce direct 
effects. In parallel, they also appear in the TYPEHE equation, and, therefore, 
affect the possibility that Tj in equation (6.2) equals one. This corresponds to 
indirect effects, since the effects of ethnicity are transmitted to Yz through this 
indirect channel. Hence, it is necessary to decompose the total marginal effects of 
the variables that appear in both equations into direct and indirect marginal 
effects. This is done with reference to Christofides, Stengos and Swindinsky 
(1997) and Greene (1996, 1998).81 Since all the variables are dummies, the 
marginal effects of the variable x on the probability of choosing public sector 
employment can be computed by E[Y2 j X l3X 2,x = l]-i? [l^ \Xx,X 2,x  -  o] (see
Greene 1996 for details). Table 6.7 presents the results for f?[72 | Yx = l], namely 
the conditional probability on the choice of public sector employment.82 Note 
that the numbers in Table 6.7 are computed from the marginal effects, not from 
the parameters of Table 6.6.
First of all, the results confirm the simultaneity relationship between type of 
higher education (TYPEHE) and sector selection (SECTOREMP) decisions, as is
81 The standard errors for this are computed by the delta method (see Greene 1998, 2003 
for the details).
82 Although STATA has a command for a recursive bivariate probit model, it does not 
have a command for decomposing the total marginal effects. In contrast, NLOGIT (or 
LIMDEP) does the decomposition by MARGINAL command.
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obvious from the marginal effect of the type of higher education (TYPEHE). The 
estimated marginal effect is statistically significant, and TYPEHE exerts the 
most substantial positive effect on the choice of public sector employment. This 
finding on TYPEHE indicates that enrolment at public higher education 
institutions is strongly related, to public sector employment, and also that the 
future sector of employment can be determined by type of higher education 
selected. Since the majority of graduates from public higher education 
institutions are Malays, it can also be argued that a large number of Malays enter 
public sector employment after graduation. This is consistent with the finding in 
Chapter 5, and provides support for Hypothesis 1. Obviously, government higher 
education and labour market policies create the institutional environment in 
which Malays are over-represented in public higher education institutions and 
then public sector employment.
We can also discern the persistence of the ethnic factor from higher education 
through to labour markets from the marginal effects of CHINESE and INDIANS. 
Their signs are negative and statistically significant, supporting Hypothesis 2. 
Turning to the direct and indirect effects, it is seen that there are clear direct 
effects of being Chinese or Indians in labour markets: being Chinese or Indians 
directly reduces the probability of working in the public sector. This indicates 
that, regardless of type of higher education attained, they tend not to work in the 
public sector. And veiy interestingly, most of the effects of being Chinese or 
Indians come from the indirect effects, as opposed to the direct effects. This 
means that their labour market decisions are to a large extent determined by their 
preceding decisions on type of higher education. Put differently, many Chinese 
and Indians seem to choose private higher education with private sector 
employment in mind. Obviously, the fundamental reason for this is that the 
institutional frameworks of higher education and labour markets set structural 
conditions and constraints they ought to consider when making decisions. 
Government’s higher education and labour market policies influence the thought 
processes through which Chinese and Indians go, and, consequently, divert many 
of them away from public higher education and then public sector employment.
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Besides the ethnic differentials, the estimation results also show the gender 
effect. The estimated marginal effect of FEMALE points to the presence of the 
gender differences in higher education and labour market decisions, and 
demonstrates that women are more associated with public sector employment 
than men. Further, almost all the effect of being female stems from the direct 
effect. This indicates that women do not necessarily make labour market 
decisions when deciding type of higher education. Rather, it can be argued that, 
whatever type of higher education attained, women are more likely to go into the 
public sector. This means a strong association between women and public sector 
employment. The possible reason for this is that the public sector offers more 
stable jobs with better fringe benefits, which are not necessarily influenced by 
economic cycles (see Chapter 5). Nonetheless, the question of why women are 
more likely to go into the public sector has to be investigated comprehensively in 
future, since they are now more likely to enrol higher education than men (see 
Chapter 4).
Turning to the effects of age cohort, it is seen that the older the individual the 
more likely he or she is to choose public sector employment. Also, most of the 
marginal effects are found in the direct rather than indirect effects. To some 
extent, this indicates that the older individuals prefer stable public sector jobs or 
that the public sector during the NEP period (35-39, 40-44, and 45-49) had 
absorbed a larger proportion of higher education graduates, as opposed to the 
post-NEP period (25- 29 and 30-34). Nonetheless, this does not mean that the 
role of the public sector in providing higher education graduates with job 
opportunities is no longer influential. Rather, those with higher education 
backgrounds remain associated with public sector employment (see Chapter 5). 
Therefore, one possible explanation is that higher education has expanded more 
quickly than the absorptive capacity of the public sector. Together with the 
earlier findings on ethnic differentials, it could be the structural reason for why 
graduate unemployment is concentrated amongst Malays.
Lastly, there are effects of other factors such as birthplace, current residence, 
household and marital status (see also sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3). As mentioned 
earlier, however, some caution is required when interpreting the results. These
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variables are likely to be endogenous, indicating that they may not necessarily be 
the causal factors of choosing public sector employment. Though this is a crucial 
issue on its own and carries some implications, I leave this aside for analytical 
purposes. Indeed, the roles of these factors on labour market decisions ought to 
be investigated in future research, so that the rest of this section looks at the 
estimated results and offers some tentative explanations.
First, the signs of the four birthplace dummies are all positive, and the 
marginal effect of being born in BORNEO is statistically insignificant. It is seen 
that those bom in the most developed states (KLANGV) are least likely to work 
in the public sector, and that those from less developed northern states are most 
likely to do so. Nonetheless, all the magnitudes on the birthplace dummies are 
negligible, which shows that they do not exert strong influence on the choice of 
public sector employment.
Second, the positive effect of marriage (MARRIED) and the negative effect of 
being the head of household are found, whereas their marginal effects are 
negligible. A tentative explanation for MARRIED can be that the job security 
and favourable hinge benefits in the public sector attract married individuals. Yet, 
the reason for the result on HEADHH remains unknown. As mentioned in 
Chapter 5, the roles of these factors in labour market decisions need to be 
examined in future.
Finally, the effects of current residence dummies corroborate the finding that 
the public sector provides job opportunities in semi-urban (SEMIURBAN) and 
rural areas (RURAL) as well as less developed states such as CRBORNEO and 
CRNORTHERN (see also Chapter 5). On the other hand, the effects of living in 
more developed states such as CRSOUTHERN and CRWESTERN on the 
probability of working the public sector are not as large as CRBORNEO and 
CRNORTHERN. This is hardly surprising since numerous private sector jobs 
tend to be concentrated in these developed areas (see also Chapter 5).
As mentioned earlier, however, the interpretation of these current residence 
variables must be done with some caution. This is because they may be the
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consequences rather than causes of the choice of public sector employment. Put 
another way, some of the individuals live in less developed states or rural areas 
because they work for the government. Further, when comparing current 
residence and birthplace, there emerge additional questions on the causal 
relationship between migration and labour market decisions, which should be 
addressed in future research. For example, one preliminary study on the 1960s 
and 1970s suggested that there were frequent job transfers in the public sector, 
influencing migration activities of the employees with higher educational 
backgrounds (Menon 1987). That being the case in the 1990s, it would cause a 
problem of endogeneity in econometric analysis since the majority of public 
sector employees are Malays. Also, there is another possible problem of 
endogeneity: many Chinese and Indians may have chosen private higher 
education with the intention of working in the private sector, and, therefore, 
moved to the city where there axe more private sector jobs. Both of these 
arguments are interesting stories, but beyond the main purpose of the present 
study. Also, the present data sets do not allow us to identify the causal 
relationship since no information on work history and reasons for migration is 
available. Nonetheless, these arguments do not necessarily deny the finding that 
the ethnic factor plays an important role in higher education and labour market 
decisions.
Most crucially, this empirical study has revealed that the ethnic factor is 
influential in higher education and labour market decisions. The two hypotheses 
developed in section 6.3.2 are supported econometrically, together with the 
descriptive findings in section 6.4.1. Above all, Malays are more likely to choose 
public higher education and public sector employment, whereas Chinese and 
Indians private higher education and private sector employment. Unlike human 
capital theory, the political-economic arguments developed in Chapters 4 and 5 
enable us to explain why and how this happens. Government’s higher education 
and labour market policies, which are influenced by inter-ethnic (equity) 
concerns, constructed the institutional framework under which various ethnic 
groups made higher education and labour market decisions differently. Put it 
further, they are the fundamental cause of graduate unemployment that is 
concentrated amongst Malays.
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Table 6.6 Result o f Recursive B ivariate Probit Equations: Coefficient
Estim ates
Coef. Std Er.
TYPEHE equation'. TYPEHE = 1
Constant 0.504*** 0.047
Ethnicity
CHINESE -1.160*** 0.034
INDIANS -0.753*** 0.061
Gender
FEMALE 0.259*** 0.032
Age Cohort
30-34 0.109* 0.042
35-39 0.056 0.044
40-44 0.143*** 0.050
45-49 0.139** 0.057
Birthplace
BORNEO 0.095 0.069
NORTHERN 0.492*** 0.049
SOUTHERN 0.288*** 0.043
WESTERN 0.249*** 0.045
SECTOREMP equation: SECTOREMP = 1
Constant -2.467*** 0.085
TYPEHE 1.809*** 0.135
Ethnicity
CHINESE -0.319*** 0 . 1 0 1
INDIANS -0.035 0.085
Gender
FEMALE 0.469*** 0.054
Age Cohort
30-34 0.253*** 0.047
35-39 0.439*** 0.051
40-44 0.653*** 0.061
45-49 0.815*** 0.071
Current Residence (State)
CRBORNEO 0.930*** 0.070
CRNORTHERN 0.595*** 0.057
CRSOUTHERN 0.472*** 0.046
CRWESTERN 0.363*** 0.053
Current Residence (Area)
SEMIURBAN 0.398*** 0.044
RURAL 0.681*** 0.058
Household
HEADHH -0.103** 0.045
Marital Status
MARRIED 0.208*** 0.041
Rho -0.588*** 0.098
No. of Sample: 8,408
Note: Log likelihood = -8281.024; *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% levels of significance respectively.
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Table 6.7 Decom position o f  M arginal Effects
Marginal Effects
Direct Indirect Total Std Er.
TYPEHE 0.649 0.649** 0.070
Ethnicity
CHINESE -0.114 -0.139 -0.254** 0.018
INDIANS -0.013 -0.091 -0.103** 0.024
Gender
FEMALE 0.169 0.031 0.200** 0.018
Age Cohort
30-34 0.091 0.013 0.104** 0.016
35-39 0.158 0.007 0.164** 0.018
40-44 0.234 0.017 0.252** 0.021
45-49 0.293 0.017 0.309** 0.025
Birthplace
BORNEO 0.011 0.011 0.013
NORTHERN 0.059 0.059** 0.006
SOUTHERN 0.035 0.035** 0.006
WESTERN 0.030 0.030** 0.008
Current Residence (State)
CRBORNEO 0.334 0.334** 0,026
CRNORTHERN 0.213 0.213** 0.022
CRSOUTHERN 0.169 0.169** 0.018
CRWESTERN 0.130 0.130** 0.020
Current Residence (Area)
SEMIURBAN 0.143 0.143** 0.017
RURAL 0.244 0.244** 0.022
Household
HEADHH -0.037 -0.037* 0.017
Marital Status
MARRIED 0.075 0.075** 0.015
Note: ** denotes 1%, * 5% levels of significance respectively.
6.5 Conclusions
Higher education and labour market policies in Malaysia have reflected the 
national priority of achieving inter-ethnic distribution with economic growth, and 
they have defined the institutional frameworks of higher education and labour 
markets, under which various structural conditions and constraints are put into 
place. Put another way, they lay the foundation on which the ethnic factor 
continues to play a key role from higher education through to labour market 
decisions. Indeed, the empirical findings of this chapter show that various ethnic
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groups respond to the policies in different ways. Malays are more likely to enrol 
in public higher education institutions and then work in the public sector, 
whereas Chinese and Indians private/overseas higher education institutions and 
then the private sector. Crucially, it was also indicated that there is a 
simultaneous relationship between higher education and labour market decisions. 
In particular, Chinese and Indians seem to decide on type of higher education 
with future employment in mind. Above all, the findings in this chapter reinforce 
the earlier argument that the reason why graduate unemployment is concentrated 
amongst Malays lies in the institutional frameworks set out by the government.
At analytical level, all these findings enhance the need for a constructive 
assessment of both higher education and labour markets when addressing issues 
like graduate unemployment. By the same token, they also confirm the 
significance of examining the historical and institutional contexts in which higher 
education is provided and labour markets are structured. This obviously means 
that the question of how higher education and labour markets work in Malaysia 
is unable to be addressed adequately by human capital theory. In order to set the 
ground on which appropriate understanding of higher education and labour 
markets is obtained and thus adequate policies are considered, therefore, the 
political economy approach that places the role of government at the analytical 
centre is required.
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Chapter 7 
Concluding Remarks
As Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated, human capital theory has serious analytical 
deficiencies in the study of (higher) education and labour markets. In a sense, 
these deficiencies are inescapable. Built upon a neoclassical framework, human 
capital theory treats how (higher) education is provided and how labour markets 
are structured as black boxes. It ignores or disconnects the historical and 
institutional contexts from its analysis, so that reliance upon the theory 
determines what can be explained and what cannot.
Application of human capital theory to the Malaysian case has some insights 
to offer by revealing the statistical significance of factors like ethnicity in 
education and labour markets. They are significant on their own, but turn out to 
be inadequate when the analytical priority is to account for why and how 
ethnicity is significant in the context of Malaysia. Indeed, the applied studies 
follow Mincerian earnings function and, therefore, reduce the contexts around 
ethnicity to parameter estimates in the estimated equations. To the extent that 
analysis is based on human capital theory, therefore, the understanding of 
Malaysia’s higher education and labour markets remains limited.
The inadequate understanding of what is happening in reality causes a number 
of problems. Practically, it suggests that policy implications derived from human 
capital theory are questionable. It is particularly so if the issues of concern are to 
explain why graduate unemployment is concentrated amongst Malays and to 
consider appropriate policies. The original human capital theory itself contributes 
very little to explaining the causes of graduate unemployment, since it presumes 
full employment. Despite so, those who are wedded to the theory and familiar 
with modifying it would provide some explanation. Let me take one example. In 
pursuit of the causes of graduate unemployment, the proponents of human capital 
theory may argue that the low productivity level of unemployed Malays make it 
difficult for them to find jobs. If so, the quality of public higher education
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services will be questioned, and, accordingly, it can justify increased government 
expenditure for public higher education and/or streamline current expenditure to 
meet objectives such as improved quality.
Apparently, the government of Malaysia follows this line of explanation. One 
typical example is the medium of instruction at public higher education 
institutions. It is reported that there are gaps in English proficiency between 
public and private university students (Pandian 2008), and there is a growing 
recognition of the importance of English fluency in job markets (Pandian and 
Ghani 2005). Consequently, the use of Bahasa Malaysia at public higher 
education institutions has been reviewed, and the medium of instruction in 
science and technology subjects has been switched to English gradually over 
recent years (Aihara 2009).
By the same token, curriculum development has also been emphasised to 
match the changing economic demands. For example, Awang and Rugayah 
(2008) recently conducted a survey of 139 manufacturing firms in Malaysia, and 
argued that various skills of Malaysian graduates do not necessarily match 
employers’ expectations. They suggested a comprehensive review and update of 
the curricula at higher education institutions in order to enhance ‘employability’ 
of Malaysian graduates. Along similar lines, Yunus (2008) suggested the 
introduction of various courses at higher education institutions to enhance 
communication and problem-solving skills of graduates. Indeed, Malaysia (2006, 
p. 257) argued that higher education institutions “will design their academic 
programmes and develop their curricula based on market requirement to ensure 
the employability of graduates. These programmes will be implemented with 
greater collaboration and active support from industry and employer 
associations.”
Certainly, it is one important thing to highlight the significance of English 
fluency and curriculum development in improving job market prospects of 
graduates. Further, improvement in many other aspects of higher education, such 
as quality of teaching, may be raised. No one can deny all this per se. However, it 
is another to point out that these arguments implicitly presume that graduates,
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either Malays or Chinese, face the same labour markets. Is it true? As this study 
showed, it is not really the case. Furthermore, how can we assess the productivity 
level of unemployed people? According to human capital theory, productivity is 
judged in the workplace when individuals produce economic output (see also 
section 2.2.1). Since the unemployed are obviously not working, their 
productivity levels remain unknown. Or, can their productivities be judged by 
their learning outcomes? Not necessarily.
Above all, it is important to understand the analytical limitations of the theory 
on which those explanations are based. Since human capital theory leaves aside 
the contexts of how (higher) education is provided and how labour markets are 
structured, it offers little to identify the fundamental cause of graduate 
unemployment. In the above example, many Malay graduates are unemployed 
not necessarily because they are competing with Chinese and Indian graduates to 
take private sector jobs requiring good English skills but because they may be 
queuing for public sector jobs. If this is the case, the jobs that the unemployed 
Malay graduates are looking for may not necessarily require good English skills. 
The question of why Malays prefer public sector employment, rather than of why 
the productivity level of the unemployed Malays is low, ought to be addressed 
first. Or alternatively, many Malay graduates may be unemployed due to a 
combination of the two reasons. Here, I do not intend to judge which reason is 
true. But it must be emphasised that, when looking for reasons of graduate 
unemployment, we need to identify its fundamental cause by understanding the 
contexts of how higher education is provided and how labour markets are 
structured. Needless to say, human capital theory offers little guidance in doing 
so.
I do not aim to present specific higher education and/or labour market policies 
to solve the problem of graduate unemployment. Rather, my main aim is to 
suggest that it is essential to understand, with reference to ethnicity, how higher 
education and labour markets in Malaysia work. Failure to do so makes it 
difficult to identify the fundamental cause of graduate unemployment, and, 
therefore, no foundation upon which appropriate policies are mooted is derived 
(see section 1.1.3). Indeed, there can be many reasons for graduate
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unemployment other than weak command of English and outdated curricula, 
such as the lack of communication skills and information technology skills and 
inappropriate job market information (New Straits Times, 12 July 2006). Since 
the content of "human capital’ is variable (see section 2.2.1), the number of 
reasons can be many. In order to understand why lack of those skills plays a 
negative role in labour markets, however, it is of upmost importance to specify 
where the fundamental cause of graduate unemployment resides rather than to 
list as many potential reasons for graduate unemployment as possible. For this 
purpose, a comprehensive analysis of both higher education and labour markets 
with reference to ethnicity is required.
In this regard, this study provides a constructive assessment of Malaysia’s 
higher education and labour markets by taking the political economy approach 
that sets the role of government at the analytical centre. As Chapters 4 to 6 
demonstrated, the institutional frameworks of higher education and labour 
markets are constructed on the ground of the trade-off between economic growth 
(efficiency) and inter-ethnic distribution (equity). They are justified, at least by 
the government, for maintaining social stability in the multi-ethnic country. Our 
arguments and empirical findings, which are briefly summarised below, lend 
themselves to suggesting that the fundamental cause of graduate unemployment 
lies in the institutional framework set up by government.
As far as higher education is concerned, policy focus is to make sure that the 
ethnic distribution of higher education enrolees reflects the population 
distribution. For this purpose, the ethnic quota system at public higher education 
institutions was put in place, and the way in which higher education is provided 
is controlled by government. Though higher education reforms were introduced 
from the mid-1990s, they were done so in accordance with the existing 
institutional environment. Naturally, Malays were over-represented at public 
higher education institutions, but, when bringing all types of higher education 
together, the Malay advantage in enrolling higher education disappears. Equally, 
the Chinese started to outstrip Malays in terms of the probability of entering 
higher education institutions from the 1990s, but Indians continued to lag behind 
Malays. As is shown in Chapter 6, the main reason for the changing trend of
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Chinese enrolment was that they started to choose private higher education 
institutions, which became widely available with the introduction of the higher 
education reforms.
The fundamental concern in labour markets is to strike a balance between 
economic growth and inter-ethnic distribution. It is so because Malaysia needs to 
maintain the win-win principle by distributing the economic pie that the private 
sector is expected to grow. For this purpose, the public sector is geared towards 
employing Malays, whereas the private sector is expected to pump up economic 
growth. Quite naturally, this has influenced labour market decisions of various 
ethnic groups. As seen in Chapter 5, Malay graduates are most likely to go into 
the public sector, but Chinese and Indians graduates tend to choose private sector 
employment. Further, Chapter 6 indicated that Chinese and Indians seem to 
choose private higher education with future private sector employment in mind. 
This simultaneous relationship between higher education and labour market 
decisions was the natural consequence of government’s higher education and 
labour market policies.
All this clearly demonstrates that the role of government is of paramount 
importance in the study of Malaysia’s higher education and labour markets. 
Government higher education and labour market policies, which reflect the 
underlying efficiency-equity trade-off, have influenced the thought processes of 
various ethnic groups. Consequently, Malays are more likely to enrol at public 
higher education institutions and then work in the public sector. In contrast, 
Chinese and Indians tend to choose private higher education institutions and then 
work in the private sector. Since the capacity of the public sector in terms of 
employment absorption is limited relative to the private sector, it is likely that 
many Malay graduates are queuing for public sector employment. This provides 
support for the argument that the fundamental cause of graduate unemployment 
resides in the institutional frameworks of higher education and labour markets, 
which are established by government.
The novelty of this study resides in two main areas. First, this study critically 
appraises human capital theory originating with Jacob Mincer. Through a wide
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and critical review of the theory and applied studies, it points out its analytical 
deficiencies in the study of (higher) education and labour markets. These 
theoretical arguments can be applied to other developing countries in future 
research. Second, it is the first comprehensive attempt to look into the ethnic 
factor in both higher education and labour markets in Malaysia in the 1990s. 
There are only a few studies that have attempted to do so, but they focused only 
on the pre™1990s. In contrast, this study examined the 1990s, when Malaysia 
went through important changes, particularly in the area of higher education. The 
causes of ethnic differentials in higher education enrolment and sector selection 
were comprehensively examined with a political economy approach. This marks 
a break with the past in which a number of researchers studied either higher 
education enrolment or sector selection in labour markets. Equally importantly, 
previous findings on these issues are based on inadequate quantitative findings. 
Instead, this study employs the two-percent random sample of the Population 
and Housing Census Malaysia 2000, which are representative data, and 
illustrates the realities of Malaysia’s higher education and labour markets.
Empirical analysis using the census data also provides a number of important 
future research topics in related fields. For example, the role of gender in higher 
education enrolment has to be investigated comprehensively, since, as Chapter 4 
found, women are now more likely to enrol higher education. Further, the lack of 
household-level information, such as parental education and occupation as well 
as household income, does not allow us to investigate the effects of family 
backgrounds on higher education enrolment (see Chapter 4). This point has to be 
investigated in further research, possibly with household-level data sets. 
Similarly, the relationship between household responsibilities, including marital 
status, and labour market decisions has to be investigated comprehensively (see 
Chapters 5-6). The relationship between place of residence and labour market 
decisions is also an important research topic, but this issue may require panel 
data sets which contain not only household-level information but also work and 
migration history of individuals.
Having investigated the ethnic factor in higher education and labour markets, 
this study provides the foundation on which future higher education and labour
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market policies are considered. When formulating policy, it is essential to 
understand reality first. When addressing higher education and labour markets in 
Malaysia, it is very important to place the role of government at the analytical 
centre.
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